


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1 JUNE 1987



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Arms Control**

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### SPECIAL NOTICE

Effective 1 June 1987 JPRS reports will have a new cover design and color, and some reports will have a different title and format. Some of the color changes may be implemented earlier if existing supplies of stock are depleted.

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WEST EUROPE.....	ivory
AFRICA (SUB-SAHARA).....	tan
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY.....	gray
WORLDWIDES.....	pewter

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1 JUNE 1987

## ARMS CONTROL

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

### SOVIET GENERAL CHERVOV INTERVIEWED ON LATEST INITIATIVES

AU290752 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Apr 87 p 5

[Interview with USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov by NOVOSTI commentator Vasiliy Morozov: "Let Us Not Waste a Unique Opportunity" -- place and date not given]

[Text] [Morozov] How can the current situation in nuclear disarmament be assessed? Are there realistic possibilities for achieving an agreement on medium-range missiles or on strategic offensive weapons?

[Chervov] The current situation can be regarded as a unique opportunity that has arisen thanks to the latest broad Soviet initiatives based on the possibility of reaching an accord on the fundamental reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, proposed in Reykjavik.

Regarding strategic offensive weapons, the USSR is prepared to take the most forceful steps -- to reduce their number by 50 percent within 5 years, as well as to fully eliminate these weapons within 10 years, provided that weapons in space are banned and that the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic defense systems is strictly adhered to.

We are making concessions in this regard. We have postponed the solution of problems connected with U.S. forward-based nuclear devices capable of hitting USSR territory; we have agreed to a 50 percent reduction in the number of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and agreed to count bombs and the U.S. SRAM missiles fitted to heavy bombers as a single warhead [naloz], and we are prepared to limit the number of long-range sea-based cruise missiles to a special level (apart from the overall number of warheads on strategic weapons).

However, the United States is obviously still not prepared to resolve the problem of strategic offensive weapons and want us to return to the stance we held prior to Reykjavik. Again they submit demands about "levels" and "sublevels" of warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic guided missiles on submarines, which lead to the impairment of the system of Soviet strategic offensive weapons and would lead to their reorganization according to U.S. ideas, to the detriment of the USSR's security interests. The United States proposes to postpone the realization of the agreement on the 50 percent reduction to 7 years instead of 5, and, on the other hand, they want to move up the pledge not to violate the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic defense systems from 10 to 7 years.

It is impossible to radically reduce the number of strategic offensive weapons when the other side is expanding its antiballistic defenses. If the United States will be developing its space-based antiballistic system, no agreement on strategic offensive weapons is possible.

[Morozov] Can an agreement on strategic offensive weapons be achieved?

[Chervov] Yes, this is possible. We have close standpoints, but we are stuck over the issue of space. If we succeed in agreeing that an offensive system must not be created in space, then we could probably also agree on the other issues. In an effort to find the solution to the space problem, the USSR proposes a compromise: It agrees to laboratory tests, by which one understands work on the earth -- in institutes, at test ranges, and in enterprises.

[Morozov] The issue of medium-range missiles has come to the fore now.

[Chervov] The USSR, bearing in mind the exceptionally great importance of the problem of medium-range missiles to Europe, agrees to fundamental compromises -- it has agreed that the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France will not be included in the count, it has agreed to a considerable reduction of the number of medium-range missiles in Asia, and postponed the decision on airborne [letecke] medium-range devices, although -- together with the British and French missiles -- they constitute a serious danger to the security of the Warsaw Pact member states.

However, the United States and NATO do not properly appreciate our compromises and have even begun pulling back from their own "zero option." The United States is trying to keep the Pershing-2's from being eliminated, but wants them to be adapted to short-range missiles, it is trying for the conversion of cruise missiles to nonnuclear cruise missiles, or allowing them to be stationed on warships, and they want the infrastructure of medium-range missiles in Europe to remain. Also, the United States wishes to link the problem of medium-range missiles with short-range missiles, which means it wants to create a new "package." [paragraph continues]

The United States also wants to gain superiority in the very process of limiting the number of weapons, and proposes a timetable for the reduction of the number of warheads [striely], according to which it could even increase the number of its medium-range missiles, while the USSR would be unilaterally limiting their number.

Regarding tactical missiles, that is, those having a range up to 500 km, which are, according to the structure of the Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces, an organic part of military alliances and blocs, it would be useful to discuss them at European talks on conventional weapons (from the Atlantic to the Urals) in a package with offensive air strike forces, nuclear artillery, and other tactical nuclear devices. The necessity of discussing these issues together arises from the fact that the majority of tactical nuclear weapons are "dual purpose" weapons, that is, they can carry conventional as well as nuclear warheads.

To put it concisely, the situation today is such that the achievement of an agreement on medium-range missiles depends on the United States alone. The Reagan administration understands that, and it is increasingly difficult for it to keep on refusing an agreement on medium-range missiles. Washington cannot reject the Soviet proposal now without definitely undermining its standpoints. The fact that the NATO countries still hesitate to make a decision proves only one thing, that is, that they do not make the best impression in the current situation.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: ABM, STRATEGIC ARMS LINKED; INF 'PROGRAM NUMBER ONE'

PM301405 London MORNING STAR in English 30 Apr 87 p 4

[Soviet Army Colonel General N. Chervov "Spotlight" article: "Unique Chance for Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] We have a unique chance to resolve the nuclear arms problem.

This chance has emerged thanks to the new Soviet proposals, inspired by the opportunity born in Reykjavik, to agree on a cardinal reduction of nuclear armaments.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go as far as 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive weapons within five years and the complete elimination of such weapons within 10 years on condition of their non-deployment in outerspace and strict observance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

We have for the moment set aside the question of U.S. forward-based nuclear weapons reaching the territory of the Soviet Union; accepted a 50 per cent reduction of heavy inter-continental ballistic missiles; agreed to count bombs and missiles carried by heavy bombers as a single charge and we are ready to single out longer -- range sea -- launched cruises from the general number of strategic weapons-based charges.

The United States is unprepared to solve the problem of strategic offensive arms, however, and is seeking a return to the pre-Reykjavik position.

The United States is not taking into account the main circumstances that hampers an agreement, namely, the relationship between strategic offensive and defense weapons. In the 1970s however, the United States did not deny such interdependence and signed agreements emphasising that linkage.

Today the Reagan administration says it is for reducing strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent without touching defences. Moreover, it talks about a possible deployment of the nationwide ABM system, with space-based elements. But how can we cut our strategic offensive weapons while the other side is simultaneously developing a nationwide ABM system?

If the United States deploys an ABM system in outer space, there will be no agreement on strategic weapons.

We have similar stands, but we differ on SDI. If we could come to terms on keeping outer-space free from attack systems, we could probably agree on other questions.



Medium-range missiles (MRMs) have become problem number one. But the Soviet proposals mean that nothing should impede dismantling these missiles in Europe and cutting down the number of MRMs in the Asian part of the Soviet Union to 100 warheads provided the United States does the same on its national territory.

The Soviet Union is conscious of the major significance of the problem for Europe. We have agreed not to count the British and French nuclear arsenals, to effect a drastic reduction of medium-range missiles in Asia and to postpone a decision on air-based medium-range missiles. But the United States and NATO have not responded to our compromises and are even backing away from their own "zero option."

Intent on overcoming the NATO-created deadlock and facilitating a medium-range missile solution, the Soviet Union has suggested a unique settlement on shorter-range and other tactical missiles.

First, when an agreement on medium-range missiles is signed, we shall withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia longer-range tactical missiles deployed there to counter U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

Second, Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed discussing prospective cuts in and the subsequent elimination of European-based missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres.

Moreover, in his talks with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is ready to commit itself in an MRM accord to fully dismantling its shorter-range missiles in Europe within a relatively short period of approximately a year.

But while the Soviet Union is working for the elimination of shorter-range missiles in Europe and is ready to do this unilaterally, the United States is out to build them up.

In short, an agreement on medium-range missiles now depends on the United States. It is increasingly difficult for the Reagan administration to find fault with it. The United States and NATO should finally show to the world whether they want disarmament or not.

The concept of nuclear deterrence is utterly selfish. Even if we presume that it builds up the security of a nuclear state, what about other countries? They are compelled to seek security under the wing of nuclear states or to look for other ways.

This will inevitably lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world and the undermining of international security.

The Western supporters of nuclear deterrence are simply deceiving the world. Peace in Europe has existed for more than 40 years not due to the nuclear arsenals of the United States but thanks to the efforts of the socialist countries in preventing imperial states from unleashing new wars in Europe.

Putting forward new compromise proposals on medium- and shorter-range missiles, the Soviet Union is guided by the sole aim of preventing nuclear confrontation in Europe, removing the war threat and saving humanity from death in a nuclear holocaust.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

### IZVESTIYA CRITICIZES BRZEZINSKI TIME ARTICLE ON DETERRENCE

PM151735 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Melor Sturua article: "The Other Side of 'Deterrence'"]

[Text] The latest edition of the U.S. TIME magazine carries an article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a well known political scientist and national security adviser to the U.S. President between 1977 and 1981.

The thrust of Brzezinski's article is abundantly clear. "The very notion of a 'world without nuclear weapons' is an illusion," the author writes. That is his main postulate. "Everyone is free to dream about such a world," Brzezinski goes on, "but encouraging the public to believe that this aim will be achieved in the near future would clearly not be a sensible policy." Furthermore, in the author's opinion "to assume that such an unprecedented boon is possible is the purest utopia." And finally: "In a world where nuclear arms exist, mutual strategic security is much better than utopian dreams and deceptive slogans."

Thus, according to Brzezinski, a world without nuclear weapons is utopia, an illusion, a deceptive slogan, not a sensible policy. The idea is not new, it is based on the theory of nuclear deterrence which was advocated with such persistence by Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain during her visit to Moscow. The more clearly discernible the outlines of possible, real progress along the path of curbing the nuclear arms race, the more stubbornly the enemies of military detente try to obscure them with the smoke of incense burned in praise of the policy of deterrence.

In his 30 March dinner speech in the Great Kremlin Palace M.S. Gorbachev convincingly proved the political and moral flimsiness and unacceptability of the theory of nuclear deterrence. He emphasized that "deterrence" is a policy of blackmail and threats and therefore a constant source of the arms race and escalation of tension. Zbigniew Brzezinski's article in TIME magazine serves as an excellent illustration of this thesis. And, furthermore, it also illustrates something else. "Deterrence" is used by Washington as a propaganda screen for its strategy of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union, as a screen for its first-strike strategy, its "Star Wars" strategy.

In vociferating against a nuclear-free world Brzezinski is openly calling for "the unilateral adoption of the strategy of deployment which corresponds to the likely political and technical conditions of the next decade and century. Bearing in mind the constant improvement of nuclear arms (especially the achievement of their increasing accuracy, which makes it possible to deliver precision strikes designed to disarm the other side), the deployment of certain components of strategic defense on earth and in space becomes an urgent necessity. The deployment of a limited strategic defense with the simultaneous establishment of carefully considered limits in respect of U.S. first-strike offensive arms, such as MX missiles and D-5 SLBMS, would help to stabilize nuclear relations by weakening the Soviet threat to the United States and not intensifying the potential U.S. threat to the Soviet Union."

I will not try to disprove these claims of Brzezinski's. Instead of making an analysis of the above quote, allow me to cite a passage from a book recently published in the United States under the title "Winning a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret Military Plans." This is what the authors, physics professors Kaku and Axelrod write.

It happened in August 1977. A session of the National Security Council chaired by Brzezinski was discussing plans for waging a third world war set forth in the draft presidential "Memorandum 10." A council staffer was delivering a report on "Annex C" to the memorandum. The annex bore the title "Overview of the National Policy of Goals." A misleading title since "Annex C" was not about policy objectives but about 25,000 targets located on the territory of the Soviet Union and subject to attack and destruction in the event of a third world war. Suddenly Brzezinski interrupted the speaker:

"What are the criteria for destroying the Russians?"

The speaker was clearly confused. He set about explaining to his chief that "Annex C" did not envisage strikes against the population as such but that nonetheless it would appear that around 113 million Russians would perish."

However, even these "details" did not satisfy Brzezinski. He rejected "Annex C", which in his estimation would not lead to victory over the Soviet Union in a nuclear war but "merely" to a stalemate. And so "Memorandum 10" with its ill-starred annex was superseded by presidential "Directive 59." Its author-- Zbigniew Brzezinski--"made provision" not just for various options for destroying the population of the Soviet Union but also for special nuclear "surgical strikes" to destroy the leading organs of our party and state. Data supplied by the U.S. National Security Agency about the locations of buildings housing republic, kray, oblast, and so forth CPSU organizations were used in the compilation of "Directive 59." Or in fewer words, the Nazi principle: "Who are the Communists here. Step forward!" And after all this, Mr Brzezinski claims that the plans he has hatched "do not intensify the potential U.S. threat to the Soviet Union!"

I did not analyze Brzezinski's TIME magazine article. Nor will I moralize about the story told in the book "Winning a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret Military Plans." I will confine myself to telling a story in which the selfsame angry Zbigniew played the leading role. Wanting to test the readiness of Washington's officialdom for evacuation in the event of nuclear war, he ordered the rehearsal of the relevant plans, assuming for himself the role of President Carter. The rehearsal was a resounding fiasco. Brzezinski, the President, was killed. And what is more, the real Brzezinski also nearly came to grief. White House security, which had not been notified, seeing the helicopter carrying Brzezinski approaching the presidential residence, sounded the alarm and prepared to open fire. A catastrophe was averted at the very last minute.

But, evidently, no lesson was learned from this. It is possible to say of course that the grave will cure the hunchback. Unfortunately, however, in our time, when there are 4 tons of explosives per individual, children included, the insane policy of "nuclear hunchbacks" is threatening all mankind with the grave.

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## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET PREMIER RYZHKOV ON REYKJAVIK, INF, ABM

PM231515 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 87 Second Edition pp 1-3

[Report by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at a ceremonial meeting at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 22 April devoted to the 117th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth: "Leninism is the Basis of Restructuring Theory and Policy"]

[Excerpts] Restructuring International Relations is an Urgent Call of the Time

Comrades, Leninism has been and remains the theoretical basis of our understanding of international life in the present era. Lenin created a scientific system of views regarding problems of war and peace, and worked out the concept of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The Leninist principles of our foreign policy have undergone the rigorous testing of historical practice and now they are really effectively serving the struggle which the Soviet state is waging for a radical restructuring of international relations. In this struggle we are guided by new political thinking, which reflects the realities of today's world, which is full of contradictions and conflicts, but is nevertheless an integral and interconnected entity.

A period of nearly 70 years separates Lenin's Decree on Peace from the fundamentals of the comprehensive system of international security put forward by the 27th party congress. But how akin these documents are in their meaning and spirit! Both are permeated by the passionate idea of the freeing of mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences. Both uphold the supreme right of man -- the right to life and the right of the peoples to peaceful development. Ensuring a lasting peace has been and remains the supreme goal of the foreign policy activities of the Communist Party and Soviet state, a goal that follows from the very nature of socialist society.

As Lenin emphasized, the end of wars, peace among peoples, and the cessation of plunder and violence are our ideal." It embodies the humanism of communist ideology and its moral values. The realities of the nuclear space age give this ideal a qualitatively new meaning: the aim of world without wars, without the threat of violence in any sphere of international affairs, military, political, economic, and humanitarian.

Our new philosophical vision of the world takes as its starting point the view that, in the present age, security cannot be built on nuclear deterrence or other variations on the policy of strength. This policy condemns man to the permanent threat of self-destruction and deprives him of hope in the future. And there is now no more important task than the struggle against the threat of nuclear catastrophe, for the curbing of the arms race, and for disarmament.

The all-embracing program for the total elimination--before the end of the century--of weapons of mass destruction which was put forward at the beginning of 1986 by Mikhail Sergveyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is in keeping with this epochal task.

Historic in its scale and significance, it underwent further development in the USSR's proposals at the Soviet-U.S. meeting at Reykjavik. The fundamental possibility of a world free of nuclear weapons was demonstrated there for the first time. But, as is known a shift to practical measures on this path was blocked by the U.S. Administration. The Soviet initiative to conclude urgently a separate agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe once again opened up the way to mutually acceptable accords.

In the search for a solution we are proposing at the same time to reach agreement also on operational and tactical missiles to fully eliminate within a brief period our missiles of this class in Europe. But of course, this rules out an upgrading of weapons by the United States. We are ready to eliminate tactical battlefield missiles. The Soviet Union has ceased to produce chemical weapons and is pushing for the most rapid completion of talks on the total banning everywhere of these weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

The proposals on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe remain in force. The USSR, along with the other Warsaw Pact countries, believes that future agreements on disarmament questions should provide for a very strict and effective system of verification [kontrol], including on-site inspection.

Having separated out the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik "package," the Soviet leadership still attaches primary significance to reaching an agreement on the substantial reduction and subsequent elimination of strategic armaments, which must, of course, be inextricably linked with an obligation to observe the Antiballistic Missile Defense Treaty.

Nobody has any right to rebuke us by saying that the Soviet initiatives are intended to gain unilateral advantages. We take into account the legitimate interests of our Western partners, because we know that there will be no progress or lasting agreements without a balance of interests.

For that reason, we for our part also have every justification to expect reciprocity. The Soviet Union will never agree to concessions through which the security of our country or that of its allies might suffer. We will never accept steps that jeopardize the destiny of mankind. [applause] As long as the threat of war persists in the world, we will continue to strengthen our glorious Armed Forces. The CPSU Central Committee emphasized with the utmost responsibility in its address to the people that the Communist Party and the Soviet state "will do everything necessary to maintain our country's and the socialist community's defense capability at an appropriate level. The Soviet people can be confident that we will never permit imperialism to have a military advantage under any circumstances." [prolonged applause]

The new political thinking, the dynamism and openness [otkrytost] of our foreign policy, and the quest for solutions to important problems in the interests of the survival of mankind, are meeting with growing understanding in the world. The broadest public circles abroad, including those far distant from socialism, are impressed by the link between the Soviet Union's line of improving international relations and the course of restructuring of all aspects of the life of Soviet society, of democratizing it, of openness [glasnost].

Our political enemies are finding it increasingly difficult to insinuate their demagogic inventions about the "closed socialist society" and about "socialism's ambitions to expand." The realities of the age have faced all states with the need to learn to live together and to solve together the problems of their security. In these conditions the Soviet Union will do everything to promote the strengthening of trust in international affairs.

Progress here is easiest of all through mutual example. The world sees we are not only ready for this, but we are also acting convincingly and vigorously. We are profoundly confident of the triumph of communist ideals. Any aspirations to spread socialism by force are alien to our world outlook. If, over the past 70 years, socialism has become a world reality, this is the result of the action of objective social laws.

We favor ideological differences being solved by history; we want the peoples themselves to choose the paths of their social and political development. The fate of peace and social progress is linked in the very closest way with the development of the world system of socialism, with the all-round cooperation of the Soviet Union with the fraternal countries, and with our unity and cohesion. The CPSU sees the deepening of the collaboration of socialist states as a priority direction of its international activity. We are striving to ensure that everything new in our internal and external policy fully responds to the interests of all countries of socialism, all democratic forces of the planet, and the whole of humanity.

Its aim is to achieve the highest level in the most important areas of scientific and technological progress. By its entire content, the program refutes the assertions of those who champion SDI that successes in science and technology are inseparable for developments in the military sphere alone.

Socialism points another way -- the peaceful way, not connected with the arms race or taking it into space. On the basis of equal partnership, our ties with the developing countries are becoming stronger -- and first and foremost those with states of a socialist orientation. As ever, the Soviet Union is on the side of the peoples struggling for freedom and progress and for national independence. Along with them, we advocate a new economic order and opposing any forms of international plunder and discrimination.

We are also in favor of intensive economic cooperation with the capitalist countries. We have established lasting and mutually beneficial business ties with many of them. The restructuring of our foreign economic activity opens up fresh opportunities for further development of such cooperation.

Side by side with the broadening of the traditional trade relations we are proceeding toward active utilization of the new forms of economic relations: wide production cooperation, the creation of joint enterprises, and collaboration in scientific and technical progress. As this is mutually advantageous, it arouses considerable interest among Western business circles. However, this whole process would have moved considerably more quickly if artificial barriers had not been created with the manifest aim of putting political pressure on us with regard to fundamental questions of our social life.

Economic relations with the capitalist world can be built only on the principles of mutuality and equal rights. This is, as they say, a two-way street. Any attempts to extract political tribute from our economic links with the capitalist countries are pointless and have no hope of success. Our country will never barter its principles or its gains. [prolonged applause]

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CSO: 5200/1450



## U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: INF, SDI, SALT DISCUSSED DURING SYRIAN LEADER'S VISIT

### Gorbachev Speech

PM271134 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 87 Second Edition p 2

[TASS Report: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"; Speech by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at a dinner in honor of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad; in Moscow 24 April--live or recorded]

[Excerpt]

Having started such a deep turn inside the country, we are, naturally, interested in the far-reaching reorganization of international relations. Yet our active foreign policy initiative is not only determined by our national interests.

New political mentality and the new foreign policy practices corresponding to it are based on the realistic analysis of the present-day world which has markedly changed recently. They take into account the diverse and conflicting forces of which world politics are comprised. They are motivated by the realization of responsibility for humanity's survival. This is a problem which is to be present in approaching any major issues going beyond the national boundaries in one way or another.

Hence our idea of building a nuclear-free world, hence the concept of creating an all-embracing international security system based on the principle of equal security for all.

The other day we put forward new proposals on disarmament problems. Most statesmen and political figures and the general public have welcomed them. Yet there is again a commotion among the NATO ruling circles as was the case after Reykjavik. All sorts of inventions are being splashed out into public and new fears are being built up.

They are again confusing themselves and the public by the suspicions: What does Moscow have on its mind? Why such bold steps? Isn't what's behind the ideas just cunning and deception designed to lull the vigilance of some and divide all, and then crush Western Europe? The very idea of ridding Europe of the nuclear arsenals is declared to be harmful. It is bitter and ludicrous to see all this in print.

And one can't help asking again: What are you afraid of, gentlemen? Is it really so difficult to rise to the present-day political level in evaluating the truly historical processes which are underway in the Soviet Union. In the whole of the socialist world?! Is it really beyond you to understand the objective, inseparable connection of these processes with genuinely good intentions in foreign policy?

We are not against our fresh initiatives being subjected to a serious discussion at competent and responsible levels. This is natural. It is important yet that these discussions be aimed at a search for mutually acceptable, fair solutions and not at trying to find out methods of how to thwart the whole thing in a "most decent" manner.

They are out to confuse people not only on the question of medium-range missiles, but also on other proposals expressed to George Shultz in Moscow. Propaganda is already beginning, again raising publicity waves around SDI as allegedly a defensive system. They say the Americans are looking for a way out along the lines of turning weapons into defensive ones, while the Russians, as always, are emphasizing offensive weapons.

But how do matters stand in fact? The USSR opposes the race of both defensive and offensive weapons and favors the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons.

The United States is not only engaged in SDI. It is increasing the production and perfection of aircraft, missiles, new warheads designed precisely to penetrate our defenses and, it must be noted, for that matter, it spends far more time on that than on SDI.

And then, isn't the elimination of nuclear weapons, for which we call, the best, the surest way to strengthen defense?

In addition, the very notions "defense", "offensive" become anachronisms in this nuclear age. Another point should be discussed -- that of preventing war. Herein lies the novelty of the situation both for politicians and for generals. But the main means of defense, if we speak about it, is mutual disarmament.

#### Joint Statement

LD271335 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 87 Second Edition pp 1, 5

[Joint Soviet-Syrian statement on the 23-25 April visit to the USSR by Hafiz al-Asad, general secretary of the Syrian Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and president of the Syrian Arab Republic]

[Excerpts] H. Asad, general secretary of the Ba'th Party and president of the Syrian Arab Republic [SAR] visited the USSR 23-25 April 1987 on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers. Soviet-Syrian talks were held in Moscow between CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and H. al-Asad. Taking part in the talks were:

On the Soviet side -- E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs; S.L. Sokolov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense; A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.M. Kamentsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; K.F. Katushev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; Yu.M. Vorontsov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs; K.N. Brutents, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy committee chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; A.S. Dzasokhov, USSR Ambassador to the SAR; V.P. Polyakov, member of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the Syrian side -- A.H. Khaddam, member of the Pan-Arab and Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and SAR vice president; M. Talas, member of the Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, deputy prime minister, and SAR defense minister; Sa. Hammadi, member of the Regional Command of the Arab Ba'th Party; D. Ni'mih, member of the Central Command of the National Progressive Frnt; S. Yasin, deputy prime minister for economic affairs; F. Al-Shar', SAR minister of foreign affairs; Y. Jum'ah, SAR charge d'affaires in the USSR; and J. Al-Kafr I, director of the East European Section of the SAR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A separate discussion between M.S. Gorbachev and H. al-Asad was held. A meeting also took place between A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Syrian president.

In the course of the talks and conversations, which proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, the identity of views of the two countries on a broad range of international problems and on the situation in the Near East was confirmed. According were also reached on concrete directions for the further development of friendly and mutually advantageous Soviet-Syrian relations. Guided by the spirit and principles of the (1980) USSR-SAR Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, and also in light of the exchange of views made between the leaders of the USSR and the SAR, the two sides declare the following:

I.

The USSR and the SAR are convinced that today's fundamental issue is the preservation of life on earth, the construction of a world free of nuclear arms and other mass-destruction weapons, and a nonviolent and democratic world. The strategy of ensuring a reliable system of international security, founded on mutual trust between peoples and states and not poisoned by the venom of fear, suspicion and hatred, is destined to provide guarantees for the survival of the present and future generations, and to consolidate forever the principles of secure development and well-being of peoples.

Comprehensive security on an equal basis for all demands the resolute elimination of accumulated arms arsenals as well as preventing the development [razrabotka] of new and still more destructive kinds of weapons and their deployment in space. Such security will not be achieved if the threat on the ground is supplemented or replaced by a threat from space.

The complex of large-scale initiatives put forward by the USSR is a significant practical step in the direction toward creating a firm foundation for restructuring international relations and resolving fundamental problems of war and peace. These bold and far-reaching proposals aimed at resetting the cause of nuclear disarmament in motion would lead to the liquidation of nuclear arms by the end of the century. It is regrettable that the current U.S. Administration, which not only failed to respond positively the peaceful Soviet initiatives and practical acts, but even opted for violating the SALT II treaty, is trying to undermine the ABM Treaty, and is developing [razrabatyvat] and building up qualitatively new strategic armaments.

The two sides make special note of the fact that through the fault of the United States, a chance was missed in Reykjavik to attain radical accords on disarmament issues and to draw very close to a nuclear-free world.

The USSR's major new initiative on medium-range missiles opens up favorable opportunities for clearing away the obstructions on the road to reducing the nuclear danger. It is in line with the fundamental interests of the peoples of Europe, and equally with those of the peoples of the Near East and North Africa, who are within range of U.S. 'Euromissiles.'

The movement toward a nonviolent world must be accompanied by the eradication of such monstrous phenomena as discrimination and racism, and by the consolidation of states' political and economic independence, and of their equality. The interests of a stable peace and reliable security insistently demand that the resources currently directed toward military purposes be employed for the need of social and economic development. [paragraph continues]

Part of the means freed in the disarmament process should be employed to render assistance to the developing countries, and for overcoming economic backwardness and destitution. A broad dialogue must be developed on all these issues at international forums.

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CSO: 5200/1450

## SALT/START ISSUES

### MOSCOW NOTES HOUSE VOTE TO BAR SALT II VIOLATION

#### Reagan Opposes Amendments

LD240620 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 23 Apr 87

[Text] The House of Representatives of the United States Congress is debating two amendments to a military appropriations bill. One suggests honoring the SALT II Treaty; the other suggests banning almost all nuclear weapons tests.

Both amendments have already drawn approval from the Committee on Appropriations. House Speaker Jim Wright believes the House will approve both later this week. Similar proposals were discussed in the Congress of the previous composition. On demand of the United States President they were put off right before the Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik. The President claimed that Congress will hamper disarmament agreements if it adopts decisions on the SALT II Treaty and nuclear tests.

Then it became clear why the administration was objecting. At the end of last year the United States launched its 131st cruise-carrying B-52 bomber and then the 132d. Since the Salt II ceiling was thus exceeded, the Soviet Union took it as a violation of the treaty's key provisions. At the same time, the United States kept testing nuclear weapons, and frustrated the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions, a moratorium that was in force for 1 and 1/2 years.

With the two amendments now before the House of Representatives, the White House is again alleging that their adoption will hamper talks. But if the talks are to be successful, the existing agreements must be boosted, not destroyed. The United States must show action on its declared readiness to meet the Soviet initiatives halfway. When Washington announced the introduction of its 131st bomber, thus inflating the SALT II ceiling, the Soviet Union said it will steer clear of countermeasures and will not exceed the ceiling itself, in the hope that the United States will not violate the treaty again. And when the Soviet Union had to terminate its unilateral moratorium, as the United States continued testing nuclear weapons in Nevada, it was announced in Moscow that the Soviet Union is ready to stop its tests any time if the United States does the same.

# House Approves Amendment

LD240912 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 24 Apr 87

[Text] The House of Representatives of the American Congress, by a majority of votes, approved the amendment binding the Reagan administration to comply with the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty.

Last year the American administration announced it will not adhere to the limits provided by the treaty, and exceeded the ceiling for strategic bombers with cruise missiles. When voting on the bill for additional appropriations the congressmen also spoke out for banning underground nuclear tests exceeding a power capacity of 1 kiloton. A bill now goes to the upper house of the United States Congress. The White House warned officially that if the Senate also approves the bill, President Reagan will veto it.

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CSO: 5200/1451

## SALT/START ISSUES

### BRIEFS

SCC SESSION ENDS 27 APRIL--Geneva, 27 Apr (TASS)--A regular session of the Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission ended here today. The commission was set up under the memorandum of understanding between the Soviet and American Governments of December 21, 1972. Its task is to promote the attaining of goals and provisions of the agreements concluded by the USSR and the U.S. on strategic arms limitation and on measures for lessening the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 27 Apr 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1451

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: RATIONALE FOR SHIFTS ON SS-20 DEPLOYMENT DISCUSSED

### Decisions Questioned

PM111505 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 10, 8 Mar 87 p 3

[Aleksandr Bovin Article under the rubric "The World on My Personal Computer": "Break through"]

[Text] The Soviet disarmament initiatives have of late become an integral part of the world political scene. They have received enthusiastic welcomes, have been spurned, but there's no denying that they have produced a stir. They have been an impetus to the thought that -- especially after Reykjavik -- they could pave the way towards a nuclear-free, non-violent world -- a goal considered impossible and unattainable until only quite recently.

And every time Moscow made a step forward, sparked hopes, politicians appeared who put a break on the process. After Reykjavik, for example, the "package" theme came into play. It was maintained that, had it not been for the "package", and had it not been for the "artificial" bundling together by Gorbachev of all issues, things could have been speedily resolved to mutual advantage.

What at fault here is the word "mutual". It would not at all be an advantage for the Soviet Union if its opponent deployed the Star Wars system. And it's a disadvantage not because we would have nothing to oppose it with, but because we would hate to spend money and resources on yet another offshoot of the arms race. And for this reason it was important for us in Iceland to focus world public opinion on SDI as being the key obstacle to agreement. It was important for us to show up all the drawbacks, all the stabilizing stuffing of the President's initiative. Judging by the scope of the debates around SDI, these objectives have been largely reached.

The new stage of political struggle after Reykjavik, the backward movement of the American administration, have prompted a speedier action on specific avenues of disarmament. Last Saturday afternoon, head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks Yuliy Vorontsov called his American counterpart M. Kampelman to tell that the USSR was taking "Euromissiles" out of the package, meaning that the Soviet and American medium-range missiles stationed in Europe. We reiterated our resolve to destroy these missiles. On Monday these proposals, together with a number of attending measures, were put on the negotiating table.

How come? Readers who have come to equate consistency with immobility in politics would be asking. Are we again meeting imperialists halfway? Yes, we are. We are



going to because the very meeting is no less advantageous to us than to them. The package is, if you will, not a strategy, but foreign policy tactics. Its content cannot be constant and immutable for all times. Vladimir Lenin used to caution against the making of ultimatums, because ultimatums deny all flexibility to those who lay them down. Ultimatums, the demands of "all or nothing at all" shackle thought, prevent one from sensing changes and making amends in line with these changes. All the necessary changes in position, the natural change in tactics, are viewed as a retreat in the presence of ultimatums. So, a really consistent policy geared at reaching specific goals rather than at slogans always tends to leave some space for manoeuvre. Learning this is also part of the reconstruction process.

And the last thing. The building and deployment of hundreds of new missiles in Europe must have cost a huge amount of money. And if we agree to destroy these missiles: Why were they built? Why were they deployed? It is not only me who is asking these questions. It would be very good to have competent answers to these questions.

### Reasons Explained

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 11, 22-29 Mar 87 p 3

[Yuriy Lebedev article under the rubric "The World on My Personal Computer":  
"Why SS-20 Missiles Have Appeared"]

[Text]

NOT ALL simplifications help explain the crux of a matter. Some can even lead away from that crux. That the Soviet Union is today offering to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe does not mean at all that this country created a problem and is now seeking a way out of it. Meanwhile, it is this supposition or assumption that is apparent at the end of Alexander Bovin's commentary carried in the previous MN issue: If the missiles are to be destroyed, why then were they built and deployed?

Why? Let's begin with some history. Since 1945 the US has come up with a series of plans to use its nuclear weapon against the USSR. In 1948 the US deployed the first B-29 nuclear bombers in Western Europe. They were followed by other types of nuclear delivery aircraft, and then by the medium-range missiles Jupiter, Thor, Matador, etc. They were deployed along the Soviet borders in close proximity to our vital centres. A bit later they were replaced with more sophisticated weaponry and came to be called "forward-based weapons". Some other European NATO countries acquired their own nuclear missiles.

Was the USSR obliged to respond? Or did it have to adhere to non-resistance to evil? The concern about our national security and security of our friends and allies prompted the only reaction possible under the prevailing conditions. We were obliged to build our own adequate potential.

A potential to measure up to the imperialist challenge.

Responding to that real challenge the Soviet Union built and deployed SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles. For nearly two decades they successfully fulfilled their function of offsetting the threats from the US and its NATO partners.

At the start of the Soviet-American talks in the late 60s and the early 70s on limiting strategic offensive weapons it was quite feasible to include on the agenda also the issue of the US forward-based nuclear weapons. More than that, the USSR insisted on this inclusion but no American consent was received.

Why? What lay at the base of Washington's approach? The official excuses were known. The real reasons were carefully camouflaged. And there were things to hide because as early as in 1967 NATO took a secret decision to actually restore the US right to station in Europe medium-range missiles which had a strategic significance as regards the USSR.

Thus, Washington was evading talks on medium-range weapons under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and was casting about for some outside pretext that could make it possible to turn the US Pershing-2 project, launched in the late 60s, into a NATO project. "In the interests of European peace" of course. The pretext was supplied by the

replacement of the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that were no longer useful with the more up-to-date SS-20 missiles. Former NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns cynically stated that the SS-20 was a "propaganda missile" which provided NATO with a pretext to start a rearmament programme. Not the replacement of one weapon system with another to solve the previous military tasks but in order to tip the balance of forces in Europe and in the world as a whole.

It would be extremely naive to think that in the absence of SS-20s Washington would have desisted from aggressive actions. Its previous record shows that the American administration has never felt any qualms over the absence of proof of a "Soviet threat". It invented proofs to suit the occasion.

The SS-20s were creating no additional threats either to the US or its West European NATO partners because they came as a replacement for the previous Soviet medium-range missiles. They were necessary in the specific conditions of the mid-70s as part of the Soviet-American parity that emerged from the realities of the 60s. By the early 80s much changed in the strategic alignment of forces. The balance became more clear-cut. The margin of strength of defence against all thinkable complications was more considerable, and there appeared a possibility and necessity to approach many things in a new way.

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CSO: 5200/1446

## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

### SOVIET REPORTAGE, COMMENTARIES ON SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCOW

#### 'Spy Scare' Implications

LD081416 Moscow TASS in English 1737 GMT 8 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Washington, 8 Apr (TASS)--Another spy-scare campaign has been launched in the U.S. on the initiative of the Washington administration ahead of the visit to the USSR of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz scheduled for mid-April.

Reagan emphasized that he had instructed Shultz to turn the problem of the security situation in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow into the main item of the agenda of the coming talks. In other words, the disarmament problem is being artificially relegated to the background by Washington.

Judging by all appearances, by kindling another spy-scare campaign Washington intends to again intimidate the man in the street with some "Soviet threat," to make him believe in the necessity of stepping up the arms race, to distract his attention from the really burning problems connected with the preservation of peace and the consolidation of security.

#### Shultz News Conference Before Visit

LD090735 Moscow TASS in English 0714 GMT 9 Apr 87

[Text] Washington, 9 Apr (TASS)--U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz gave a news conference on 8 April devoted to his visit to Moscow in the middle of April. He told the media that on Wednesday he had had his last meeting with President Reagan and "had the completion of his instructions" for the forthcoming talks in Moscow.

George Shultz said, inter alia, that the United States approached all problems "in a constructive spirit" and that the President was resolved to continue such discussions if they would help achieve agreements in U.S. interest and a way to a more constructive and stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

However, contrary to his stated wish for "constructive relations" with the USSR, the secretary of state confirmed that Washington intended to apply a "broader

interpretation" of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, which is standing in the way of Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program.

The larger part of the press conference was devoted to "the security of the American Embassy in Moscow." George Shultz said that the environment at the Moscow talks would be very difficult, that the American delegation would have to work in extremely taxing conditions and that all that "cast a heavy shadow on our discussions."

Asked by a journalist if the current campaign related to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was not a U.S. "attempt to sabotage, to prejudge the discussions that you're going to be having in Moscow, and to make them more difficult," George Shultz said that "we're upset at them,...and we intend to do everything we can to correct our problems."

#### MFA Spokesman on Prospects

LD130949 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2230 GMT 12 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow -- The visit by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, whose talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze are to open on Monday, is anticipated with interest in the Soviet Union. Shultz made a stopover in Finland today en route to the Soviet Union.

According to a U.S. State Department spokesman, Shultz is prepared to negotiate in the Soviet Union on the new disarmament proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague. According to a White House announcement, Shultz is to hand over a personal letter from President Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev concerning the disarmament problem. Reagan has so far voiced his satisfaction with the new Soviet proposal but has insisted at the same time on the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which aims to shift the arms race into space. In this connection our correspondent Stefan Babiak asked Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov how he assessed the prospects for reaching an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

[Begin recording] [Gerasimov, here and subsequently in Russian with superimposed translation] The prospect will be apparent when Shultz opens talks with us. We shall then see what he has brought to Moscow with him. The Americans themselves have written a great deal about the coming visit and they have been making certain forecasts in connection with it. Shortly before the visit, however, they unleashed a wave of spy mania to spoil the atmosphere before the talks. You know our reply to this campaign showed the Americans that it is precisely they who have been eavesdropping on Soviet offices in New York, Washington and San Francisco. So, it is inappropriate for them to claim innocence.

That is not an issue. The real issue is the fact that it has become some kind of rule of late that when there are certain possibilities for progress, for a certain improvement or for talks, which offer hopes for reaching a result with the Soviet Union, some obstacles immediately appear. For instance, when a summit meeting was held in Geneva there was Weinberger's letter to the President calling on him not to accede to any agreement. When Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz, our respective foreign ministers, held a meeting in New York during the 41st UN General Assembly session, the Daniloff problem was raised. Now it is spy mania, and so we see in the United States a

struggle between those forces who desire a dialogue with the Soviet Union, who are represented by Shultz himself, and other forces which are against.

Shultz is vacillating and is uncertain. He said before embarking on his journey that it will be very difficult for him to conduct negotiations, and that he will not find facilities where he would be able to discuss matters with his advisors because there are listening devices everywhere. This is simply a disreputable game which shows that in the U.S. Administration itself there are many people who do not want any agreement with the Soviet Union. As far as we are concerned, we are prepped for the talks and we have been preparing ourselves with all seriousness.

[Babiak] How can the West European states contribute to resolving the question of medium-range missiles in Europe?

[Gerasimov] West European states have to voice their clear stand on this issue. I would say that Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German foreign minister, was sufficiently clear when he stated that the missiles should be removed.

With regard to England, it would appear that it is in favor but at the same time it has a lot of excuses. France is standing aside and thinks that it does not concern it, so there is a paradox there. When the Americans brought the missiles into Europe they said that this was on the basis of NATO's so-called two-track decision. This decision was based on the need to eliminate missiles. If, however, the Soviet missiles continued to be placed in Europe, it would be necessary to bring in U.S. missiles. The Soviet Union is now ready to eliminate its missiles. This means that if this two-track decision taken by NATO were implemented it would be necessary to agree to the elimination of the U.S. Pershing and cruise missiles.

At the same time I observe what one could term the Dr Strangelove syndrome. I have in mind Stanley Kubrick's film in which Dr Strangelove ceased to be afraid and fell in love with the bomb. Likewise, certain Europeans and above all British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, have fallen in love with the bomb and hold the view that nuclear weapons are totally essential for the preservation of peace in Europe. So it would appear today that the NATO two-track decision was not meant sincerely and that neither the Americans nor its transatlantic allies have ever intended to agree with the zero option, with the elimination of nuclear missiles from the European Continent. We shall see how events will unfold further. [end recording]

#### U.S. 'Marring' Atmosphere

LD131606 Moscow TASS in English 1544 13 Apr 87

["Who is Marring the Atmosphere" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 13 TASS -- Follows commentary by Askold Biryukov, TASS political news analyst:

Claims can be heard in Washington that Moscow is doing its utmost to mar the atmosphere of Soviet-American talks, with the participation of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. What are these claims based on? The truth is that they are totally unfounded. But what is then their underlying reason? The point is that each time that prospects appear in the international arena of any agreements between the USSR and the USA, when the Pentagon or the U.S. espionage department set out to extort new appropriations for their subversive activities against peace on earth, they in

Washington cook up a fresh cock-and-bull story of the type they dished there on the eve of the U.S. state secretary's visit to Moscow.

Therefore, if we try to find out, who mars the prospect of talks, we will inevitably draw the conclusion that this is done by them in Washington. Thus THE NEW YORK TIMES notes that the great expectations for a new turn for the better, for an improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations in connection with the U.S. secretary's visit to Moscow were shattered this week by the outcry raised in Washington over the so-called violations of the security regime at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and far-reaching differences among the Reagan administration on issues, which George Shultz is to discuss with the Soviet foreign minister. Another article in the newspaper points out that a defeat in most of his disputes with the proponents of a tougher policy from the U.S. Defense Department. The question of the freedom of manoeuvre George Shultz is going to have, remains, as they say, open, the newspaper notes.

Some people at the Pentagon demanded that Shultz be given the tough instructions for the talks prepared in advance, that he be not allowed to deviate from them and react to the proposals of the Russians in some way or another.

Hasn't the fresh spy-scare campaign whipped up, as if following an order, both in the USA itself and in some of Washington's allied countries, been really motivated by the Pentagon's concerns of this kind? Why, for example, should they have started talking about the pet "children" of Caspar Weinberger, the Pentagon chief, the U.S. Marines standing guard of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who, as is alleged, have been seduced by Russian "sirens"? Since it is known how these young loafers behaved themselves during their stay in the Soviet Union. None of their "dashing adventures" in Moscow ended without drunken brawls and similar "deeds". This is the way they always behaved themselves, but why should they in Washington display such touching concern about them precisely now. Well, it must be believed that in the first place they at the Weinberger department have found a good pretext for settling their old scores with the U.S. State Department, and hope that this pretext would help, as the above said newspaper mentioned, to shatter prospects for an improvement of Soviet-American relations. And at last, as far the third pretext is concerned: ...it remains so far not quite clear.

Then who is marring the atmosphere?

#### Shultz Arrives

LD130717 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Shultz arrived in Moscow today on a business visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government. He was met at the airport by Comrade Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs; Comrade Dubinin, USSR ambassador to the United States; and other officials. Among those at the airport was the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Jack Matlock.

#### Talks With Ryzhkov 15 April

PM150957 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 87 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Talk in Kremlin"]

[Excerpts] Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on 14 April.

During their talks, which passed in a businesslike atmosphere, they examined some fundamental issues of the Soviet-American relationship, the positions of the two countries in international economic relations, and prospects for trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

Pointing to the primary significance of the issues of ensuring security, stopping the arms race and bringing about disarmament to Soviet-U.S. relations, Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed that at this crucial moment in the development of the international situation it was essential to use every opportunity for solving those overriding issues.

Achieving relevant accords between the two countries on a mutually acceptable basis would be of high significance to strengthening trust between them and thus create felicitous prerequisite conditions for progress in other matters of Soviet-American relations.

While recognizing the need for settling the fundamental security problems and for greater trust in each other's policy, George Shultz made at the same time the development of positive trends in that field dependent on the meeting of a number of conditions by the Soviet side.

In that connection his attention was drawn to the fact that building confidence as a factor promoting success in international affairs may be a result of efforts not by one, but by both sides, and the Soviet Union is doing everything in its power for the attainment of that aim, and has every ground to hope for reciprocity.

The meeting was attended on the Soviet side by Boris Aristov, minister of foreign trade of the U.S.S.R., Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. Yuriy Dubinin, ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to the U.S.; and on the American side by Jack F. Matlock, ambassador of the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., and Rozanne Ridgway, U.S. assistant secretary of state.

#### Meets Shevardnadze 13 April

LD131428 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1303 GMT 13 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 13 April (TASS) -- Talks began today in Moscow between Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. On the agenda is a discussion of the issues which make up the object of USSR-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. Specifically, prospects for working out an agreement between the USSR and the United States on eliminating medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe are being examined. The sides are exchanging opinions on a wide range of security problems and other key aspects of world policies and USSR-U.S. bilateral relations. [In its Second Edition of 14 April PRAVDA on page 4 carries a report on the talks and here adds: "including humanitarian issues and the working conditions for their embassies and diplomatic missions on each other's territory."]

Taking part in the talks are, on the Soviet side, A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs; Yu.V. Dubinin, USSR ambassador to the United States, V.P. Karpov, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for Arms Limitation and Disarmament; A.A. Obukhov, charge d'affaires; S.P. Tarasenko, aid to the USSR minister of foreign affairs; V.A. Mikolchak, head of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs United States and Canada Department. On the U.S. side are Jack Matlock, U.S.

ambassador to the USSR; P. Nitze, special advisor to the President and the U.S. secretary of state; R. Ridgway, U.S. assistant secretary of state; R. Perle, assistant secretary of defense; K. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; R. Linhard, member of the U.S. National Security Council; and T. Simons, deputy assistant secretary of state.

On the same day, E.A. Shevardnadze held a luncheon [zavtrak] in honor of George Shultz and those accompanying him, in which A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' B.I. Aristov, USSR minister of foreign trade; G.I. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.V. Tereshkova, chairman of the Presidium of SOD (Union of Friendship Societies); participants in the talks from the Soviet and the American sides; and other officials took part.

#### Foreign Ministry News Conference 14 April

LD141253 Moscow TASS in English 1242 GMT 14 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 14 TASS -- The Soviet-American talks in Moscow are going on in a businesslike, equitable and calm atmosphere of the quest for points of contact and mutual understanding. This was stated at a briefing in the press centre of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz spent many hours together. For instance, the latest meeting ended yesterday night at 10.30, p.m. Most of the time was devoted to the discussion of the security problem in all its aspects. They touched as well upon other questions. Specifically, they raised humanitarian problems dealing, for example, with the homeless, the unemployed and with the functioning of the embassies.

The ministries set forth the stands of their governments and stated sometimes the similarity of their views. However, on more numerous occasions they stated the difference of opinions on many problems.

It was decided to set up working groups which would discuss concrete problems and fix the stands of the sides before the next meeting of the ministers. These problems include primarily the problem of intermediate-range missiles. Perhaps, this is the most promising direction. Other working groups will be set up to discuss other problems, for instance, that of strategic offensive armaments.

The spokesman of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that a rather wide range of questions was being discussed at the talks.

#### Atmosphere of U.S.-USSR Talks

LD142053 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 14 Apr 87

[Text] The atmosphere at the negotiations here between the American secretary of state, George Shultz, and his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, is favorable. That was said by the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov in his comment on the talks. Gerasimov said the atmosphere is favorable, but it is too early



to give an assessment of the talks which began on Monday and which are focusing mainly on an agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe.

The American side, which has described the negotiations as businesslike and serious, has likewise refused to assess their progress.

Gerasimov told a news conference that the atmosphere does not cause any concern, it is businesslike and calm. Both sides are looking for common ground. He added that the most promising area of discussion was on medium-range missiles, but this was a preliminary assessment. Gerasimov confirmed that working groups of experts had been set up to discuss the medium-range missiles and strategic arms. So far, there had been an exchange of views. The groups were working in a businesslike manner on a wide range of questions.

The two foreign ministers also discussed embassy security on United States and Soviet territory. Both sides outlined the positions of their respective governments concerning the functioning of the embassies and diplomatic missions in our two countries. The spokesman did not elaborate.

On human rights, Soviet officials, including a deputy foreign minister, Anatoliy Adamishin, met on Tuesday for several hours with an American delegation headed by Richard Schifter, the assistant secretary for human rights. These talks too were characterized as very businesslike. Yuriy Kashlev, the head of the Foreign Ministry's Humanitarian and Cultural Department, confirmed at the news conference that in Vienna last week he had given a list of 139 cases, 350 persons, to the United States ambassador, and this had been favorably resolved.

The Soviet side also took the opportunity to state that human rights were being violated in the United States because of the great number of homeless and unemployed. Kashlev said the Soviet side had expressed concern because while many things are changing here through the Soviet leadership's democratization plans, absolutely nothing is being changed in the United States.

#### Western Response to Initiatives

LD141406 Moscow TASS in English 1345 GMT 14 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 14 TASS -- It is with interest that Moscow is expecting a reaction in the Western countries to the proposals expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his speech in Prague, a briefing was told today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Albeit the first reaction to these proposals was cautiously positive, it has not been clearly expressed. We hope, Gennadiy Gerasimov said, that the process of study of the fresh Soviet proposals will not drag on for too long.

## Gorbachev Makes New Proposals

PM151045 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 87 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[TASS report: "M. S. Gorbachev's Reception of George Shultz"]

[Excerpts] Mikhail Gorbachev received in the Kremlin 14 April George Shultz, who is having substantive negotiations with Nikolay Ryzhkov and Eduard Shevardnadze. The visit of the U.S. secretary of state to the USSR is taking place at a crucial juncture in the life of both states and is of special significance in connection with the new foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet leadership.

George Shultz has been received in the Soviet Union in the spirit of new thinking, considering the role the United States is playing and can play in world politics, and also the accumulated experience of mutual relations, contacts, and dialogue with the U.S. Administration, including summits.

George Shultz handed over to Mikhail Gorbachev a personal message from President Ronald Reagan.

A frank, principled conversation was held, marked by the desire to look seriously for decisions on key questions of international security. Greater understanding of each other's positions showed up in the course of a thorough exchange of opinions.

Over 2 years we took many steps to create a new atmosphere in the relations between the two countries, gave new chances for mutual understanding and accords, said Mikhail Gorbachev.

No previous administration had such chances. Yet we have not seen on the part of the United States the wish to take advantage of them to improve bilateral relations and the international situation. Each of our steps met with attempts at complicating or even simply foiling the effort. At the very best, they were dragging feet on the matter, pending our new steps. The erroneous calculation persists until now that the Soviet Union needs detente and disarmament more than the West.

Judging by deeds rather than by separate statements, there is an impression that the U.S. Administration behaves as if nothing has happened in the Soviet Union over these 2 years and that it has done nothing to improve the international situation.

George Shultz has not agreed with that appraisal. Yet the very course of the conversation, which centered on disarmament issues, has borne out that the U.S. leadership is practically unprepared to act vigorously, to go its part of the way.

Mikhail Gorbachev asked the candid question: What has George Shultz brought along? Is the U.S. Administration prepared to really do something in the remaining time? Our proposal on medium-range missiles is an attempt at creating both for the U.S. Administration and for ourselves better conditions for making a big step, perhaps, the most difficult one, but a step that would start the real process of putting an end to the nuclear arms race and a cut in nuclear weapons.

George Shultz expressed consent with the Reykjavik formula for a settlement on medium-range missiles, while expressing a number of reservations in connection with our proposal on operational and tactical missiles (with a range of from 500 to 1,000

kilometres), which we have put forward precisely in order to take into account Western Europe's concern and facilitate a settlement on medium-range missiles.

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the readiness to record in an agreement on medium-range missiles the Soviet Union's obligation to completely eliminate its operational and tactical missiles in Europe within a relatively short and clearly defined time frame. Nevertheless, George Shultz insisted on the United States' right to create such weapons and deploy them in the amounts approximately equal to those that the USSR will have after the elimination of operational and tactical missiles removed from Czechoslovakia and the GDR. This has caused puzzlement: It turns out that while the USSR will be unilaterally eliminating its missiles of this type, when it firmly proclaims to the whole world its obligation to do so, for instance, within a year, the United States will be arming itself with such missiles. This would contradict the very essence of the process of disarmament.

It followed from George Shultz's explanations that the U.S. Administration, together with its allies in NATO, is not prepared to reach zero in the question of operational and tactical missiles, that they have no final stand on the matter.

We have told you everything. We have probably told you even more than you expected, Mikhail Gorbachev said. We are going further than was stated in Prague: We are also prepared to eliminate battlefield tactical missiles. What are you afraid of? We support a reliable agreement with the most stringent and all-embracing control. If the process of the elimination of nuclear arms is really started, we shall be holding the most stringent stand in the question of control, we shall be demanding verification and inspection everywhere: on the sites of missiles' dismantling, on the sites of their elimination, at ranges and military bases, including those in third countries, at depots and plants, whether private or state-owned.

Taking account of the new ideas expressed during the conversation, Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that there existed a need for the United States and their allies to think all that over. However, it is important to realize that it is absurd to demand a buildup when the Soviet Union starts unilaterally the elimination of its shorter-range missiles -- an entire class of nuclear weapons.

The issue of strategic nuclear armaments was discussed in detail. The examination of that problem revealed that the United States was departing from what they agreed to in Reykjavik, namely -- from the readiness to reduce the entire triad of strategic armaments by 50 percent. Back then the stumbling block was SDI. And now it turns out that, apart from SDI, there once again appeared as complicating elements "levels", "sub-levels" and other pretexts that, it seems, were discarded in Reykjavik.

Deviations from the Reykjavik position are also evident considering the fact that at present the United States is planning the realization of an agreement on strategic offensive armaments over a period of 7, not 5 years, just as is the case with the commitment not to break out of the ABM Treaty over a period of 7 years, not 10 years.

Mikhail Gorbachev brought into the fore the question of observing that treaty. Assurances that work under SDI allegedly is not fraught with the threat of breach of that treaty are unacceptable.

We, Mikhail Gorbachev stated, will never recognize a transfer of the arms race to space as something natural. The very idea of SDI is harmful. If the U.S. begins to deploy ABM systems in space there will be no agreement of any kind on strategic offensive armaments. If you force us, the response to SDI on our party will be asymmetrical, it

will not necessarily come from space and will be far less expensive. However, a very dangerous situation will emerge as a result. And there can be no trust of any kind of each other -- neither on our nor your part. Is it possible that politicians shouldering very heavy responsibilities can associate themselves with such a prospect -- destabilizing the entire system of security and doing so precisely at the time when there exists a realistic possibility for tackling the issue of nuclear weapons?

We take into consideration the fact that the U.S. Administration associated itself with SDI. Seeking a solution and not wishing to frustrate the process of the talks on nuclear disarmament, we are prepared to look for the way out in this area, too. We agree to research in ABM systems but only in the laboratory. It was explained to the interlocutor for the first time what is meant in the Soviet Union by this, namely, research work on the ground -- in institutes, at proving grounds, at plants. Let experts of the two countries take their time, ponder the subject and agree on the list of devices that would not be allowed to be put into space in the course of this research. This is the road to the solution. As you see, we look for compromise. We are making "the last efforts", so to say, Mikhail Gorbachev continued.

As to the nuclear tests, the Soviet Union's firm resolve to press for their complete ban in the course of the full scale negotiations has been confirmed. To get matters off the ground, the Soviet Union is prepared to work out jointly a formula that would make it possible to ratify the 1974 and 1976 agreements, to come to terms on a considerable lessening of the yield and number of explosions.

Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to work out "key provisions" about strategic offensive arms, ABM systems, and nuclear tests. Alongside the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles, they could become the subject of arrangement at the summit level and the basis on which legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States could be drafted. I am ready to meet the President of the United States in order to reach agreement on these "key provisions" and conclude a treaty on medium-range missiles, Mikhail Gorbachev said.

Mikhail Gorbachev has urged the U.S. Administration to think over carefully all aspects of disarmament, which were touched upon at the talks in Moscow, and to have another look at the whole of the disarmament process. Even if there is not enough time to conclude any treaties, we could still lay the groundwork for them. Much work has been done in preparing for them, hence this political work should not be wasted.

We are not inclined to pursue a pugnacious policy vis-a-vis the United States. We reject the vicious principle according to which, the worse it is for the Soviet Union the better it is for the United States and vice versa. It is necessary to overcome the old stereotypes. Our two countries' responsibility to the world is immense. Today's problems cannot be settled along the lines set in the Fulton speech by Churchill and the Truman Doctrine. We invite the United States to think over a restructuring of Soviet U.S. relations, to think how we should live further on, how to contribute to an improvement of the whole international situation. I am convinced that this is possible and necessary.

It is better to discuss things, to argue and engage in polemics than to make perfidious plans of mutual destruction. It is better yet to have a constructive dialogue designed for an outcome acceptable to all.

Taking part in the talks were Eduard Shevardnadze, Anatoliy Dobrynin, Sergey Arkhromeyev, Yuriy Dubinin, Jack Matlock, Paul Nitze, Rozanne Ridgway.

## White House Reaction

OW151218 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1045 GMT 15 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Hello comrades. The world press has a great deal to say about the reception by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of the U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, noting the particular importance of the new foreign policy initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union.

THE NEW YORK TIMES emphasizes that Gorbachev had proposed to eliminate, together with the intermediate range missiles, all the tactical missiles in Europe. However, the paper notes, a highly placed White House official stated that the U.S. Administration has serious reservations about the elimination of nuclear tactical arms.

White House Deputy Press Secretary Daniel Howard described the proposals made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev during his talks with Shultz as interesting. Answering questions from journalists at the Santa Barbara ranch in California where President Reagan is resting, Howard announced that the United States is taking these proposals seriously. However, he also said that the United States must consult with its allies before giving an answer to the proposals.

## Talks End 15 April

PM161037 Moscow PRAVDA Russian 16 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Visit Ends"]

[Text] Talks between member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz ended here on 15 April.

The thorough, indepth discussion of the central questions of international security and Soviet-U.S. relations, the tone for which was set by Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting with George Shultz, facilitated a better understanding of each other's positions and the creation of preconditions for drawing them closer in the future.

In the course of the intensive exchange of views on questions of nuclear and space arms and on other important aspects of reducing and liquidating armaments, the Soviet side worked enterprisingly for translating into reality the big possibilities for drafting agreements opened up by the Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

As a result of talks between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and George Shultz, agreement in principle was reached jointly to step up work to realize the Reykjavik understanding on medium-range missiles.

The Soviet side, in particular, stressed a desire to work out an agreement on the issue within a short time and displayed readiness to solve constructively the operational and tactical missile issue with this aim.

The Soviet leadership made a concrete proposal to the U.S. Administration to elaborate "key provisions" concerning further talks on strategic offensive arms, the regime of the ABM Treaty and nuclear testing, which along with the signing of an INF agreement could form the subject of a summit accord and the basis for drafting legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States.

The U.S. side has recognized the need for resolving the fundamental security problems, yet proved at the same time to be unprepared to give a constructive response to a number of specific Soviet proposals.

It was agreed that the sides will continue discussions at various levels, including at meetings of foreign ministers as well as at the Geneva talks on security and disarmament with due regard for the exchange of views held in Moscow. In so doing, the common aim was reaffirmed of drawing up meaningful and mutually acceptable agreements.

The sides have evaluated as timely and useful, as a whole, the discussions held of other aspects of world politics and bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations. Thus, in particular, regional problems have been examined in detail and in a frank atmosphere, with special emphasis being laid on those problems that are particularly acute in character and create a serious threat to international peace. In that connection it has been decided to continue the practices of Soviet-U.S. exchanges of views on a broad range of regional issues.

Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz signed an agreement between the USSR and the United States concerning cooperation in the exploration and the use of outer space in peaceful purposes which provides for joint work by Soviet and American scientists in studies of the solar system, space astronomy and astrophysics, earth science, physics of solar-terrestrial ties, space biology, and medicine. There was a productive and enthusiastic comparison of viewpoints on other questions of bilateral cooperation that revealed new possibilities for further developing and enriching it.

The discussion of socio-humanitarian questions proceeded vigorously and was marked by an indepth presentation of the fundamental approaches of the sides.

The talks passed in an open [otkrytyy] and businesslike atmosphere.

G. Shultz left Moscow the same day.

He was seen off at the airport by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh and other officials.

#### World Press on Talks

OW141405 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1115 GMT 14 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] Hello, comrades. The world press is paying a great deal of attention to the talks in Moscow between U.S. State Secretary George Shultz and Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze.

The British newspaper THE GUARDIAN considers these to be the most important talks since the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. The two sides are discussing a broad spectrum of international problems, but the main interest is caused by the question of disarmament.

Observers seem to agree there is now a realistic opportunity to reach, at long last, important agreement between the Soviet Union and the present Washington administration on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. As is known, our country has agreed to remove this problem from the general package of questions of disarmament. We took into consideration the so-called zero option put forward by President Reagan. But a paradoxical situation arose. As soon as we agreed to this proposal, certain Western governments began backing away from it, surrounding it with new reservations and conditions. They began speaking about the problem of tactical missiles.

We are prepared to constructively solve even this question. The Soviet Union has declared that in the event of the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles, we intend, in agreement with the Governments of the CSSR and the GDR, to withdraw from these countries the tactical missiles that were placed there [razmeshchenny] as a retaliatory measure to the deployment of the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe.

Moreover, to reach without further delay an agreement on medium-range missiles we have proposed to begin discussing the question of reduction, followed by elimination, of missiles with a radius of 500 to 1,000 kilometers located on the European Continent. This initiative, put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev during his visit to the CSSR, would appear to have removed the last barrier on the path of agreement.

The London weekly THE OBSERVER noted that the Soviet Union has offered one more olive branch. This step, writes THE OBSERVER, should lift all doubts in the West.

In this manner we attempted to create a situation conducive to the talks with Shultz in Moscow. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the U.S. Administration. On the eve of the state secretary's visit, another anti-Soviet campaign broke out in Washington, this time in connection with a spy mania. We are being accused of creating a difficult situation for the U.S. diplomats to work in and subjecting them to intensive surveillance.

Such charges are blatantly hypocritical. The U.S. secret services have constantly been engaged in espionage against the Soviet Embassy in Washington and other Soviet establishments in the United States. Therefore, the outrage of the U.S. Administration on the matter of the situation of U.S. diplomats in Moscow -- many of whom, by the way, are engaged in unlawful activities -- is clearly contrived.

Furthermore, the U.S. paper NEWSDAY, in its editorial, admits this is nothing but chatter, dictated by egotistical considerations. The paper notes that there are people who would dearly like to make use of the talks about the security of the embassy as a way to torpedo the talks on arms control. This must not be allowed to happen, since these talks are equally in the U.S. as well as Soviet interests. This is the conclusion reached by NEWSDAY, and it is impossible not to agree with it.

The future dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States depends, to a large extent, on what Shultz brought with him to Moscow. In the opinion of U.S. observers, if during Shultz's visit no agreement is reached, at least in principle, on intermediate-range missiles, the Reagan administration will not have a sufficient basis to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union during its tenure.

#### Shultz Holds News Conference

LD151418 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1352 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (TASS) -- I have spent 3 full and productive days in the Soviet Union. I would like to express my thanks for the hospitality accorded to me here, U.S.

Secretary of State George Shultz stated. He addressed a news conference today at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center for Soviet and foreign journalists.

On Monday, he said, I met USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. On Tuesday I was received by Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, with whom we held very productive discussions on matters relating to economic cooperation. Then there was a meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, during which a wide range of issues was discussed, and I think that we have advanced things a little in the right direction. Intensive and interesting discussions took place at all meetings, the U.S. secretary of state said.

#### PRAVDA on News Conference

PM161315 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Visit Ends"]

[Text] Before leaving G. Shultz held a press conference for Soviet and foreign newsmen at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center.

I had 3 full, productive days in the Soviet Union, he said. I believe that during the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, having discussed a wide range of issues, we moved things along somewhat in the right direction.

At the meetings with Soviet leaders there were intensive and interesting discussions, the U.S. secretary of state continued. Nearly all the issues were examined, including the problem of arms control, bilateral relations, restructuring, the new thinking, and human rights.

It seems to me that considerable progress was made in the discussion of the problem of medium-range missiles. But the prospect of rather difficult talks lie ahead. One question which is of great significance and is as yet unresolved, but on which, I believe, progress was made, G. Shultz went on, concerns operational and tactical missiles. The U.S. side agrees that it is necessary to impose limits on the number of missiles of this type. And we believe that whatever limits are established, the only acceptable concept is the global concept, since these weapons are very mobile and can be easily moved from place to place.

Concerning the USSR's willingness within a brief and precisely defined period to eliminate its operational and tactical missiles in Europe within the context of an agreement on medium-range missiles, G. Shultz said that the U.S. side cannot give a response to this new Soviet proposal without consulting the allies first. I will commence the consultation process tomorrow in Brussels, he added.

There were frank and intensive talks in the sphere of strategic and space arms, but there was no significant progress at them, the secretary of state said. We accept, he said, the general idea of a 50-percent reduction in strategic armaments and that the verification [kontrol] setup should be very tough. Experience of talks in the area of operational and tactical missiles will be an important guide for considering questions of verification [kontrol] in the strategic arms sphere.

Answering questions on the SDI problem, G. Shultz said: "No particular progress was achieved on this topic." According to him, the United States intends to continue the exchange of opinions with the USSR on banning nuclear tests. The Soviet and U.S. sides made a definite effort in the discussion of chemical weapons. There are good prospects, G. Shultz believes, for the continuation of talks on the creation of centers to reduce the risk of a nuclear war.



The visit was very interesting for me, G. Shultz stressed. Evidently, very important changes are taking place in the Soviet Union. I was glad to obtain first-hand information on this. There are many difficulties in relations between our countries. But we also have an enormous responsibility.

#### Timetable Proposed

LD151748 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 15 Apr 87

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Igor Surguchev]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Shultz held a news conference today at the USSR Foreign Ministry's Press Center at which he reported on his meetings and conversations in Moscow. The secretary of state set out the U.S. position on the problems of disarmament, which have already become known from the report on his reception by Comrade Gorbachev.

#### Missiles in Asia, East Europe

LD151935 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report of Shultz 15 April press conference]

[Text] In Moscow today a news conference was held by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. [Video shows scene at news conference with distant shot of four people on platform, Shultz is third from the left. Others unidentified.]

After thanking the Soviet side for its hospitality George Shultz said in particular: [Video shows Shultz in medium shot, intercut with pictures of jouranlists attending the press conference]

[Begin Shultz recording in English, with superimposed translation] In my view, we achieved substantial progress in the field of medium-range nuclear systems. The negotiations will be difficult, but nevertheless there is the possibility of progress in the very near future. Each country will be keeping 100 nuclear warheads on medium-range missiles, as was provided for at Reykjavik. The Soviet missiles will be kept in Asia, and the American missiles on U.S. soil. It is our common view that an agreement should provide for strict verification [kontrol].

The next, as yet unresolved issue of importance is the question of short-range nuclear systems. I consider that we have achieved progress in this field too. We have agreed that the number of tactical and operational weapons should be limited. We agreed that, whatever restrictions be established, the only available way is to solve the problem on a global scale. After all, tactical and operational nuclear weapons are very mobile. Our mutual relations are determined by the principle of equality. This must be applied also in this sphere. The Soviet side has stated that after the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles it intends to withdraw its tactical and operational missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia and that in the course of

subsequent negotiations it will proceed from the need to reduce such missiles to zero. The Soviet side today stressed that the reduction should be carried out within a minimum period of time.

We are members of a military alliance and are unable to give an immediate answer on such issues. We shall confer with our allies first. Tomorrow I shall be commencing consultations in Brussels.

There has been no similar substantial progress, as regards strategic armaments in space. [end recording]

[Announcer] George Shultz answered journalists' questions.

[Begin recording] [unidentified correspondent] Did you discuss the issue of a new summit meeting?

[Shultz in English with superimposed translation] Firstly, you have been adhering to the Washington custom of shouting out questions from your place. Yes, the problem was discussed, but as you could see we concentrated not so much on the issue of a fresh meeting as on a discussion of questions of substance, since like the Soviet side we agree that a meeting should be filled with important content and should be well prepared. [end recording]

#### Further on Press Conference

LD151549 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow, 15 Apr (TASS)--"An issue of importance, as yet unresolved, but on which we made considerable progress, in my opinion, involves what we refer to as short-range INF missiles," U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz told a news conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Center here today.

"The principle of equality is one that governs our relationship and we believe it must govern in this field as well," the U.S. Secretary of State continued.

He added that "if we can settle all of the issues in the present negotiations well and good, we intend to give this matter a first priority as we return on 23 April to the discussions in Geneva"(on nuclear and space weapons).

"I think we made quite a lot of progress" on the INF issue and "perhaps we can see the prospect--with some hard negotiations ahead but nevertheless prospect--close to hand of reaching an agreement in that area," Shultz went on to say.

After noting that the Soviet side during the talks had made a new proposal, he said the United States could not respond to it immediately and had first to consult its allies.

The U.S. Secretary of State said there had been "very strong and forthcoming" negotiations on strategic and space arms but no considerable headway had been made in that area.

However, "We agree on the general idea of a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms" and "we agree that the verification regime must be a very strong and intrusive one," he added.

"Our experience in negotiating in the INF area will be an important guide in looking at verification in the strategic field," Shultz remarked.

Answering newsmen's questions about space arms, he contended that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative was consistent with the ABM Treaty.

He also said that the Soviet and U.S. sides had made certain efforts in discussions also on chemical weapons.

"It's been a very interesting trip for me," the U.S. Secretary of State continued.

"It's quite clear that there are some important changes taking place in the Soviet Union," he said, adding he was glad to have had "direct information" about them from the Soviet hosts.

"We have many difficulties, our two countries, but we have great responsibilities. And, of course, it is our responsibility to deal in a realistic way with the difficulties but also to have in mind the importance of continuously seeking a more constructive, a more stable relationship in the interests of peace in the world," Shultz concluded.

Concerning the question of medium-range missiles, he said, in part:

[Begin Shultz recording in English fading into translation] I think we made quite a lot of progress and perhaps we can see the prospect of fairly difficult talks ahead, but nevertheless there are prospects for quick progress in this field.

The basic structure of this agreement will be the following: first, the Reykjavik formula -- 100 warheads on each side from the longer-range intermediate forces that will be deployed [razvernuto] by the Soviet side in Asia, and, on the part of the United States, in the United States. We have worked out a timetable for these reductions -- somewhere within a period of 4-5 years. We have resolved that these agreements should contain clauses for very precise verification [kontrol] and inspection [proverka]. [end recording]

[Surguchev] Setting out the U.S. side's position on questions of nuclear disarmament, the secretary of state accompanied it with a whole number of reservations. Concluding the news conference, he said:

[Begin Shultz recording in English fading into translation] It's been a very interesting trip for me. It's quite clear that there's some important changes taking place in the Soviet Union. All the leaders with whom I spoke described them to me, and to others, and I was pleased to hear this information first hand. Our two countries have many difficulties and differences, but we have an immense responsibility, and, of course, our responsibility lies in solving realistically and spontaneously [neposredstvenno] all the difficulties that arise, but, at the same time, we must also remember the importance of constant efforts to achieve more constructive and more stable interrelations between ourselves in the interests of peace throughout the world. [end recording]

## INF Agreement Discussed

LD160052 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Excerpts] The 3-day Soviet-American talks here in Moscow have drawn to a close. The American secretary of state, George Shultz, held talks with the Soviet prime minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and the foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. On Tuesday George Shultz was received in the Kremlin by Mikhail Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed a readiness to include into an agreement on medium-range missiles that is being drafted at the moment a Soviet pledge to eliminate tactical missiles in Europe. [passage omitted]

Touching upon this Soviet proposal the secretary of state, Shultz, said this at a news conference:

[Begin Shultz recording] The Soviet side has told us that they intend upon the signing of an INF agreement to take the missiles they now have stationed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia out and destroy them, and that in the negotiations over the remaining missiles they will take the position that the right, equal number should be zero. This is a new proposal and this afternoon they added to it -- zero to be accomplished within a year. We are a member of a strong alliance and on matters of this importance, of course, we don't respond immediately, we consult carefully with our allies and I will start that process tomorrow in Brussels.

But I think in summary I can say that very considerable headway has been made and it should be possible to work out an agreement in this field with hard work and creative effort. [end recording]

At his talks here in Moscow George Shultz insisted on America's right to build tactical missiles and deploy them in Western Europe in numbers equal to those the Soviet Union will hold following the scrapping of tactical missiles removed from Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. This would lead to a situation where the Soviet Union will be scrapping its tactical missiles unilaterally under an appropriate pledge over, for instance, 1 year, while the United States would be adding such missiles to its potential. This would run counter to the very idea of disarmament.

The talks also dealt with other nuclear disarmament issues, including ways to prevent the militarization of space and observe the ABM Treaty. Addressing the news conference after the completion of the talks the secretary of state assured that work on SDI under way in the United States does not contravene the accord.

[Begin Shultz recording] In the field of space we have not made very much progress. On the other hand we have very strong and forthcoming negotiations taking place. I suppose the one basic idea that is in play is the general notion of a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. As far as the United States is concerned, President Reagan's view is that the research on strategic defense which we are undertaking is of course being done in accordance with the ABM Treaty and we don't seek to have that treaty changed in any way; we think the research can be conducted in a fully consistent manner with it. [end recording]

Mikhail Gorbachev strongly emphasized the issue of compliance with the ABM Treaty. He did not accept claims that the SDI will not violate that treaty. [passage omitted]

There is a reasonable alternative to militarizing space, (?serving) its use for the benefit of all nations. It is indicated by the fact that an agreement was signed on Wednesday on Soviet-American cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

George Shultz handed Mikhail Gorbachev a personal message from President Reagan. The message suggests holding a new summit meeting. Asked how this issue was discussed at the news conference, Mr Shultz answered:

[Begin Shultz recording] The subject was discussed a little bit but, as you can see, our discussion focused on substance rather than on that meeting. I think it's fair to say that both we and the Soviets have the similar view that such a meeting ought to be associated with some important content and that it ought to be a well prepared meeting. And so that is the way we approach it. [end recording] [passage omitted]

#### Shultz TV Interview

LD152052 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1926 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Interview with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz by political observer Valentin Zorin; time and place not given; Shultz remarks in English with superimposed translation; video shows Shultz and Zorin seated in unidentified room -- recorded]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. I would like to introduce to you [to] Mr George Shultz, secretary of state of the United States of America.

Mr Secretary, these last few days in Moscow you have been having important talks with Soviet leaders. My first question is this: Have the talks you have had these last few days brought any closer important agreements, including -- and I would like to start with this -- an agreement on medium-range missiles?

[Shultz] I think that I can give a clearly affirmative answer here; progress has been achieved. As we contemplated, the greatest progress in the field of arms control was achieved in relation to intermediate nuclear forces or medium-range missiles. I believe that we are sending our participants to the Geneva talks again with greater chances -- probably much greater chances -- of achieving an agreement there in the near future.

We also made certain progress in a number of other fields, too. Of course, we discussed a wide range of questions, from human rights to economic questions, regional conflicts, questions of bilateral relations, problems in the field of espionage that have existed between us of late, and other questions. So we had a broad discussion. Apart from replying to this first question, I would like to tell the Soviet viewers that I am very glad to be here and to talk with your leaders.

President Reagan sent me here on a mission for peace. The United States wants peace in the world. We want to see mutual relations with your great country that are more constructive, more stable and will make a contribution to the cause of peace. That is our objective, and I am sure that this is shared.

[Zorin] Thank you. I think that these wishes will be backed up by real steps, and in connection with this I would like to ask you this question: The latest Soviet proposals on operational and tactical missiles that were made by Mikhail Sergeyevich

Gorbachev in Prague, and subsequently during the course of your conversations with him in Moscow, and the Soviet Union's commitment to completely eliminate its operational and tactical missiles in Europe in a comparatively short and precisely stipulated period are in response to the apprehensions of those in Washington who recently put forward the idea of a U.S. package. This should significantly ease a solution to the whole problem, wouldn't you say?

[Shultz] This is an interesting proposal, and, of course, the United States is part of an alliance. We have friends in Western Europe and Canada. We have common values with these countries, and we strive together to defend our security. Naturally, when such a proposal, which is new and interesting, is put forward, we consult our allies and do not react to it straightaway. However, I would like to dwell on one point. You have put this proposal in terms of the elimination of these weapons in Europe. We consider that the kinds of weapons we are speaking about are very mobile; they can be transported by air. So the only principle that makes sense is the global principle, because they can be transported, and I think that one of the results of our discussion was the accord reached between us and the Soviet representatives on the fact that the global principle is the correct one.

[Zorin] As became known today, in the course of the conversation with you, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev proposed working out key proposals regarding strategic offensive weapons, ABM, and nuclear tests. Together with the signing of the INF treaty, they could become the subject of agreements at the highest level. I understand that you have to discuss this proposal in Washington and to inform the U.S. President. Nevertheless, if I may ask you to forgive my professional curiosity, I would like to ask what your recommendation to the President will be in connection with these proposals?

[Shultz -- laughing] Well, the answer is easy. I would give the President a recommendation that agrees with his instructions to me. What the President wants is the following: a radical reduction in strategic weapons. He and the general secretary agreed on the 50 percent cut formula. It is difficult to apply this formula. We have already agreed on certain aspects of its application, namely, 6,000 warheads, 1,600 launchers, 1,500 heavy guns [tyazheliye orudiya], the rules for counting bombers and the importance of very strict verification. We consider that there are a number of other areas where it is important to establish what we call sublevels, but we were arguing this issue with the Soviet leadership. We have yet to solve many problems but we should not ignore the fact that we have agreed on a number of issues. We will continue to work on these matters. We brought with us some new proposals concerning space and we are working on this. I think that we will now start energetic activity in Geneva, and try to push forward these talks as soon as possible. We will see at any moment what is the state of these talks. We made some [nemnogo] progress on nuclear tests during our talks when I and the foreign minister exchanged views about the merits of various means of verifying the power of a nuclear test, and we agreed that meetings of experts we were holding should continue. We agreed to instruct our experts to examine the relative advantages of these means of verification and possibly conduct some experiments and try to arrive at some sort of agreement. It would be constructive if they do this.

[Zorin] I am pleased to hear that you are so optimistic. In this connection I would like to ask you the following: Speaking in Los Angeles recently, President Reagan stressed verification in connection with the arms reduction problem. In this connection I want to ask you, Mr Secretary, whether the United States is ready for these comprehensive forms of verification that were proposed by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Prague last week.

[Shultz] Not only are we ready that we proposed such means of verification. I should say that we went further than a general statement that we want comprehensive and penetrating [pronikayushchiy] means of verification. We described at length and in great detail in our draft on medium-range missiles or on the INF treaty a precise plan of how such verification will work. This is the area where, after achieving general agreement, details are particularly important. We should undertake such work seriously and we are trying to do precisely that.

[Zorin] I want to be frank with you, Mr Secretary of State, and say to you that the Soviet public is forming the impression that Washington is trying surreptitiously, without publicity, to dismantle certain accords on a number of issues achieved in Reykjavik. In particular this concerns the ABM Treaty. For 15 years Washington administrations, one after another, were satisfied with the interpretation of that treaty. But now some lawyers in your department have set forth the idea of some kind of broad interpretation of that treaty, an interpretation which effectively renders the treaty null and void, if one accepts it.

[Shultz] First of all, in Reykjavik, unfortunately, no accord was achieved in this important area. Progress was achieved there. However, in the end no accord was reached. One of the reasons for this situation was the fact that the President considered, and I agreed with him, that the Soviet side's proposal regarding restrictions on research were aimed at establishing whether we are able to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles. Of course, we all want this if it is possible, but the proposal by the Soviet side would have restricted research so much that the entire SDI program as a whole would have suffered. We consider that the ABM Treaty satisfies us, and our program has been developed in full accord with this treaty.

You are right that we are studying the treaty very carefully so as to be able to establish, on the basis of this careful study, exactly what the treaty makes provision for. There are certain contentions, points, in this matter. We are working very thoroughly. We intent to fully examine the treaty. It is being studied by our experts, senators, and congressmen, and of course by the President.

[Zorin] I know that the Senate is studying it carefully. I have read the 80-page report by the esteemed expert, Senator Sam Nunn, which asserts that the existing interpretation -- not the so-called broad one -- is the only correct one. The same is said by six former defense secretaries, including Malvin Laird, your colleague from the Nixon administration, who participated in the conclusion of the treaty. All agree that the present interpretation is the correct one, but recently this idea of a broad interpretation has arisen, and this is what worries the Soviet public, and leads to my question. I would like...

[Shultz -- interrupting] Let me interject here and say that, of course, what was drafted at the negotiations is a very important element when we ask ourselves exactly what the Soviet Union agreed to and what we agreed to. We can't help but notice the statement by your then defense minister, Marshal Grechko, who told high-ranking leaders of the Soviet Union -- this is a direct quotation: No clauses of this treaty will prevent us seeking a means to defend our country against these missiles. Perhaps I have quoted him not quite accurately, but the general sense is absolutely exact. He said roughly that. That was his interpretation. We are carefully studying this treaty.

[Zorin] That was an unofficial statement by one figure, a very old statement, which in no form entered the documents, and thus cannot in any way be considered to have judicial force. But I do not want to go into this dispute. We have little time. I want to be sparing with your time, and I would like to broach the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative. A comparison of the way this question stood at Reykjavik

and the way it is treated in Washington today, including the idea of the accelerated implementation of the program -- an idea the Pentagon is setting forth -- shows that on this specific question the present Washington position differs from that in Reykjavik.

I would like to ask you about one clear inconsistency in Washington's position. On the one hand, it is said in Washington that SDI is a defense against nuclear arms; but on the other, it is claimed that the growth of nuclear potential, against which you want to defend yourselves with the help of SDI, is a guarantee of preserving peace. A few days ago, Mrs Thatcher, when she was in Moscow, tried to convince us of precisely this view. How can these be combined?

[Shultz] Well, they aren't so incompatible. Now, both our countries rely -- and I am convinced that it will continue to be so in the foreseeable future -- on means of deterrence to defend our countries. Nuclear deterrent forces are the very core of such deterrence. And, fundamentally, such a policy of deterrence works: we have not had a World War III; and we shall pray that we shall not have it in future, either, that there never will be such a war. Nuclear deterrents force both sides to realize that a war would be a catastrophe, a destructive catastrophe; and, therefore, it must be avoided. So, we have means that have produced a result.

The President thinks that, at the same time, we must set ourselves the goal of finding, in some way or other, a way of eliminating nuclear arms. But that's for the future.

It is perfectly obvious that this is linked to what we are able to do with regard to our conventional Armed Forces, what we are able to do with our potential in chemical arms, and the main thing, the most important thing, what we can do to strengthen the feeling of trust and confidence -- trust in relation to one another. It is precisely the lack of such trust that leads to the production of arms, and not the other way around. You said that you want to be frank with me, and I must be frank with you: when you invaded your neighboring country of Afghanistan, and one-third of the people of Afghanistan were forced to leave their country as a result, when bloodshed continues there, we are not in a position to understand that. Afghanistan does not represent any kind of threat for you -- we have had no intentions to set fire to Afghanistan. It is precisely these things that cloud the atmosphere.

There are other things, too. I am sure that some of the things we do cause you dissatisfaction, but it is precisely trust and belief in one another that must be viewed side by side with questions of armaments. I hope that, somehow, we will be able to reach the establishment of such trust. Important changes are going on in the Soviet Union now: I have been told about them. The general secretary and Mr Ryzhkov told me about them. Your writers with whom I met this morning told me. So, let us hope that we shall be able to achieve success in this direction, on a human scale.

[Zorin] I would like now, in connection with what we have been speaking about, to ask a question, though I can imagine the answer you are going to give; still, I will ask you this question. The world press, including the U.S. press, writes a good deal about a serious controversy within the Washington administration in connection with the Soviet-U.S. talks and, specifically, about the difficult situation of Secretary of State George Shultz. Most likely, you are going to deny this, yet, frankly speaking, how are things?

[Shultz] How are things going? The President, members of his administration, and members of Congress wish to establish more constructive, stable, predictable, productive, and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. We are making great efforts toward this. This is difficult as we do have disagreements. Yet it is very important that we do not give up our efforts, and we are trying to settle our differences. I



would like to think that my trip here -- I know that many of the difficulties that have arisen now in our relations -- they thought that such a trip is not a very good idea. [as heard] But the fact itself that I am now here with you shows what great importance the President attaches to it and how important he regards the work with your leaders and with General Secretary Gorbachev, with whom the President has established a good personal relationship. I have a good relationship with my Soviet counterpart, and we should use such human contacts to try to achieve the establishment of better relations. So we spare no efforts for that, and I think that I received full support in coming here for this purpose.

[Zorin] I am pleased to hear this, yet, however, my professional duty calls on me to ask you another sharp question, so to speak. On the eve of your arrival in Moscow, another spy mania campaign was whipped up in the United States, and whipped up so seriously that you had to pose this question in your conversations with Soviet leaders. In this connection I have two short questions for your.

My first question is whether this is just a coincidence or whether it has become a bad habit. And my second question: At the news conferences in Moscow and Washington irrefutable material, proof was put forward of unlawful activity with regard to Soviet institutions and citizens in the United States. Why are U.S. accusations against us totally unsubstantiated and not supported by literally any material proof? Perhaps such proof simply does not exist?

[Shultz] Unfortunately, it does exist. I had a look around the new embassy building that you have now handed over to us. You handed over to us the shell of the building for us to complete the finished work and I was able to see with my own eyes what had been done there. I have also seen photographs of other missions, so there is no doubt that these devices were installed there. As I have already told your leaders we have great respect for the technical possibilities and abilities of your intelligence services. They did a good job, but we cannot tolerate this. Your methods become so suffocating. You are always watching us. You are always trying to get inside. But then the cost of maintaining any embassy here might be so high that it will be impossible to avoid the question: How is this possible? I do not know whether we will accept this building but it demands a vast amount of work.

However, let us return to your main question. Are such events timed specially to coincide with meetings? The reply to this is no. The problems we had last fall arose as a result of your unjustified arrest of the journalist Mr Daniloff. You yourself are a journalist and you should have some sympathy for him. Everything else that was connected with this matter occurred because these things really happened at that time. And the problems that have arisen now are a result of the fact that such problems exist and not because they were specially timed. The very fact that I am here now, the fact that President Reagan went to the Geneva meeting, that he went to Reykjavik, that we sent an invitation to General Secretary Gorbachev to come to the United States, all of this, taken together, seems to me to display our firm aim that is shared by very broad circles in the United States.

We want to establish better relations with you and we consider that if such relations are established then the prospects for universal peace throughout the world will become much better and this is precisely that we want.

[Zorin] Thank you. Of course, it is not for a journalist to enter into a dispute with a secretary of state but I would simply like to say that, all the same, the accusations of unlawful activity made by your side are unsubstantiated. I do not know what you saw, but what we are able to present was seen by all of your journalists. And as far

as concerns this strange coincidence, I must say that people in the USSR take account of the fact that the present administration has been taking quite large steps in order to find a solution to difficult problems that exist between our countries -- there was Geneva, there was Reykjavik. Soviet people value this visit of yours highly. It is another matter where we get the impression that there is no unanimity in Washington on this theme and that things are not too easy and not too simple for you, Mr Secretary of State, in Washington. Allow me to conclude our conversation with a question that interests all of us very much.

[Shultz] I would like to interject a comment in connection with what you have said. We have seen, particularly in the period from about January 1984, a gradual improvement in relations. Since then there have been ups and downs but the general tendency remains very positive.

A man called John Matlock has been working during this period in the White House directly with the President. This man knows your country very well. His wife also knows it well. And the President chose precisely him. He recognized his knowledge of your country. He recognized how important it was to have here an ambassador who knows the President well, understands his thoughts and how he thinks, since he worked very closely with him. It is very important that precisely such a man has come here as our ambassador. He moved in here a couple of weeks ago and look at what he has achieved already. He achieved my visit here. We have already begun talks and all of this shows the very strong and positive intentions of the President.

[Zorin] Well, it remains for us to wish success to Ambassador Matlock in his important work. I want to conclude our conversation with a question that worries us [volnuyushchim nas]. Less than 2 years remain for the work of the administration, of which you, Mr Secretary of State, are one of leading figures. What do you consider can be done in Soviet-U.S. relations, for their normalization, to improve the situation in the world, in the remaining period of time?

[Shultz] I think that a great deal can be done. We usually have a tendency to focus our attention on such talks about which we have already talked here. It goes without saying that they are important and we are applying a great deal of effort in that respect and much work to them, and I consider that we can attain accord in at least one of the areas, or even more.

Another matter has an even greater significance: If we strive for this [Shultz heard to say "if we work at that], if we are able to attain accord in one area and it turns out to be successful, vindicates itself, and if we are able to resolve several problems here and there, we will then form the habit of resolving problems and not creating them. It may be that this will then impart a corresponding impetus to our relations and will give them a push in a positive direction. If President Reagan, with the help that I can give, is able to create this positive impetus, then I will consider this the main contribution, and an extremely important contribution, to the strengthening of peace in the whole world and to the stability of relations between our two countries. You see, both of our countries are great and important [bolshiye i znachitelniye] countries. We live with you in one world where gigantic events take place that have an effect on both our countries. What I would like to do, and what I have already tried somewhat to do at meetings, with both General Secretary Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov, is fantasize [pofantazirovat] a bit -- what will our world be like, where are we going, and how can both of our countries, individually and perhaps together, make a positive contribution to this future? That is what we ought to do.

[Zorin] Without fail, together. Permit me to thank you, Mr Secretary of State, for this conversation. All the best to you.

[Shultz] I thank you for the possibility afforded me to speak here.

#### Shultz Departs

LD151735 Moscow TASS in English 1724 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 15 TASS -- U.S. State Secretary George Shultz left Moscow today. He was staying in the Soviet Union on a business visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

#### Reagan, Shultz Comments

LD170712 Moscow TASS:International Service in Russian 0612 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Text] Washington, 17 Apr (TASS) -- Late on Thursdasy evening President Reagan met Secretary of State George Shultz on his ranch in California, reporting on the outcome of his visit to the USSR and consultations with the Americans' NATO allies in Brussels. Following almost 1 and 1/2 hours of conversation, Reagan and Shultz came out of the ranch house to the journalists waiting for them. The President read a short statement, which said:

I have just received a full account from Secretary of State Shultz on his talks in Moscow and consultations with our allies. He set out our position in Moscow. It is clear to me that this visit was very useful in advancing the dialogue between our countries in a number of areas: human rights, bilateral relations, regional conflicts, and arms reduction.

Important progress was attained in the field of arms reduction. We have reduced the gap between the positions of the two sides on the question of medium-range missiles. Following further consultations with our allies we might propose some new ideas. I remain optimistic regarding the attainment of an agreement this year. There were advances on the issue of nuclear tests and on the issue of a chemical weapons ban. Talks on the reduction of strategic weapons and on defense systems in space were detailed and useful. They are to be accelerated.

When I get back to Washington I will meet the leadership of both parties in Congress and report on the progress that has been made this week. I hope that the current process will continue further and that M.S. Gorbachev and I will be able to sign an historic agreement on East-West relations at a summit meeting. And in this connection I shall personally be holding consultations with our NATO allies on further talks and plans."

When journalists asked Reagan whether the Soviet Union has put NATO into a corner by its latest proposal, the President replied: "I don't think so".

Taking the matter up, Shultz said: "In my opinion we had a very good meeting in Brussels where the whole process was examined, and I think that there are opportunities for us -- and we have different, alternative routes -- they are all very positive."

Shultz noted that the United States and its NATO allies are discussing the latest Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles and "will form an opinion" on this issue. He asserted that it would be wrong to say that there were differences within NATO on this

problem" It is correct to say that people are examining an important proposal that has been submitted by the Soviet side while I was in Moscow, and that one shouldn't react to it straightaway."

Reagan was asked whether he has resigned himself to the fact that in the remaining period of his term of office there will not be sufficient time for proper discussion of a new agreement on strategic offensive armaments. Reagan replied: "I haven't completely resigned myself to that. We are approaching this question seriously and we intend to continue to progress along this path."

The President stressed that he "anticipates and is hoping for a summit meeting. But it must be a well-prepared and balanced meeting, where results must be achieved. There must be material agreement to merit such a meeting." Reagan was asked to explain whether this meant that a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting would not be held until some kind of agreement on arms control was prepared. "No, I meant that such a meeting should be well-prepared and there should be prospects at it for reaching material agreements."

### U.S. Media Reaction

LD161016 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] People in the United States have followed with great attention and interest the Moscow visit of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, as well as his talks with Soviet leaders. Here is our correspondent in New York, Vladimir Gerasichev:

[Gerasichev] Almost all the major American newspapers are publishing accounts by their own correspondents or news agency reports from Moscow. Gorbachev proposes clearing Europe of nuclear missiles -- these are today's headlines and the basic idea of the reports.

There's another particular thing in the 'journalists' accounts: disappointment. Disappointment that, this time too, the American side has turned out not be ready for decisive steps in the area of limiting the arms race. Gorbachev, the influential paper THE WALL STREET JOURNAL stresses, made an unexpected proposal to rid Europe both of medium-range missiles and of operational and tactical missiles. And the United States was taken unawares. Today's NEW YORK TIMES notes that Secretary of State Shultz referred to the need to consult with his allies. But this could have been done before the start of the talks in Moscow.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL recalls that the USSR's advantage in operational and tactical missiles was considered by the Reagan administration to be the main obstacle on the path to attaining an agreement on medium-range missiles. What will the White House say now?

The press is clearly still not ready for such a rapid turn of events at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations table. It is muttering something unintelligible about the Soviet Union's advantage in the area of conventional armaments. But our country's position on that question is well known, too. The Soviet Union is prepared to adopt measures to resolve that problem, too. But it shouldn't be forgotten that, here also, the American side will have to think about how it is going to go its half of the way. The television

channel CNN transmitted a direct relay of the Moscow news conference by Secretary of State Shultz.

The list of questions on which agreement was reached during the Moscow talks is impressive. However, the insistence with which the secretary of state repeatedly speaks of the difficulties of finally reaching an agreement on very important questions concerning the limitation of the arms race puts one on guard.

#### Bessmertnykh Briefs Pact Envoys

LD151655 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 15 TASS -- The heads of diplomatic missions of Warsaw Treaty member states were invited today to the USSR Foreign Ministry and briefed in detail by deputy minister of foreign affairs Aleksandr Bessmertnykh on the content and results of the talks with the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz that ended today.

Special attention was given to the new Soviet proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev during his conversation with George Shultz on the entire range of problems of nuclear and space arms and first of all on medium-range missiles in Europe. It was noted that although the course of the talks revealed that the United States Administration was not prepared in practice for an agreement on these issues the Soviet leadership decided to give the Americans and their allies an additional possibility to think over the latest Soviet proposals.

It was noted that the Soviet Union's position at the talks was based on the agreed-upon foreign policy course of the allied countries directed at strengthening universal peace, ensuring its own security and that of the other Warsaw Treaty states, of all countries and peoples in Europe.

#### Gorbachev-Shultz Discussion Viewed

LD161722 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Soviet-American talks have been held in Moscow during the stay here of America's Secretary of State George Shultz. Here is what Radio Moscow's Yuriy Solton writes:

The (?tone) for a detailed and profound discussion of the problems of disarmament and strengthening international security was set by Mikhail Gorbachev's meeting with George Shultz. The Soviet leader not simply reaffirmed his sincere desire to solve all those problems in a constructive way, but advanced new proposals offering the chance to make a big step forward in nuclear disarmament already in the next few months.

It has been suggested to eliminate American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe so that both the Soviet Union and the United States would each have no more than 100 warheads of such missiles outside the continent.

In order to remove the fears of the West about Soviet shorter-range missiles, with a range from 500 to 1,000 km, the Soviet Union gave its consent to put down into an

agreement the commitment to fully eliminate them in Europe, and a specific timetable was mentioned, about a year. It was also stated that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss the scrapping of so-called battlefield nuclear weapons. And so the two sides now seem to be closer to agreement on medium-range missiles in linkage with tactical missiles.

But the talks also showed something else -- that the U.S. Administration is so far practically unprepared for agreement. And that applies to the above mentioned problem, and to the problem of strategic and space weapons.

Mikhail Gorbachev has described as logic the other way round [as heard] the attempts made by the NATO countries already after the Moscow talks to respond to the new Soviet initiative, not by agreeing to bring down the level of nuclear weapons in Europe to zero, but by rearming themselves.

At the Moscow talks, the United States demonstrated the intention to again complicate the solution of the problem of strategic arms by confusing technical details, and that can be described as nothing else but departure from the Reykjavik general agreement. The same can be said about America's intention to reduce the earlier agreed period of not overstepping the Antiballistic Missile Treaty from 10 to 7 years.

The Soviet Union has suggested working out key provisions concerning strategic offensive weapons, anti-ballistic missiles and also nuclear tests. Along with signing a treaty on medium-range missiles, those provisions could be a subject of a top-level agreement and the basis for preparing legally binding agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Cautious optimism, such was the first reaction on the outcome of the Moscow talks, and one can quite agree with such an assessment. The Soviet Union has again given the West a chance to start practical disarmament and not only speak about the need to lessen the military danger. But will the United States and its NATO allies take advantage of that chance?

### Security Aspects of Shultz Talks

PM161331 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[A. Mozgovoy article: "M.S. Gorbachev: Is It Time to Restructure Soviet-U.S. Relations?" -- first paragraph printed in boldface italics; passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz has been on a business visit to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Government. N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, had talks with him. The head of the U.S. State Department was received by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 14 April. A frank and principled conversation took place, marked by the desire to seriously seek solutions to key questions of international security.

Over the last 2 years our country has taken a number of steps in order to create a new atmosphere in relations between the USSR and the United States. These steps offered prospects for mutual understanding and accord. Not a single previous U.S. Administration had been offered such chances. But the United States failed to display

the will to take advantage of them in order to improve bilateral relations and the international situation. This is precisely why, during the conversation with G. Shultz, M.S. Gorbachev directly asked the head of the U.S. State Department: Is the administration prepared to really do something in the remaining time?

This applies primarily to the problem of nuclear disarmament. A chance has emerged now to reach accord on medium-range missiles. Our country's proposals on this account are well known. "Our proposals on medium-range missiles," M.S. Gorbachev noted in the conversation with G. Shultz, "represent an attempt to create, both for the administration and for ourselves, the best conditions to take a major step, maybe the most difficult step, but a step that would mark the beginning of a real process of terminating the nuclear arms race and reducing nuclear weapons."

A paradoxical situation developed after the USSR submitted its proposals on medium-range missiles, which take into account wishes previously expressed by NATO leaders: Some Western politicians and even governments are now disowning their own "zero option" as if it were an impure force and are trying to make the resolution of the medium-range missiles question subject to all sorts of conditions and reservations. In particular, they artificially exaggerate the problem of operational and tactical missiles in terms of which, North Atlantic bloc figures claim, the Soviet Union enjoys "superiority" in Europe.

But operational and tactical missiles cannot be taken in isolation from other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The United States and its NATO allies have a vast potential of such vehicles in the Old World. The following facts testify to this: /The United States has deployed 640 nuclear-armed aircraft in West Europe. Aircraft carriers of the U.S. Navy's 6th and 2d fleets, cruising in European waters, carry about 300 nuclear-armed ground attack aircraft. The North Atlantic bloc has a total of up to 4,000 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in West Europe./

In other words, the "dramatic imbalance" in reduced range means, about which so much noise is made in the West, simply does not exist. The USSR is in no way aiming to retain them. On the contrary, it is doing everything to reduce their numbers and, in the long term, to fully eliminate them. For example, it was proposed at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik to freeze the number of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and right away start talks on their future.

Literally a few days ago -- during his visit to Czechoslovakia -- M.S. Gorbachev announced the USSR's readiness to start discussing the question of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of 500-1,000 km stationed in the continent of Europe, without linking this with the course and outcome of the solution of the medium-range missiles problem. Moreover, the sides would pledge that they would not build up the number of operational and tactical missiles during the period of talks. The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee confirmed yet again at the Prague rally that, following the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles and regardless of the course of discussions on the question of operational and tactical missiles, the Soviet Union, in agreement with the CSSR and GDR Governments, would withdraw from these countries the missiles stationed there as countermeasures to the deployment of U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. The implementation of any accord on medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles would, of course, take place under strict verification.

And so, in the course of the conversation with G. Shultz, M.S. Gorbachev announced a new major step by the USSR -- he expressed readiness /to include in the medium-range missiles agreement a pledge by the Soviet Union to completely eliminate its operational

and tactical missiles in Europe within a relatively brief and precisely defined time period./ The response by the U.S. secretary of state made it clear that the U.S. Administration, together with its NATO allies, has no intention of descending to zero level in the sphere of operational and tactical missiles.

Questions of strategic nuclear arms and the White House's "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) were discussed in detail during the conversation in the Kremlin. It was noted that retreats from the Reykjavik positions are noticeable on the U.S. side. M.S. Gorbachev stressed that if the United States were to deploy a space-based ABM defense system, there would be no agreement at all on strategic offensive arms. But bearing in mind that the administration has committed itself to SDI, our country -- in its quest for a solution and in order not to thwart the process of talks on nuclear disarmament -- is prepared to seek a way out in this sphere, too. We agree to research in the sphere of ABM defense, provided it is confined to the framework of the laboratory. Moreover, it was explained to G. Shultz how the Soviet Union interprets this. Namely: research work on earth -- in institutes, at test sites, and in plants.

M.S. Gorbachev offered the elaboration of "key provisions" regarding strategic offensive weapons, ABM defense, and nuclear tests. Together with the signing of a treaty on medium-range missiles, they could become /the subject of accord at summit level/ and provide a basis on which to prepare legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States. "In order to agree to these 'key provisions' and conclude a treaty on medium-range missiles," M.S. Gorbachev declared, "I am prepared to meet the President of the United States."

There was a brief discussion of the "human rights" subject, the latest outburst of spy mania in the United States, and the question of regional conflicts during the conversation.

M.S. Gorbachev emphasized at the conclusion of the meeting: "We have no intention of pursuing a pugnacious policy toward the United States. We reject the flawed principle according to which the better things are for the Soviet Union the worse they will be for the United States, and vice versa. Old stereotypes ought to be left behind. Our two countries bear too great a responsibility to the world.... We invite the United States to reflect that it is time to restructure Soviet-U.S. relations and to ponder how to live in the future, how to assist in improving the entire international situation. I am convinced that this can and must be done."

This same belief and confidence are shared by all Soviet people.

#### Shultz Addresses NATO Council

LD161938 Moscow TASS in English 1913 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Brussels April 16 TASS -- A special session of the NATO Council on the level of foreign ministers was held here today. At the session U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz informed West European allies of the United States by the NATO bloc of the results of his talks in Moscow on disarmament problems.

Upon the end of the session Shultz spoke at a press conference at which he positively assessed, on the whole, the results of the talks in the USSR and pointed out that a significant progress had been made there. He said that a prospect existed today on concluding a good agreement on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. There are all



the basic elements of the future agreement, and it remains for the NATO countries to take a decision concerning their stand. According to Shultz, the allies realize their great responsibility for taking a correct decision. In his turn, NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington emphasized that the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State to Moscow had brought closer prospects of reaching agreement on intermediate-range missiles.

#### Moscow Comments

LD162304 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 15 Apr 87

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Viktor Levin]

[Excerpts] Let us proceed now to the problems of nuclear arms limitation and the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. You know that in the course of the conversations of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders with U.S. Secretary of State Shultz, new proposals were voiced that give form to the ideas expressed by the Soviet leader last year in Prague and go even further.

I will remind you that in the conversation with Shultz, the readiness of the Soviet Union for the elimination of not only medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, but also battle tactical missiles was stated.

During the conversation Shultz did not give any concrete answer. Today, as a telegram from Brussels reports, he familiarized the leaders of the foreign policy departments of the NATO states with the content of the Moscow talks. As the telegram of DPA NEWS AGENCY notes, satisfaction over the prospects for working out an agreement on medium-range missiles was expressed at the meeting. However, one cannot overlook the fact that, judging again by the DPA telegram, more emphasis was laid by the NATO ministers on attempting to justify their persistent unwillingness to lead the matter toward a nuclear-free Europe and not on the problem of INF.

At the meeting in Brussels the view was expressed that it is necessary to retain in Europe nuclear weapons described as a necessary component of the NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence. It is noteworthy that at the same time -- Lord Carrington, the NATO general secretary, spoke about this in part -- attempts are again being undertaken to represent the matter as if nuclear weapons are necessary for NATO to order to counter, as the NATO leaders assert, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional armed forces and weapons. Since this thesis is being used very frequently of late it will be expedient, in my view, to dwell on the problem of correlation of forces in greater detail. [passage omitted]

I will name a few figures. They speak very well for themselves. NATO has 94 combat-ready divisions in Europe, while the Warsaw Pact has 78. What is more, it is necessary to take into account that the numbers of the divisions of the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries is between half and two-thirds those of the divisions of the NATO countries. Here is another correlation of forces in the field of tactical air force: In the area of combat aircraft the correlation is 1.2 to 1, while in the area of helicopters, 1.8 to 1, with the superiority being on the side of NATO.

True, taking into account that we indeed have more tanks, although with Spain entering NATO, this superiority has been considerably reduced, and there are also other equalizing points, we believe that all in all there is parity. Our superiority is simply out of the question. The conclusion is apparent: Those who are intensely whipping up the myth of Soviet superiority today are also trying willingly or

unwillingly -- and in my view, rather willingly -- to poison the atmosphere of Soviet-U.S. talks and to hinder the development [vyrabotka] of agreements that would open up the way toward the limitation of nuclear weapons.

Leaving Moscow Shultz said that the United States should thoroughly think over the new Soviet proposals. This is natural, but it would be sad if this thinking over hides a search for ways to evade the agreement.

#### IZVESTIYA Report

PM170905 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Consultations With Allies"]

[Text] Brussels, 16 Apr -- U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz has informed representatives of the NATO countries of the results of his talks with the Soviet leadership in Moscow 13 through 15 April this year. He addressed a session of the NATO Council at foreign minister level specially convened for the purpose.

At the close of the session G. Shultz addressed a news conference during which he gave as a whole a positive assessment of the results of his talks in Moscow, noting that substantial progress was achieved there. "We now have the prospect of a good agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe. All the basic elements exist for a future agreement. And now we have to take a decision concerning our position -- should it be changed for decreased range missiles [rakety ponizhennoy dalnosti]? We are approaching this decision cautiously and on the basis of consultations."

G. Shultz said that at the session he made a thorough and full report on the talks he had in Moscow after which "there was a study of alternatives and the process of preparing our decision was begun." Noting that the Soviet side had made a new proposal, G. Shultz said that he could not reply to it without a preliminary consultation with the NATO allies. According to him, the allies are aware of the great responsibility that rests with them for making the correct decision and they intend to discuss everything painstakingly and only then make a decision. "We do not intend to be in a hurry with any unconsidered conclusions... We have a difficult decision to make," he added, recognizing that he could not say when this decision could be expected.

At the same time the leader of the U.S. diplomatic department insisted on the need to preserve NATO's "flexible response" doctrine, which provides for the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a military conflict. He said that this strategy "will be retained irrespective of the decision NATO makes on medium-range missiles or operational and tactical missiles."

For his part NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington made a statement in which he stressed that G. Shultz' visit to Moscow "has demonstrated further headway on important aspects of arms control and has brought closer the prospects of reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles." Lord Carrington stressed that the allies "will begin immediately a discussion of the consequences of these proposals for NATO's security."

## NATO's 'Snail's Pace'

LD171800 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] A special session of the NATO Council has taken place in Brussels at which U.S. Secretary of State Shultz gave a briefing on his talks in Moscow. Here is a "Latest News" commentary with our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver:

[Zholkver] On first reading with the reports of information agencies from the Belgian capital, a saying about making the mountain out of a molehill comes to mind. True, the foreign ministers and ambassadors of the NATO countries have stressed in a brief communique the importance of Soviet-U.S. talks and greeted the progress made in the vitally important areas of arms control. But where is the contribution from Western Europe itself to the strengthening of peace and security in our common European home?

So far the representatives of the NATO West European countries promise only to begin considering the consequences of the proposals that were discussed. Certain auxiliary groups of experts will take up the matter, and they will be having meetings, as the BELGA Agency points out, for 1 or 2 months. Can one be satisfied with such a snail's pace? Surely it is a question of necessity to take urgent measures to prevent the danger of a nuclear catastrophe -- the danger that is not only increasing with each year, but also with each month, bringing ever new replenishments to the arsenals of nuclear arms, which are becoming ever more devastating and sophisticated.

Recently reports have appeared that in the United States work is being carried out on the creation [sozdaniye] of new nuclear warheads that are able to change the route of its flight. Yet now there is a real chance to stop and turn back the deadly nuclear arms race.

The London press, for example, recognizes that after the new Soviet proposals put forward in the course of the talks with Shultz, an agreement on scrapping nuclear missiles in Europe is just the distance of a stretched arm away. Well then, stretch this arm! But nothing of the sort. There in London again, Lord Carrington, NATO's secretary general, stated that the Gorbachev proposal to deprive Europe of practically all nuclear missiles is a menacing challenge to the NATO strategists.

The essence of this Atlantic strategy is sadly well known for nuclear deterrence. However, Lord Carrington complains, it is difficult to talk about all this now when one must deal with the inclinations of the public, when people are starting to think that the epoch of peace, safe from nuclear arms is not far away. Yes, this is of course true. People in Europe, and not only in Europe, want a nuclear free world, and they see that this prospect is becoming ever more real. Only it is a pity that this new political thinking is carving its way so slowly among NATO leadership.

## Reagan Comments

OW171203 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1035 GMT 17 Apr 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenko]

[Text] Hello, comrades: On returning to the United States after his talks in Moscow and and after meeting allies in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of State George

Shultz went to report to President Reagan in Santa Barbara, California, where the president is enjoying the pleasure of a short break. Shultz reported to the head of the administration about his talks with the Soviet leaders.

The meeting took nearly an hour after which President Reagan announced the following to the journalists: It is clear to me that this visit; that is, Shultz' visit to Moscow, was very worthwhile in continuing the dialogue between our countries on a number of issues. Great progress has been achieved, I hope, said that president, that the process which is taking place now will continue in the future and that we will be able to sign a historic agreement on the relations between the East and the West at a summit meeting.

Not bad words at all. All that remains is to check whether these will develop into anything specific or, as it happened on previous occasions with the Washington leadership, something will happen again--an excuse or a snag--which will enable the White House once again to substitute words for deeds.

#### Broadcast to North America

LD181331 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 17 Apr 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] The new Soviet proposals, ranging from shorter range missiles to space weapons and nuclear testing, continue to occupy center stage, put forward by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who was here on a 3-day visit, are being now assessed and discussed in the NATO alliance. Let's start the ball rolling with one of you summing up the essence of the Soviet offer on shorter range missiles.

[Bogdanov] Well, I tend to agree with you, Pavel, that Shultz visit to Moscow, or rather the results of his visit, are the major international event now and it is really, it has really a world importance. And if you sum it up in one or two words, what is the main (?result) [words indistinct] American view, but you have another player in the equation -- Western Europe. But in any case I believe that the Soviet side this time has done its level best to open the way for the comprehensive, real agreements starting a real nuclear disarmament, maybe for the first time in the history. What do I mean by that? I mean that you have just a menu of very tasty dishes, like INF, it is settled to the satisfaction of the Western (?desires).

[Kuznetsov] How, how?

[Plekhanov] Because the new offer is a step beyond what was offered in Prague by Mikhail Gorbachev.

[Bogdanov] No, no, no. I start with INF, I start with INF. You have it done, I mean 100 warheads in the Soviet Union, 100 warheads in United States and zero for Europe. What Western European leaders were crying for for the last year, they have it now. Number two, shorter range missiles -- by the way, Pavel, we didn't bring that problem to the equation. The Western Europeans brought that to the equation. With

shorter-range missiles, okay, we started in Prague suggesting that we are ready to start negotiations on the (?parallel), but in Moscow we went many, many steps further. We said okay, we are ready to destroy them within 1 year, within 1 year.

[Kuznetsov] As a package with medium-range missiles.

[Bogdanov] Yes, as a package, as a package with the medium-range missiles and that was the package not created by us, that was the package created by the Western Europeans and by the Americans, if you like. Now we destroy them and that problem is no more existing. And of course you have such an amount of goodwill in our side that we are really in the full right to ask the other side: What are your real intentions? Are you really for nuclear disarmament, or are you for building up endlessly and making just, you know, kind of noises about all that, you know?

[Kuznetsov] Yeah, this question is now being asked. Thank you. Mr Shultz was made familiar with the Soviet definition of what the laboratory research on SDI is all about. What do we understand by it and how does it square with the ABM Treaty?

[Plekhanov] Well, basically it means that you can do research in some of the new technologies and you can even test them in a testing field. The thing that you can do is to (?use) laboratories, plants and so on. The thing that you should not do in our view is take them to space. And Comrade Gorbachev suggested that the experts of both sides get together and study in minute detail the problem of which particular systems must not be taken into space because that would destroy the ABM Treaty.

Now, the problem is that the Shultz delegation came to Moscow with a position on SDI which is a step backward from the position that President Reagan had in Reykjavik and according to press reports from the United States this is a the result of pressure applied by the Department of Defense and according to the new American position they are prepared to abide for the ABM Treaty, by the ABM Treaty, which, by the way, doesn't have any time limitation -- when the two sides signed the ABM Treaty that was forever.

[Kuznetsov] Of indefinite duration.

[Plekhanov] Of indefinite duration, that neither side should try to build an ABM system which would cover the territory, which would be space-based, air-based and so on. Yes, so now the United States says -- in Reykjavik they said well let's abide by it for 10 years -- now they say no, just 7 years. After 7 years let's be free to develop the system which the ABM Treaty forbids.

[Kuznetsov] [words indistinct] that seems to coincide with their plans for early deployment of SDI. If we add 7 years to 1987 that would bring us to 1994.

[Plekhanov] That's right, and according to the latest estimates from the Pentagon, 1994 is the year when they could deploy something in space, some kind of early deployment. As to whether the stuff that they're prepared to deploy would protect anyone or any territory, I don't know, it's a big question, because there is a lot of obfuscation around.

But the clear intention of the U.S. Administration is to destroy the ABM treaty, as quick as they can, because it interferes with their plans for creating an ABM system.

[Bogdanov] And it means that they're ready, still ready, to sacrifice the whole arms control process for SDI. That's (?simply) in one word what they are up to.

[Plekhanov] And that's very disappointing, by the way, that's a very disappointing impression that many people got from the Shultz visit to Moscow, that the position of the U.S. Government does continue to deteriorate in some important respects. The movement backward from Reykjavik continues.

[Kuznetsov] Professor Bogdanov, I quite agree with you when you said that we did our level best; I think we did a little bit more than level best on the INF issue to move it out of the current impasse. At the same time, fears in the West persist that without nuclear weapons -- although France and Great Britain do preserve them -- so, without nuclear arms Western Europe will be even more vulnerable to a conventional Soviet attack. Don't they understand that there can be no nuclear or conventional war in Europe without the complete destruction of both sides? Why do they keep talking and harping about a so-called Soviet threat when this country, which is said to be superior, to have more of everything in every (?class and) category of weapons, voluntarily wants to eliminate its own advantages? [passage omitted]

[Plekhanov] I would like to add something to here. A delegation of U.S. congressmen visited Moscow a few days ago and at one of the meetings a member of the Soviet parliament, Marshal Akhromeyev, who happens to be the head of the General Staff of the Soviet Union, made a very, very persuasive plea for not only eliminating nuclear weapons from Europe but drastically reducing the level of conventional forces because, he emphasized -- and here is a professional, a top professional military man from the Soviet Union emphasizing -- that you can't fight any kind of war in Europe because Europe is full of nuclear reactors, because Europe is full of storage tanks filled with all kinds of chemicals and oil and so and so forth.

[Kuznetsov] That's very important.

[Plekhanov] If you simply replay World War I type battle, conventional weapons, Verdun-II for instance, or a Battle of the Bulge from the Second World War, Europe will be gone and the damage will spread to other continents as well. That's a very, very important thing. We do recognize that, and as a result we will continue pressing for very deep cuts in conventional weapons, for changing the doctrines of both sides in such a manner, and the equipment of both side, in such a manner that neither side, neither the West nor the East, will be able to launch an offensive. But we must bring the levels down in Europe to the levels and to the structures where both sides will be capable only of defensive action. And that is our goal and we'll continue to press for it.

[Kuznetsov] Secretary of State George Shultz has flown to California, where he briefed President Reagan at his Santa Barbara ranch on the results of the talks in Moscow, and after the briefing President Reagan said that he would consult with allied leaders in Venice in June at an economic summit. As far as the latest reports go, West Germany and Great Britain are said to be against going too far along the road of nuclear disarmament. But in our view a long delay could be dangerous to prospects for an INF agreement. I understand this one is a difficult question, but does the United States want this agreement badly enough to be able, to be willing to override disagreement within the NATO?

[Bogdanov] You know, I would like to come back to my, you know, pessimism about this administration. I am sorry to say, but you know, the secretary of state came to Moscow literally empty-handed. Number one.

Number two, he brought with him quite a big group of people -- 75 people, as if he were trying to hide behind them if he takes some decision.

Number three, at the last moment when he got all these proposals from the Soviet side he had no instructions, he was not empowered by his own President to say yes or no and he was hiding behind the allies' backs. What does that mean?

[Kuznetsov] But as I said, they keep saying that what we proposed is something they have wanted for a long time.

[Bogdanov] Yes, but what does it mean? It means that still within this administration there is no consensus, consensus on what they should do or not do with the Soviet side. They are going to delay till June, but I am sorry to say, I don't wish any harm to anybody, but who knows what will happen within this time with the domestic, you know, developments in United States? Now you put the question are they willing or not. That is a question to them, not to us. They have to answer that question to themselves. What I mean to say, it seems to me they have to strike a deal among themselves, because it's the usual situation -- they come to Moscow, they get something, but they they come back and they discuss it and of course it cannot be indefinite, you know, indefinite proposal, because -- let me come back again to my point, which to my mind is very important one -- let's talk, let's talk business.

[Kuznetsov] What you seem to suggest is that despite the fact that the talks in Geneva resume on 23 April they will still be marking time until somebody makes up his mind in June in Venice. Is that your point?

[Bogdanov] That's my point.

[Kuznetsov] Okay. Our countries can and should cooperate despite the numerous disagreements, differences on certain vital, I would say, problems. This is borne out by a series of meetings between Soviet leaders and top officials with the high-level congressional delegatin you mentioned, Sergey, led by House Speaker Jim Wright. And they discussed a number of joint ventures, spoke in favor of developing broader ties between the United States Congress and the Supreme Soviet. So I think there are prospects for better relations, at least more businesslike relations, between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Plekhanov] This delegation from the House of Representatives is the most important, the most prestigious and high-level delegation ever to visit the Soviet Union. I took part in some of the meetings and I was impressed by the constructiveness of the dialogue. There is evidently a wide body of public opinion in the United States both at the public opinion level and at the level of U.S. Congress in favor of serious steps toward improvement of Soviet-American relations. I think one area of consensus which emerges, I think, between the two countries as far as those delegations' meeting is concerned, is that we spend far too much on military hardware, far too much on weapons. There are crying needs both in our own countries and elsewhere, in the third world...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] So let's cut our budgets.

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Which must be met. Yes, let's cut our budges and use the funds -- I would prefer a 50 percent cut, and I think if the two sides reach a consensus on that that we can really eliminate a lot of the unnecessary stuff that we have. I think we could go really very far. So to me that visit, the results of the visit, are very encouraging because the House of Representatives -- we can argue as to how representative it is, whether it's more representative or less representative of the people than the Supreme Soviet of the United States [as heard], that's beside the point. It is a representative body in American politics and I think the winds in American politics are starting to blow in the direction of something like, well, some kind of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. [Passage omitted]

## NATO Strategy Criticized

PM191355 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 18 Apr 87 p 7

["Saturday Commentary" by G. Gerasimov: "After the Mission to Moscow"]

[Text] George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, visited our country this week.

Much was written in the West prior to the visit about its prospects, but even the optimists were put to shame. They wrote, in particular, about various possible approaches to the solution of the problem of operational and tactical missiles (OTM), but through a Soviet initiative, the problem itself was removed.

Having heard the unexpected Soviet proposals that get rid of Western misgivings connected with the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe -- misgivings that were farfetched in our view -- G. Shultz took time out.

He had the right to do so, although for the benefit of the matter one would have liked him to have broader power rather than simply listening.

He brought many advisers with him and an abundance of guaranteed secure communications means, but, from the viewpoint of diplomatic baggage, he travelled light. His mandate was limited and possibly one of the reasons is the continuing disagreement in the Washington administration over the fundamental question of how to treat the Soviet Union: as a sworn enemy, or as a respected partner in the quest for mutual security.

In any case the secretary of state undoubtedly had the right to travel with his report to Santa Barbara, California, where the President is relaxing, via Brussels, Belgium, where he gave an account of his Moscow mission to the NATO foreign ministers.

The initial reaction in Brussels, and indeed in Washington, to the Soviet proposals could not fail to contain elements of approbation: After all, the West's own wishes were coming true, the notorious "advantage of the Soviet Union" in operational and tactical missiles was being eliminated. Accordingly the President expressed optimism and registered "important progress."

"I hope," the President declared, "that the process that has begun will progress and that Mr Gorbachev and I will be able to complete a historic agreement in East-West relations at a summit meeting."

So why have things gotten stuck?

They have become stuck on the foundations of NATO strategy which relies on nuclear deterrence.

For an introduction to the NATO way of thinking, let me quote the reasoning of the London TIMES of 16 April:

"If the present Soviet proposals are adopted in full, the result will be to turn the arms control clock back 10 years." According to THE TIMES, the reason for this is the Soviet Union's 2.5:1 superiority over NATO in tanks and artillery.

The world has been told repeatedly that the Soviet "overwhelming superiority" is the result not of calculations but of falsifications. Nevertheless, this "overwhelming



superiority" is talked about in all Western political salons, and of course, in Washington too.

Ambassador Jonathan Dean, who headed the U.S. delegation at the talks on the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from 1978 through 1981 makes clear, from an informed viewpoint, that the NATO forces "are equal to the Soviet forces to a significantly greater degree than is allowed for by the majority of analyses." In Dean's words, Soviet superiority is a "myth" the mass media are "accepting without reservation, without even pondering it or studying its foundations."

There is now no opportunity to go deeper into this almost "eternal" topic. It should be noted, however, that the Warsaw Pact countries have no aggressive intentions. On 10 April in Prague, M.S. Gorbachev proposed that the foreign ministers of the participants states of the Helsinki process should meet in Vienna and adopt a decision on commencing large-scale negotiations on a radical reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Such is our preemptive response to the probable results of "an in-depth study of all the consequences" of the Soviet proposal for which FRG Foreign Minister H. -D. Genscher is calling.

Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign secretary on 16 April has already given a reminder about the "harsh facts of life -- geography and the Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons."

Mention has already been made of "superiority" and it is possible here to argue and negotiate, but what is to be done about the geography Howe mentioned? It is beyond dispute and is not amenable to negotiation, for the Soviet Union cannot fly off to the moon or sink to the bottom of the sea. Perhaps one could look at geography not as an enemy but as an ally, and perceive Europe not as a continent split by military blocs, but as our common home?

Now that we have removed one "linkage" -- medium-range missiles with operational and tactical missiles, they want to propose the next one -- medium-range missiles with conventional arms. In accordance with the rule: The "linkage" is dead, long live the "linkage!"

#### 'Cautious' Assessment

LD190042 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Moscow Viewpoint" commentary by Valentin Zorin]

[Text] One of the main issues being discussed worldwide these days is the result of the talks that Secretary of State Shultz had in Moscow where new Soviet disarmament proposals were announced. How does the American side see these negotiations? I put this question to Mr Shultz as I interviewed him for more than half an hour on Soviet television. The secretary described the results of the talks as rather favorable. He believes that the two sides have managed to considerably narrow down their differences. Anyway, that is what he told me. In the first place, they came closer to a solution of one major problem, the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, and also achieved progress on a number of other important world issues.

Mr Shultz' interview was seen by more than 100 million Soviet televiewers. First comments say that the Soviet people would like to share his optimism. I agree with this opinion. However I'd be cautious in my assessment of the Moscow talks. Why? Well, although Mr Shultz' position contained constructive elements, his negotiations confirmed that the American Administration is still not prepared to act energetically and walk its part of the way. I have the impression that Mr Shultz was unable to act freely because he had to confine himself to tough bounds established by Washington. I believe it was not accidental that among the officials who accompanied Mr Shultz were strong opponents of disarmament, people like Kenneth Adelman and Richard Perle. I have the impression that if the American delegation's attitude were more constructive, the Moscow talks would have produced much greater results already now and not at some future date in Geneva.

I'd also like to point to some circumstances that accompanied the negotiations, for instance the spy mania campaign started in the United States. Why has Washington chosen this particular time to poison the political atmosphere? What will the American Administration do now that it has new Soviet proposals before it? An early solution to major disarmament problems, in the first place medium-range and shorter-range missiles and a change for the better in Soviet-American relations and international affairs depend on this. And this is how the USSR's leading body, the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee sees the results of Mr Shultz' talks in Moscow.

#### PRAVDA Views U.S. Reactions

PM211403 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 87 Second Edition p 5

[Correspondent V. Gan report: "Boldness and Innovation"]

[Text] Washington, 17 Apr -- These days Moscow has been the chief source of international news, and it is the Soviet side that has been "making" this news, notes the ABC-TV Company. The U.S. journalists who covered U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz' talks and meetings with the USSR's leaders made similar assessments of what happened, which most frequently employed the epithets "important," "good," "great," "interesting," and "earnest."

It is the general opinion that the Soviet Union convincingly demonstrated that, given the political will, problems of arms control and disarmament are perfectly soluble. "As in many other spheres, Mikhail Gorbachev proposes new ways of thinking," ABC stated.

The fact Shultz failed to mention in his public statements the Soviet initiative on operational and tactical missiles gave U.S. commentators grounds for concluding that Washington was not ready for such a turn of events.

The administration's reaction is of a dual, contradictory nature. On the one hand, Washington seems to want agreements with the USSR. Right now, when the President's prestige is at an extraordinarily low ebb following the scandal of the affairs over Iran (according to the last poll conducted by the ABC-TV Company and THE WASHINGTON POST, two-thirds of Americans believe Reagan is not telling the truth about "Irangate"), a Soviet-U.S. accord would help to restore the country's trust in the White House. In the opinion of CBS, Reagan "could once again look like a world leader and not just like a president seeing out his term in office."

At the same time, the positions of right-wing radicals, who do not want to even hear of any agreements with the USSR and who dream of just one thing -- of exhausting it

economically with more and more new rounds of the arms race -- are extremely strong in the administration. It is not hard to assume that it is due to their efforts that the mass media emphasize in every possible way that, in the event of the adoption of Soviet proposal, the U.S. NATO allies "will be left naked" in the face of "the threat of war" from the East. Revived arguments about the USSR's "colossal advantages" in the sphere of conventional arms have now started appearing in the pages of the U.S. press. According to this "logic," ridding Europe of nuclear weapons will merely... increase the likelihood of war on the continent.

Be that as it may, everyone can see that the Soviet side at the Moscow talks, so THE WASHINGTON POST writes, "stunned commentators with its boldness, innovation, and fresh ideas."

### U.S. Choice 'Not Easy'

LD190608 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 18 Apr 87

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Vyacheslav Lavrentyev]

[Text] Hello comrades. The attention of the mass media this week has been focused on our capital where talks and meetings took place between the leaders of the Soviet Union and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. "A new gesture of good will. Bold and far-reaching proposals. Breakthrough in the talks" -- these are excerpts from the West European press on the Soviet proposals laid out during the Moscow talks. But how are these evaluated in the United States itself? I address this question to our New York correspondent, Vladimir Zvyagin.

[Zvagin] The official reaction of Washington to the results of the talks in Moscow was expressed by President Reagan, who said in his California residence in Santa Barbara, that he hoped that both sides will consider it possible to conclude this year, as he put it, a historic agreement on medium-range missiles.

It is difficult to say to what degree the U.S. leadership feels sincere satisfaction with the new Soviet initiatives. After all, for a long period of time, practically for the entire period of the present administration, the United States has consistently rejected, one after another, all Soviet proposals aimed at reducing military danger in the world.

However, many political observers here comment that the new bold proposals by the USSR have placed Washington in a position where it is necessary for it either to agree to these proposals, or to reveal itself for all to see, as an opponent to any agreements in the sphere of reducing armaments. In general, the choice is not an easy one if one bears in mind that the rightwingers and conservative groups are insisting on the need to continue the arms race, call for taking action from a position of strength, and talk about the possible linkage of a possible agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe with limitations on operational and tactical missiles and the like.

The supporters of the notorious SDI are also stepping up their activity. Speaking a couple of days ago on nationwide television, one of their leaders, the leader of the arch-reactionary grouping High Frontier, Admiral Graham stated for example, that it was precisely thanks to SDI that America had succeeded in forcing the Soviets to enter talks. And it would be wrong to shut one's eyes to the fact that, unfortunately, a part of the U.S. Congress shares a similar view.

[Lavrentyev] But what are they afraid of in Washington? After all, strengthening security and stability in Europe, as is officially stated by representatives of the U.S. Administration, would also correspond with the interest of the United States.

[Zvyagin] I think that in certain U.S. circles, people are really quite concerned that the signing of an agreement on the basis of the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union would lead to the further strengthening of our country's authority in the world as a true champion of disarmament. We are following an honest course toward attaining mutually-acceptable accords, and this is recognized at the present time by many mass media in the United States.

The newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, commenting on the results of the past meetings, wrote that Moscow has proposed to Western leaders more than they themselves had hitherto proposed. An observer of the television station CNN stated that the Soviet proposals serve as the key to the cherished door of disarmament. The newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES, replying to the assertion that the Soviet proposals allegedly waken Western Europe, stressing that up to the present time, U.S. troops number 200,000, and hundreds of bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons are deployed there. Therefore, the prospect of an agreement should only be welcomed. One feels that such attitudes are these days prevailing in the broadest circles of the U.S. public.

#### IZVESTIYA Commentary

PM191821 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 87 Morning Edition pp 4-5

["Political Observer's Opinion" by Stanislav Kondrashov: "American Week in Moscow"]

[Text] I will hardly be betraying a secret if I say that Americans and the United States are constantly in our zone of consciousness, as well as on our television screens and the pages of our newspapers. Sometimes more, sometimes less. Moving away or coming nearer -- and not necessarily politically. So, this week saw some influential inhabitants of Washington coming nearer -- by arriving in Moscow. Secretary of State George Shultz flew in Monday (on four special U.S. aircraft, with a retinue of 160 personnel). Saturday, a delegation of the House of Representatives led by the speaker, Jim Wright, left the Soviet capital -- also on a U.S. Government aircraft. Tuesday and Wednesday the paths of these official Americans crossed... in the Kremlin. Both the secretary of state and the speaker, with their colleagues in tow, called at the main Kremlin office: They were received by M.S. Gorbachev. For 3 days at the end of the week 20 U.S. congressmen met with a delegation of the Supreme Soviet and members of the Soviet leadership.

It is possible to speak of an American week in Moscow. No, not a week of friendship, nor a week of cooperation -- but, rather, of the quest for this. A week of important Soviet-U.S. dialogue -- private, direct, detailed, across the negotiating tables of the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry skyscraper on Smolenskaya Square. It was preceded by a week of spy mania, loud squabbling, and mutual denunciations connected with the work of the special services. And yet immediately this deafening sanctimonious choir across the ocean fell silent, as it were; or at any rate it retreated into the background. The stage was taken by serious state -- and interstate -- affairs. People demanded loudly that Shultz postpone or abandon his visit -- but Shultz came, as agreed. Kissinger, casting prudence to the winds in order to again grab the limelight, proposed that, in order to avoid bugging (whose?!), Shultz meet with Shevardnadze in Helsinki at least. Shultz did not avail himself of the advice. And Speaker Wright also arrived, with his group, on schedule.

We cannot get away from each other -- the old conclusion, confirmed by yet another week in Moscow. During those very same days the question of the future was posed acutely in different parts of the ancient Kremlin -- where the Komsomol met in session and where the Soviet leaders held talks with the Americans. A history that has divided the world and a science that has uncovered the destructive force of the atom have committed us to confrontation and the common quest for peace. We are betrothed to the Americans through the medium of nuclear missiles. The discussions touched on the entire range of problems, including human rights and regional conflicts, but the main conversation with Shultz was about missiles.

The impatient reader, eager to take the bull by the horns, may say: "Beating around the bush again. Don't pull the wool over our eyes! Tell us outright, what's the bottom line?" Dear reader, you have every right to be impatient. An entire world of ordinary people awaits and thirsts after not words and assurances but the first real steps toward real nuclear disarmament. But to answer outright means to indicate the day and the hour of the signing of what in the present circumstances is the most likely agreement -- the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe -- but not the most key agreement. But there is still no agreement, and the day and hour have not been appointed. Do not take as a jibe the conclusion that this week in Moscow, I believe, we moved nearer to... the unappointed day.

In the Soviet estimation, agreement in principle [printsipialnoye soglasiye] was achieved on speeding up work to realize the Reykjavik accord on medium-range missiles. In the U.S. estimation -- given by Shultz to a packed press center on Zubovskiy Boulevard -- "considerable [znachitelnyy] progress has been achieved in discussing the problem of medium-range missiles." After hearing at his California ranch the report from his secretary of state on his return from Moscow, President Reagan declared that he felt "optimistic" about the possibility of an agreement this year.

The Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva resume 23 April. The course of these talks will indicate how rapidly that same still unappointed day will approach, and, along with it, yet another summit meeting. Or on the contrary, this day will become more remote: There is nothing irreversible in our relations with the United States, especially under the present U.S. Administration.

The past week again provided convincing evidence that Moscow is determinedly clearing the path of those stumbling blocks that Washington and its allies are quite deliberately running up against. After the Soviet Union adopted the "zero option" for medium-range missiles in Europe, Soviet operational and tactical missiles became a stumbling block. M.S. Gorbachev demonstrated how to remove this obstacle in his 10 April Prague speech. Four days later, at his meeting with Shultz, the Soviet leader went even further by voicing the readiness to record in an agreement on medium-range missiles a Soviet commitment to completely eliminate its operational and tactical missiles in Europe within a year. The readiness to eliminate battlefield tactical missiles was also expressed. As for verification [kontrol] of the fulfillment of an agreement (also a stumbling block), it must be rigid, comprehensive, the very strictest.

The United States insisted on "increasing their arsenal" of operational and tactical missiles in order to compensate for a Soviet advantage. Now the need for this no longer arises. Shultz called the new Soviet proposal interesting, but he did not say yes or no, referring to the need to consult with the NATO allies. The consultations began in Brussels, where -- en route for the presidential ranch -- the secretary of state met with NATO foreign ministers.

Here is what the diplomatic correspondent of the BBC reported from Brussels: "Shultz found himself in an unusual position. He had an agreement with the Soviet Union on

medium-range missiles -- which the West Europeans had been calling for since 1979 -- almost ready. But in Brussels he discovered nervous partners who fear that, in the event of the removal of U.S. missiles from Europe, they will become vulnerable to Soviet long-range missiles and Soviet tanks and ground forces. Shultz was polite enough with his NATO partners, but he let it be clearly understood that the answer he wants from them is 'Yes' -- moreover without prevarication. However, the West Europeans -- and NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in particular -- let it be known that they do not want to be pushed into such a decision."

It is presupposed that the West's reply will be given, at best, at the beginning of May; at worst, consultations will continue for a month or two.

Given the Soviet Union's increased readiness -- resolution, I would say -- to meet its partners' concerns, Western diplomacy is having to improve the art of rejecting Moscow's constructive proposals. But the virtuosos are losing their credibility. Opinion polls in Great Britain, the FRG, Italy, and other West European countries show that, when it comes to sincerity of attitude toward nuclear disarmament, more people trust the Soviet leader, not the U.S. President.

And Washington has a problem: How to reject the Soviet peace initiatives while maintaining the reputation of peacemaker in the eyes of its own people. And if we add to this another imprecise quantity, namely the U.S. President's concern for the legacy he leaves behind him, then maybe we will arrive at the chief explanation for Shultz' appearance in Moscow. Reagan reiterates that achievements in the arms control field are the central task for the remainder of his days in the White House. Meanwhile, the days dwindle down, the time is shrinking.

If a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles is not signed before the end of this year then the laurels will pass -- but not soon -- to another President, because from the start of 1988 the ship of U.S. politics will for a long time be caught up in the turbulent waters of an election campaign. Ronald Reagan will pass into history as the only President in the last 2 decades not to have concluded a single arms control agreement with the Russians.

On the other hand, the right wing of what is already a right-wing U.S. Administration and the ultraconservatives who have entrusted their mandate to a conservative President are quite prepared to consign him to history in just such an unseemly fashion, because they are concerned only with building up U.S. muscle. Among them, Shultz has a reputation for being "spineless." Before his Moscow trip, when the line to be taken at the talks was being formulated, he reportedly suffered yet another defeat at the hands of the Pentagon "hawks," who secured a new retreat by the President from the Reykjavik positions on strategic armaments and the ABM Treaty. Whatever opinion about "substantial [sushchestvennyy] progress" the secretary of state took back from Moscow, this opinion will by no means necessarily emerge intact from the Washington infighting.

Shultz, of course, also took a close look at internal processes in the Soviet Union, at the restructuring process. In this respect Washington manifests demonstrative skepticism, attempting also to infect its allies with the same. It was not for nothing that M.S. Gorbachev leveled a direct reproach at the Reagan administration during his conversation with the U.S. secretary of state: It is behaving as if nothing has changed in the Soviet Union in the last 2 years and as if Moscow has done nothing to right the international situation.

At his news conference Shultz grudgingly observed that important changes are taking place in the Soviet Union. He tried to evaluate them not only during his talks with Soviet leaders but also during meetings of an unofficial nature -- in particular, with

a group of writers in the suburban settlement of Peredelkino. Openness, democratization -- this is what primarily interested the U.S. secretary of state.

The wish to find out about restructuring firsthand, to determine a little more precisely its possible impact on the course of events in the USSR and on the prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations also brought to Moscow the most representative U.S. congressional delegation in history. Jim Wright, the new speaker of the House, has spent more than 30 years on Capitol Hill as the congressman from Texas, and he is known for his sound, moderate-liberal views. He is disturbed by the enormous military expenditure of our two powers; at the meeting at the Supreme Soviet he voiced the desirability of reducing it, let us say, by 5 percent a year. Not the least of his concerns is the U.S. national debt, which has passed the \$2 trillion mark -- the children and grandchildren of the present generation of Americans will have to pick up the tab for this. As the speaker, Wright is the most influential Democrat on Capitol Hill. His role is all the more important insofar as since January the Democrats have predominated in both houses, while the Republican administration has been weakened by the "Iran-contras" scandal.

Most of the delegation were Democrats. However, while in Moscow they did not lay claim to the prerogatives of the secretary of state, explaining to their Supreme Soviet colleagues that there are not two administrations -- Republican and Democratic -- in Washington, but only one -- that of the elected President -- and that it alone has the constitutional right to conduct negotiations with other states.

On the other hand, with a Democratic majority in both houses, Congress is by degrees intensifying its pressure on the Republican administration.

The majority does not approve the refusal to observe the SALT II treaty, favors a reduction in appropriations for SDI, and differs from the administration in its opinion of the recently ended 18-month Soviet moratorium and the problem of nuclear tests in general, and so forth. In the present circumstances the role of Congress will undoubtedly increase, which gives added significance to the visit to the Soviet Union by its representative delegation. Let us hope that their meetings on our soil will increase the accumulated capital of goodwill.

In any case, Speaker Wright formulated clearly his attitude toward the main foreign political event of the week. "The Soviet Union," he said in Moscow, "is signaling clearly its desire to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles before the end of President Reagan's term of office."

### **'Reserved Position' in West**

LD191900 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Apr 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Gennadiy Gerasimov]

[Text] [Gerasimov, in studio] This week saw a visit to our country by George Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. A great deal was written about this in the West prior to his visit. Everyone felt that Soviet-U.S. relations were stagnating and they were making forecasts about possible movements. In particular they wrote about various approaches to resolving the problem of operational and tactical missiles. Perhaps by way of introduction it is worth attempting to understand all this palissade of missiles to which macho military and technical thinking and limited political thinking have driven mankind. We are recommending new thinking according to which what is needed is to get rid of all dangerous nuclear missiles straightaway and all nuclear weapons to boot.

Now let's take a look at this pallisade of missiles. Here are the most threatening ones: the intercontinental strategic missiles, portable crematoria with enhanced productivity, the swallows of nuclear winter. There are ground based ones; there are sea based ones. Pictures showing them being launched look impressive and they are not without their own peculiar grace so that outwardly they differ from the ovens of Auschwitz, although in effect they are similar. So much flight of thought, enlightenment, discovery as well as very clever technical decisions and the most precise mathematical calculations have gone into them. Only for what purpose?

Either this sort of weaponry must face the executioner or else mankind will have to do so. As regards this main question we have proposed to the United States the formulation of key provisions concerning strategic offensive weapons, antiballistic missile defense and nuclear tests.

Now we come to the next class of missiles, medium-range missiles, not intercontinental but intracontinental ones. They are currently the basic topic of conversation. When the United States brought missiles of this class to Europe they explained the step which they had taken by the need to balance things, or to neutralize Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. They added that if the reason, that is Soviet missiles, was removed then the need for U.S. missiles would also fade. We did not do so immediately, but as you will recall, we decided to take a step to meet them and test the sincerity of the West.

Straight renunciation of its own proposal and its adoption by the other side was fraught with political costs for the West, and with the danger of losing the confidence of the public. The West took up a reserved position and stated that the elimination of medium-range missiles was not enough and that the question of operational and tactical missiles -- here they are -- must be resolved.

Before Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, came to visit us she was advised to persuade Moscow to separate medium-range missiles from the general complex of nuclear disarmament problems, but we had separated them even before her arrival. Before Shultz came to see us he was advised to persuade Moscow to add operational and tactical missiles to medium-range missiles, but we had added them before he arrived, on 10 April when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke in Prague and proposed talks on this class of missiles.

When the theme was being further developed in Moscow we expressed our readiness, given an accord on medium-range missiles, to destroy our operational and tactical missiles in approximately 1 year. Well one would have thought that this would have made the West rub its hands in glee, but instead it is rubbing the sweat from its brow. Its brow is wet from intellectual exertions. Whatever should they do next? They can't say, hold on we weren't serious, we meant something completely different.

The first reaction to the Soviet proposals in Brussels, where Shultz made a stop, and in Santa Barbara where he went to report to the President, could not fail to contain elements of approval. To be sure here were the West's own proposals coming back to it, only drawn up with Soviet agreement. Why then have things ground to a halt? Because of the fundamental principles of NATO strategy, which relies on nuclear deterrence.

To acquaint you with NATO's train of thought let me cite the arguments of the London TIMES. It writes: If the current Soviet proposals are accepted in full we will be set back by 10 years when it comes to arms control. According to THE TIMES the reason for this is the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union over the West in terms of tanks and artillery. The superiority to which they refer is not the result of



calculation but of stretched interpretations as well as simply of falsification. Nonetheless in the West this is a kind of popular axiom and, as it were, there isn't even any need to prove it.

Ambassador Jonathan Dean was head of the U.S. delegation at talks on reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. With a full awareness of what he is talking about he writes, in a book published recently that deals precisely with how to dismantle the East-West military confrontation, that arguments about the superiority are a myth that unfortunately the Western press unreservedly swallows. [video shows front cover of book by Jonathan Dean, entitled Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation] Dean writes that the very reason for which the NATO Atlantic bloc was created -- that is the threat of Soviet attack -- is becoming so remote that it amounts virtually to zero.

Nonetheless here is the reaction to our proposals from Geoffrey Howe, the British foreign secretary. He talks about the harsh facts of life, geography, and Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons. In actual fact we are proposing getting rid of chemical weapons and are proposing the start of large-scale talks on radically reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe while the West is dragging its feet. Here at least there is a theoretical possibility of reaching agreement, but what can one do about geography? To be sure, the geography of a country is dictated by fate. The Soviet Union cannot fly off to the moon nor can we sink to the bottom of the sea. So perhaps geography should be seen not as an enemy but as an ally. Perhaps what should be seen in Europe is not military confrontation but our common home about which we should feel common concern.

In order to come around to this point of view we must get rid of popular notions, of the enemy image, and of ingrained stereotypes.

#### 'Wide Gap' Remains

LD181717 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] The United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, has visited Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders. Aleksandr Druzhinin has examined the prospects of relations between the two countries in the light of these talks:

The talks were marked by a lively dialogue and a search for common grounds. Nobody expected George Shultz' visit to Moscow to settle the greater part of the difference between Moscow and Washington. There still is a wide gap between them on a number of current global issues, and above all on nuclear disarmament. In the circumstances the focal points are to display political will and try to smooth over the differences, and that is exactly what this country did. On the two countries' medium-range missiles in Europe, the secretary of state agreed with the Reykjavik formula, that they should be scrapped completely. He had reservations however about the Soviet proposals on short-range missiles.

Now the Soviet Union is ready to do away with its shorter-range missiles in Europe in a relatively brief and strictly specified period. This pledge can be entered in an agreement on medium-range missiles. As for Washington's Strategic Defense Initiative, so-called, Moscow is also ready to search for compromise solutions.

(?If) the United States claims it has committed itself to the SDI the Soviet Union offers a way out. The program must be strictly confined to laboratory research. The system must not be tested or deployed in space and the two sides must fully comply with (?the) Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

Has the American side matched the Soviet willingness to come to terms? It seems it hasn't. Regrettably it has backed down from Reykjavik agreements on a number of matters including strategic weapons. However, as the Soviet leader told George Shultz, the American administration had a chance to reconsider all disarmament issues covered by the talks. The ball is in the United States' court.

The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has discussed the outcome of the Moscow talks. It pointed out that progress on the major disarmament problems hinged on how Washington would react to the Soviet proposals. As for the Soviet Union it is ready to solve these problems together with the United States (?with) the same businesslike dialogue that marked George Shultz' visit to Moscow.

### Talk Show 19 April

LD191955 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 19 Apr 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program, presented by Vitaliy Sergeyevich Sobolev, All-Union Radio commentator; with Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, first deputy editor in chief of IZVESTIYA; and Georgiy Aleksandrovich Kuznetsov, first deputy editor in chief of ZA RUBEZHOM]

[Excerpt]

[Sobolev] Hello, comrades. For anyone concerned with international affairs, patience is a necessary professional quality; but I don't think we need be ashamed if we occasionally feel impatient. In the vital world problem of disarmament, there have been no real changes for the better for so long -- though there have been for the worse -- that now that hope has begun to dawn of an agreement on certain nuclear missiles in Europe, impatience is understandable. It is understandable in part because the term of the present U.S. Administration is drawing ever nearer to its close. The first shots of the election battle have already been fired, and when the campaign gets under way in earnest, the American politicians will have neither the time nor the inclination to bother about international problems. Finally there are the Western proposals, together with the recent Western amendments, which the Soviet side has accepted.

So what are we waiting for? It seems we must once again be patient. The United States intends to consult its allies, and informed sources at NATO headquarters say the consultations will take a month or two, or possibly even longer.

[Yefimov] I'd like to say that the two sides differ a little in the way they assess the outcome of the talks that have been held in Moscow -- the talks between the Soviet leadership and Shultz. What's the difference? The Soviet view of the results of that meeting is that we now have a better understanding of each other's position. We have stressed that the two sides are close to agreement on the problem of medium-range missiles in linkage with operational and tactical missiles. It's true that we have at the same time noted the unwillingness of the United States at those talks to take vigorous action and travel their part of the way. Shultz brought practically nothing new to the talks. On the contrary, the United States even tried to take a step backward by comparison with the agreements and accords or understandings that were achieved at Reykjavik. It is not without reason that the French newspaper, L'HUMANITE, wrote, with creditable vividness and precision, that Shultz brought to Moscow a vast amount of electronic technology, but not one new idea.

How have they assessed the Moscow results? At the end of the week we're reviewing, Reagan read at Santa Barbara -- in California, where he spends his holidays...

[Kuznetsov -- interrupting] He has a ranch there.

[Yefimov] ...On the ranch where he's on holiday, from a prepared text, in which he said that in his opinion, important progress has been made on arms reduction. On medium-range [sredney dalnosti] missiles, he said, we have narrowed the gap between the positions of the two sides; but after consultation with the NATO allies, the United States may put forward some new ideas. By and large, the President said he was optimistic. The order in which Reagan expounded the questions that, in his opinion, were discussed at the talks in Moscow is also interesting; First, human rights; second, bilateral relations, third, regional conflicts, and last of all, arms reduction. Doubtless it's not a matter of chance that he should put arms reduction last. It means something.

I'd call last week American week in Moscow. Not because we had a month or week of culture, a week of films or theater. No. Serious negotiations were being conducted. But that's not the only reason I'd call it American week. There was a very important parliamentary delegation in Moscow at the invitation of our Supreme Soviet, led by the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.

[Kuznetsov] By the way, he also assessed the results of the Moscow talks very interestingly, and I can't resist quoting his appraisal. In reply to a question from an American television correspondent, he said: We now have the best chance since World War II of achieving genuine peace and beginning a process of gradually reconsidering our priorities. Now that we have a huge budget deficit, we should not be spending \$300 billion a year on nonproductive means of intimidation out of fear that the Russians will do so if we don't. They do incur vast expenditure, because they're afraid that we will if they don't. I am in favor, said Wright, of mutual verifiable [poddayushcheyesya proverke] reduction of arms, and I'm against nonproductive expenditure. The world press and many Western figures assess the results of the talks between Shultz and the Soviet leaders in roughly the same key. For example, Danish Prime Minister Schlueter has said, I regard Gorbachev's proposals as interesting and positive. The newspaper NUERNBERGER NACHRICHTEN of West Germany wrote: There is nothing to prevent agreement on this question; the fact that the West is having difficulty in taking the next step is not Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's problem. Many papers in the West are raising the question that the proposal from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that we should abolish not only medium-range missiles but also antitactical [protivotakiticheskiy] missiles operating at 500-1,000 km -- that this proposal has taken Shultz and the West generally by surprise, and that even the zero option itself, which we have offered to the West -- offered them, in effect, their own option -- this option they call a trap.

[Yefimov] It turns out that when the West, or Mr Reagan, proposed the zero option, they did so on the assumption that the Soviet Union would never accept it. The Soviet Union has accepted it.

[Kuznetsov] That is to say that it was purely a propaganda move, so they could look like peacemakers at the tense time, when Europe didn't want the American medium-range missiles.

[Sobolev] When they began saying that they couldn't reduce or abolish the Pershings and cruise missiles because the Soviet Union has operational and tactical missiles, again it turns out, if the present Western press is to be believed, that they put this

forward with the same thing in mind: that the Soviet Union would never agree to it. It did, and they fell into the trap.

[Yefimov] Well, and now we have the strange picture, that at the NATO Council session in Brussels, British Foreign Secretary Howe thanked Secretary of State Shultz, not for agreeing to the far-reaching Soviet proposals, but, on the contrary, for reserving his opinion, for the fact that he did not give immediate assent to the idea of agreeing on a reduction of operational and tactical missiles. It's a strange picture that emerges; and in general there's cause of anxiety, of course, in the fact that the communique on the NATO Council session is framed in such a way that it looks as if they, on the one hand, welcome the accords achieved in Moscow, or rapprochement of positions, while, on the other hand, they quite plainly intend to act together taking into consideration the facts of general European security. What lurks behind that is the presumption that if we abolish nuclear weapons, then hapless Western Europe will be left naked and barefoot in the face of Soviet military superiority in conventional arms.

[Kuznetsov] Though on conventional arms, too, we are putting forward our proposals for equalizing forces.

[Yefimov] That's one side of it. On the other hand, it's no accident after all that the experts who make a serious study of the problems of correlation of forces now actually deride this concept of Soviet military superiority. They are calling it a myth, because, as the BOSTON GLOBE recently wrote, this notion of a so-called overwhelming superiority of the USSR in conventional arms is being irresponsibly put about by the unscrupulous mass media and the U.S. Defense Department, which needs to increase its budget; and according to the experts, the NATO forces are a lot stronger than a simple enumeration of armaments would suggest. The way they usually talk is this: Alas, the Soviet Union has more tanks than NATO! Or it is superior in heavy artillery. But the interesting thing is that the American military, the American experts, have said that just to compare tanks and artillery is a very great simplification. NATO could turn out tanks like sausages if it wanted to; but we are putting money into our antitank weapons. That is the opinion of an expert from Rand Corporation, one of the U.S. brains trusts.

[Sobolev] Then they have superiority in other types of arms -- in tactical fighters, and many others. What we're talking about is overall parity, though in particular types of arms there are discrepancies. But in the West, those who are creating this myth of Soviet military superiority emphasize all the time the weapons in which we do, possibly, have some advantage. They are careful to conceal the fact that in others, they have it.

[Kuznetsov] That's very true. The American press says bluntly that, after all, the U.S. strategic missiles remain, and consequently it would seem that there's nothing to worry about.

[Sobolev] In Europe, too, there is still an abundance of forward based systems.

[Kuznetsov] In Europe too. The forward based systems remain in Europe.

[Sobolev] Truly, the thing that stands out is the lack of conscience of those who appeal to that myth.

[Kuznetsov] I well remember how at one time, in 1979 and later, they were using the terrible Soviet SS-20 missiles to frighten the inhabitants of Western Europe: only one thing could save them from these -- the American cruise missiles and Pershing-2's.

Suddenly all this fear of the SS-20's vanished into thin air, solely because Western Europe had its Pershings and cruise missiles. The leaders of some of the West European countries are apparently even ready to reconcile themselves to the terrible Soviet missiles; and these missiles, as THE NEW YORK TIMES now writes, turn out to be entirely without significance for the military balance. It's all a matter of politics.

Another issue concerns operational and tactical missiles. If Western press statements can be believed, then literally just a few days ago, Western Europe was very frightened of these Soviet operational and tactical missiles. Yet the moment the Soviet Union agreed to abolish them all, they at once ceased to be frightening; all that mattered was that the new American operational and tactical missiles should make their appearance on the territory of Western Europe.

[Yefimov] On the eve of the meeting, and during it, the rightwingers and ultrarightwingers on both sides of the Atlantic were mounting an attack on the very possibility of any agreement, including an agreement on medium-range missiles [rakety srednego radiusa deystviya], of any further development of the process begun at Reykjavik. For example, a day before Mr Shultz came to Moscow, U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger published a long article in THE NEW YORK TIMES. What did he say at the very beginning of it? I quote: We will take care, he wrote, not to raise any hopes among the public as to when an agreement on medium-range missiles [rakety sredney dalnosti] will be concluded.

[Kuznetsov] That's very remarkable.

[Yefimov] Not to raise any hopes.

[Kuznetsov] That's a very remarkable statement.

[Sobolev] Nonetheless, those hopes exist.

[Yefimov] Secondly, Kenneth Adelman, who is the Reagan administration's man in charge of matters relating to disarmament and arms control, has said that even if the problem of operational and tactical weapons were to be resolved -- and he said this not knowing what proposals were to be put forward -- other issues which are hard to resolve would be found. Why is it that two key figures in the U.S. Administration were making precisely these kinds of statements on the eve of a serious and important meeting?

Finally, the Western allies among the ranks of the ultraright have been very active these last few days.

[Kuznetsov] I think that the listeners following our discussion are probably asking what the outcome was: will they accept our proposals or not? It is doubtful whether any of us three could give an honest reply to that question, whether affirmative or negative. I don't know. At any rate THE GUARDIAN newspaper put it very precisely: Nobody expected the revolutionary ideas which are now being put forward by the Kremlin; if they caught Shultz unawares, they will hit Europe like a storm. NATO will have to take enormously important decisions, whatever it might try to do, and it is from the reply we hear that we shall judge the true intentions and capabilities of the United States and of its allies to take real steps along the path of disarmament.

I think the problem is that inside the administration itself -- not only within NATO, but within the administration itself as well -- very serious debates lie ahead. So far they have taken no stance; they have not yet worked it out, not worked it out, to all

appearances. But which side will gain the upper hand? Weinberger's side, or a more reasonable side?

[Sobolev] Well I think that at any rate if one is to sum up the results, there are, nevertheless, both in the United States and Western Europe, very strong feelings among the public and in political circles in favor of achieving an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles.

I would also like to draw your attention to the question of why the Soviet diplomatic service is striving so hard to bring this medium-range missiles business to an end. Of course, there is a reason for this striving. To begin with, the strategy here is beginning to show success, as they say, in disarmament issues.

If we can be allowed to dream a little, if and when an agreement is concluded on these missiles, then in a different and somewhat altered international climate -- and the winds of change have already begun blowing here, even in the process of approaching an agreement -- it will be easier to come to agreements on other types of weapons, including conventional and chemical weapons. After all, here too numerous realistic and constructive proposals have been advanced. As we know, a factory for destroying chemical ammunition is under construction in the Soviet Union, and it would be very nice if by the time it is built the diplomats could provide it with an operating schedule.

#### Weinberger's 'Malicious' Statements

LD210258 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger has made a series of malicious, anti-Soviet, instigatory statements. Over to Soviet television political observer Valentin Zorin.

[Zorin] Hello, comrades. At first sight we have a situation which is, well, simply paradoxical. The Soviet-U.S. talks, which the secretary of state and then the President of the United States assessed as very fruitful and highly promising have just ended in Moscow. In the White House, according to the U.S. news agencies, conferences are in progress at which possibilities and prospects for the development and implementation of the Moscow accords are being examined. At the most delicate stage of these talks one of the most influential figures of the very same administration that is conducting the negotiations comes down upon the Soviet Union with salvoes of malicious slander of the kind that has not been resorted to for a long time, accuses us of the most perfidious schemes and, not limiting himself to verbal escapades, reports the Pentagon's quite concrete plans that are totally incompatible with the negotiations being conducted. How do we explain this kind of discord and disagreement, to put it delicately? The straightforward, customary stereotype handy in such situations is an established fact: Washington is playing a propaganda game; it does one thing and means another.

However, I think that the matter is too serious and the moment in time far too important for trying to engage in scoring such propaganda points. The truth lies deeper and looks more complicated. At present in Washington sharp political struggle

is in progress in which highly potent forces are fighting each other and the outcome of which, to my mind, is not clear so far. If 2 or 3 years back the foreign policy course of the ruling circles in the United States was distinguished by a fairly large degree of unity, then now, under the influence of serious factors, an important and evident split has appeared in the top U.S. ruling circles.

The line of frenzied anti-Sovietism and unrestrained arms race has developed a crack. The military programs' excessive burden on the country's economy, the growing alarm of the broad public circles at the military threat -- whose effect on the ruling elite gets greater as another skirmish for the White House in next year's presidential elections gets closer -- the enormous force of attraction of the peaceful Soviet program which has become one of the most efficacious factors in the present-day international situation -- all these have essentially changed the political landscape, including in the United States.

At the same time, one can in no way underestimate the might of the forces that represent the military-industrial complex in the U.S. corridors of power. They hold in their hands not only key posts in the state but in many ways still hold the prevailing influence. Thus, the skirmish currently taking place at the top of the U.S. political pyramid is a serious fight with far-reaching consequences. You and I will be able to judge the result of the present round in this presumably long-term fight in the immediate future.

#### Suspicious of NATO Response

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 21 Apr 87 pp 1-2

[Article by APN columnist Vladimir Katin under the rubric "Opinion Column":  
"NATO: A Time-Out That Puts You on Your Guard"]

[Text] What put me on my guard was the time-out that Secretary of State George Shultz took, following his discussions in Moscow, before replying to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to scrap the medium-range and theatre missiles in Europe. It was taken, upon consultations in Brussels, also by the NATO allies of the United States. They claimed they were going to give careful consideration to the proposal that Mr Shultz had brought with him from Moscow. For the issue is to make a real breakthrough on the way to disarmament. Isn't the West trying to tangle it up and make nothing but a talking point out of it, I thought.

There is some ground for that kind of suspicion, you must admit. There has been too much evidence to show that Soviet proposals have disappeared deep in the recesses of the NATO Headquarters in Brussels amidst all kinds of studies, considerations, and clarifications.

It will be a whole year before long since NATO got down to a "careful study" of what would seem to be a very simple collective idea of the Warsaw Treaty countries--that of slashing conventional arms and cutting the strength of armed forces by a million on either side. There was been no progress in this sense so far, unfortunately. What's worse is that NATO people must have forgotten all

about that proposal as its leaders have all of a sudden begun to talk about a major Warsaw Pact edge in terms of divisions and conventional arms.

Beyond dispute, any new initiative has to be thrashed out first. However, the impression is that London, Paris and Bonn are in no way eager to do something practical towards ridding Europe of nuclear explosives and dragging their feet while cooking up all kinds of arguments to prove they just have to keep them where they are.

Paradoxical though it might seem, the idea of having American and Soviet missiles removed from Europe has displeased some States and politicians of Western Europe and the press that speaks for them. A French General, retired, thank God, has even called such a prospect disastrous....

All that is bound to put you on your guard, indeed. For the latest Soviet proposal on the missiles in Europe is another effort to create better conditions for a break through in the chronically difficult issue of nuclear arms control. All other linkages and obviously unacceptable demands betray a bid to keep nuclear weapons in Europe and have nothing to do with any concern for its security,

I would like to remind those who scare themselves by imagining that without American nuclear missiles Western Europe would be defenceless: the U.S. has 640 nuclear-capable aircraft in NATO countries and some 300 strike aircraft with such weapons on the carriers of the 2nd and 6th U.S. Fleets cruising off European shores. The missile accord that Moscow is calling for does not apply to those forces.

(APN, 20 April, In Full.)

#### IZVESTIYA on Western Reaction

PM221319 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed roundup: "The USSR's Proposals: Reactions in the West"]

[Excerpt] The optimistic notes heard in the appraisal of U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz' visit to Moscow and his talks with Soviet leaders contained in President Reagan's press statement (see IZVESTIYA No 108) inspire confidence that the people in Washington will finally decide to go -- if not the "last mile" promised earlier -- at least their part of the way to meet the Soviet Union in the question of arms control. These hopes are based on and result from a number of domestic and foreign policy factors. However, the picture would not be complete without mention of other opinions being expressed on the results of the visit both in the United States and in West Europe, opinions that are a clear indication not just of different approaches to this problem in the Atlantic alliance but also of diplomatic maneuvering to gain concessions.

Let us begin with the fact that in addition to positive reactions ("We have obtained a historic opportunity for substantial agreements with the Soviet Union in the sphere of arms control," -- H. Baker, White House chief of staff), people within the administration itself have amplified the tone of accusations leveled at the USSR in



connection with an alleged "imbalance" in the sphere of conventional arms. Some people are even claiming that the Warsaw Pact has an almost "treble superiority" over NATO without citing any evidence to corroborate this claim.

White House spokesman M. Fitzwater is already arguing that "an acceptable equal reduction of forces (conventional arms -- editor's note) must take into account the geographical asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact." In other words, since the United States is not a European power and since it is separated from the European "theater of military operations" by the Atlantic, the reductions -- according to this strange logic -- to be applied to it must also be immeasurably smaller.

You get the impression that now, the Soviet side has made an effective attempt once and for all to unite the knot of contradictions in the question of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles and the green light has been given to deciding the fate of battlefield nuclear weapons, the United States seems to have lost interest in these topics and switched to other "sore points."

The persistent questions with which journalists bombarded M. Fitzwater as to whether the U.S. Administration would now link the fate of medium-range missiles with prospects for the reduction of conventional arms in Europe are also noteworthy. The questions were unanswered. However, the very fact they were asked at the same time by many observers indicates people here are familiar with the stereotypical White House technique of trying, with the help of "linkage," to stall talks on arms control.

Washington's European NATO allies are also constantly referred to here as some kind of "supreme court" that will decide the fate of any future Soviet-U.S. agreements on nuclear weapons in Europe. They, as propaganda organs are claiming in every possible key, "are not yet ready for this" (THE WASHINGTON POST). Some West Germans, according to the NBC television network, are against the elimination of medium-range and operational and tactical missiles because "they cannot live without them."

The West Europeans believe, the ABC television network reports, that without these missiles they would be "more vulnerable toward the Soviet Union, which has a vast advantage in such nonnuclear means as tanks, aircraft, and artillery."

In raising this old argument, which has blocked the talks in Vienna on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe for many years, the Americans are desperately trying to attribute it to their allies. Meanwhile, not everything is as clear-cut as that. It is no accident that after G. Shultz' meeting in Brussels with 10 NATO foreign ministers and 5 deputy ministers, J. Clark, Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, noted differences had emerged not just between "the United States and Europe, but also between Europe and Europe" (meaning West Europe -- ed.).

Our Washington correspondent Artur Blinov transmitted a comment on the results of G. Shultz' meetings in Moscow made by Paul Warnke, former head of the U.S. delegation at the strategic arms limitation talks. He declared on television channel 5: "Moscow has made all the concessions necessary for the conclusion of an agreement. The future course of events will be a test of the sincerity of the present U.S. Administration's declarations of its desire for arms control." [passage citing foreign press omitted]

## Reagan, Shultz Brief Congressmen

LD220637 Moscow TASS in English 0635 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 22 TASS -- On Tuesday U.S. President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz met Congress Republican leaders at the White House. A White House spokesman said that they had informed legislators of the talks the secretary of state had had in Moscow and particulars of the Soviet proposals on liquidating medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

According to the White House spokesman, the U.S. President said that he appraised with optimism and realistically prospects for achieving understandings with the USSR on liquidating these systems of nuclear weapons in Europe. The White House spokesman said that, to all appearances, the Soviet Union wanted to make a headway with tackling the issue of medium-range nuclear missiles but a host of outstanding questions remained to be settled. At the same time the U.S. President intimated that he could not for the time being give a clear-cut positive reply to the constructive Soviet proposals. For instance, asked about a possibility of concluding a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles this year, he said that he was not inclined to dare guessing.

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## INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: REPORTAGE ON WRIGHT DELEGATION IN MOSCOW

### Gorbachev Greets Congressmen, Wives

PM161003 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 87 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "M.S. Gorbachev's Conversation With a U.S. Congress House of Representatives Delegation"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev met in the Kremlin on 15 April with the U.S. congressional delegation led by Jim Wright, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. The delegation including 20 congressmen, among whom are leading figures from both groups of the House, has already had a number of meetings with Soviet representatives in Kiev and in Moscow and started a discussion of a broad range of issues with the delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Before the conversation in full complement, Mikhail Gorbachev had a brief exchange of views with Jim Wright, Thomas Foley, House Democratic majority leader, and Richard Cheney, who represents the Republicans in the delegation.

Then all the participants in the meeting, many of whom were accompanied by their wives, were introduced to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Mikhail Gorbachev welcomed the visit to the Soviet Union of such an authoritative delegation, and congratulated its leader on the recent election to the high post of House speaker. He said approvingly that albeit the dialogue between the U.S. and Soviet MPs is a difficult one, it is gaining momentum. This assumes the greater significance in the light of the growing influence of the U.S. Congress on the policy of the United States and the role played by the USSR Supreme Soviet in carrying out the reorganisation.

You should rest assured, Mikhail Gorbachev told the guests, that the implementation of the plans for the transformations, which have been started in our country, constitutes no threat in any respect either to the United States or to anybody else. We welcome your visit, the more so that we would especially like to be understood now by both the U.S. Administration and the American people. There has been some progress in this respect recently. We have noticed that. Yet so far it has had little effect on real cooperation, whose level in no way corresponds either to the potentialities or the duties of both our countries. The role predestined by history to the USSR and the United States, makes it incumbent upon them to know each other better, since it is only in this way that it is possible to exclude surprises in politics and such decisions

that may prove to be extremely adverse to both countries and to all of mankind. for each of our countries to be confident of its future, we need mutual understanding and cooperation. Therefore, however difficult it may be, however the relations may be complicated at times through foreign and internal factors, we should never lose sight of that aim.

Mikhail Gorbachev voiced hope that after the election of the new leadership in Congress, the process of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue would become more regular, more intensive, and more productive.

Mikhail Gorbachev briefed the congressmen in detail on the contents of the talks with George Shultz. He expressed the opinion that both countries are close to reaching agreement on the problem of medium-range missiles in linkage with operational and tactical missiles. He also pointed out the Soviet Union's preparedness to scrap unilaterally that type of nuclear weapons in the course of several months or roughly a year. In that connection he again expressed perplexity about the "upside down logic", which already manifests itself in the attempts at responding to our new major initiative with an arms buildup.

This initiative provides another chance for a radical turn in international relations. The real intentions and abilities to make real steps towards international security will have to be judged by whether use is made of them. Our steps, our initiatives, Mikhail Gorbachev said, are motivated by our country's deep fundamental interests, and are closely linked with the period through which it is going. They are predetermined by new thinking, which includes the realization of the responsibility placed on the great powers by the current state of the situation in the world.

Mikhail Gorbachev dwelt upon the problem of reducing the triad of the strategic offensive weapons. He reaffirmed the immutable connection between the resolution of the issue with the observance of the ABM Treaty. He briefed the congressmen on the proposal made to George Shultz on ABM research, and stressed that there too our clarified compromise proposal is motivated by the wish to find a way out.

Mikhail Gorbachev resolutely rejected the conjectures that arise in the United States in waves and that sweep the congress at times, about the Soviet Union's alleged violation of the arrangements under the SALT II treaty. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had considerably reduced its strategic weapon systems to be within the frameworks set by these arrangements.

Mikhail Gorbachev attentively received considerations expressed by the U.S. congressmen, specifically, Jim Wright's statement that the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear explosions that lasted for 1 and 1/2 years, even though the U.S. Government had not joined in it, might yield tangible practical results in the near future.  
[paragraph continues]

Answering the call of the speaker to the Soviet leadership to continue observing restrictions imposed by the SALT II treaty, Gorbachev said that he welcomes his words, but in order to be fair, the Congress should also address the same call to the U.S. Administration, which ostentatiously violated the treaty in 1986.

Mikhail Gorbachev supported all the directions of cooperation proposed by Jim Wright: At the level of parliaments, exchanges among citizens, students, television link-ups, cultural ties, etc. He also received with interest the idea of a joint study of adjacent Soviet and U.S. regions of the north, as well as a project for jointly combatting famine and disease in Africa, even though all these things, naturally, require concrete analysis by experts.

We are truly sincere when we propose to exchange experience in the solution of various problems, including national ones, but for this to be useful, it is necessary to abandon speculations and attempts at interfering in internal affairs, to get rid of a gendarme's and teacher's ways. One must give up the "enemy image". All these are things of the past, intolerable in the present situation. What is needed is attention to all people, to every country and a self-critical attitude toward oneself and the problems of one's own country. We must be aware of mutual responsibility, whether we like each other or not.

Humanitarian matters, matters of emigration were touched upon. The congressmen expressed the opinion that the transformations taking place in the Soviet Union contribute to the strengthening of the atmosphere of confidence and this, in its turn, will be promoting the solution of many problems, both bilateral and international.

So far one has to note, however, that methods that can only impede positive processes are still used in the question of human rights. We witness actions that, as Mikhail Gorbachev put it, one feels awkward even to mention, as, for instance, when dissatisfied persons are sought out on purpose among Soviet people and a falsified image of Soviet society is formed with their assistance.

In conclusion Mikhail Gorbachev noted that there are no taboo questions in the dialogue with the Congress, and with the West in general, and personal contacts are very important for there are no politics in general. They always have their champions, concrete persons invested with confidence, and even with power, and when they know each other, they can predict what will be the attitude to some or other action, to some or other political step. This helps appraise correctly the conditions of making decisions and their consequences. So, from this view point, too, the visit of such an important delegation from the United States is, undoubtedly, a positive occurrence.

The detailed conversation with the congressmen was marked by mutual awareness of the importance of the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations and the striving to seek approaches to the solution of vital international problems.

Anatoliy Dobrynin, Lev Tolkunov, Yuriy Dubinin, and Georgiy Arbatov took part in the meeting.

#### Wright on Gorbachev Meeting

LD170144 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Our reporter Sergey Goryachev talked with James Wright, head of the U.S. congressional delegation and House speaker.

[Goryachev] Mr Wright, what problems have you discussed with the general secretary Gorbachev?

[Wright] Well, we discussed the whole range of issues pending between the United States and the Soviet Union. He was very unrestrained; he was very forthcoming; he was very frank and very candid. We talked about arms control issues. He described the Soviet initiative as it effects intermediate-range and short-range INF missiles. Also, he talked in terms of a planned reduction of other, even conventional, weapons. He talked also of his attitude toward the ABM Treaty and his belief that we must continue to observe it. We agreed that we should. We encouraged him in the continued observance of the SALT II numerical limits even though that treaty was not ratified. We believe that we in the United States will return to an observance of it. We also encouraged him in the belief that we felt our secretary of state and our administration were sincere in the desire to achieve an agreement on short- and medium-range missiles in Europe, reducing them perhaps to the zero point.

[Goryachev] Mr Wright, has the American delegation come out with any new projects for possible Soviet-American cooperatin?

[Wright] Yes, we've offered some suggestions that we might consider; that we might jointly consider projects to explore the Bering Straits, that we might jointly perform some good works in Africa to abate hunger and disease and demonstrate to the world that these two great peoples can work together for peaceful pursuits and not always be eyeing one another with suspicion across fences of bristling armaments. I am guardedly optimistic. I see a more open and forthcoming attitude on the part of the Soviet Union than I have seen in the last 50 years. I believe the chances are better right now than they have been at any time in our modern recollection for us to achieve binding, verifiable and mutual reductions in these deadly armaments.

[Goryachev] Do you believe that the American side should also demonstrate some flexibility?

[Wright] Yes, I do. Without that it isn't possible. It has to be a two-way street.

[Goryachev] Mr Wright, Mr Gorbachev spoke about the desire of the Soviet leadership to broaden people-to-people contacts with the United States. How would you think about this idea?

[Wright] I think it's the very best idea to come along. If we are to have the basis for understanding and for support among the public at large for the broader things that have to be done such as reducing armaments then I think it's important for the people to understand one another. Perfect knowledge drives away fear. The more we know each other the less likely we are to suspect one another; the less likely we are to live in suspicion and fear of one another.

[Goraychev] Mr Wright, would you please describe General Secretary Gorbachev to our listeners? What kind of man is he?

[Wright] I find him to be a thoroughly engaging person -- intelligent, well informed, unafraid, totally willing to enter into the give and take of an exchange, practicing as well as preaching the doctrine of glasnost, welcoming others to talk with him even when they disagree and then entering into a spirited discussion with them. That's the kind of man I find him to be.

[Goryachev] Do you trust Mr Gorbachev?

[Wright] Yes, yes I do. I think he's very sincere. I think he sincerely and earnestly wants to create conditions of peace in which his country and our country both may be more secure.

## Dobrynin, Wright Discuss Talks

LD161825 Moscow TASS in English 1739 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS -- Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Dobrynin met today with a delegation of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress led by Speaker of the House Jim Wright.

A wide range of problems which are of fundamental importance for assuring a stable development of Soviet-American relations, for improving the international situation was discussed in an open [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian in an identical report at 1741 GMT on 16 April uses the word "frank" (otkrovennyy) at this point] and constructive spirit.

Special attention was paid to comprehensive proposals advanced by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague and in a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Anatoliy Dobrynin stressed that the new Soviet proposals opened realistic prospects for concluding a treaty on medium-range missiles and for advancing in other important matters toward a non-violent world without nuclear arms. This opens one more chance for a cardinal turn in international relations.

The American guests, on their part, expressed profound satisfaction with a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev during which they were thoroughly informed of a peaceful nature of the Soviet Union's foreign policy course, the readiness of the Soviet side to develop relations with the USA on terms of reciprocity. The present level of these relations is not in keeping with either potentialities or obligations of the two countries.

The side noted the importance of continuing an intensive systematic dialogue between representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet and U.S. congressmen.

## Shevardnadze Meets Delegation

PM200945 PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Talk With U.S. Congressman"]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, had a talk 18 April with a delegation of members of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, led by James Wright, speaker of the House. The delegation was staying in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The talk proceeded in a businesslike and frank [otkrovennyy] atmosphere.

Eduard Shevardnadze set forth the Soviet Union's principled approach to accomplishing the task of a drastic reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons -- an approach embodied in the program for a nuclear weapon-free world put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his January 15, 1986, statement and in the position of the Soviet side at the Reykjavik meeting.

In the existing conditions the Soviet Union's innovative initiatives aimed at eliminating medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in Europe are especially important.

The realization of these initiatives which were at the center of the talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow a few days ago would make it possible to make a major step ahead toward decreasing the level of military confrontation on the European Continent, improve the situation in the world as a whole and promote an overall improvement in relations between the USSR and the U.S.

The Soviet minister of foreign affairs then dwelt on the task of settling regional conflicts and singled out, among other things, the existence of a realistic possibility for a political settlement of the situation related to Afghanistan on the basis of the program for national reconciliation formulated by the Government of the DRA.

Eduard Shevardnadze reiterated that the Soviet Union consistently favored a positive development of bilateral contacts and exchanges with the U.S. In this context the importance of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space signed during George Shultz' visit was noted.

The U.S. congressmen agreed that security issues were a top priority matter in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and that the time was ripe for resolving some of them, specifically, the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe.

The U.S. side expressed support for observing the quantitative limits under SALT II and resolving the problem of terminating nuclear tests. In this context the congressmen highly appraised the moratorium on nuclear explosions the Soviet Union had observed for over 18 months.

The U.S. congressmen said that they support the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations.

During the meeting some of the congressmen set forth the idea of establishing cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. in providing relief aid to the hunger-stricken people in a number of regions of the world.

In response the Soviet side said that the USSR consider the solution of the problem of hunger to be very important and that it was prepared to develop efficient international cooperation to these ends. It was emphasized that the termination of the arms race and reduction of military spending would release a huge amount of funds for that.

Yuriy Dubinin, ambassador of the USSR to the U.S., and Jack F. Matlock, ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR, were present during the talk.

#### Gromyko Receives Congressmen

PM161057 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS Report: "U.S. Congress Delegation in Kremlin"]

[Excerpts] Andrey Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, received on 15 April in the Kremlin a delegation of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, headed by Speaker James Wright, now on a visit in the Soviet Union on the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.



Characterizing Soviet-U.S. relations Andrey Gromyko said that their complex and contradictory nature should not exert a negative impact on the situation in the whole world. As to the Soviet Union, it is persistently and consistently striving to facilitate the solution of key problems of our time -- rid the world of nuclear weapons, create a reliable system of international security, and banish violence from relations between states.

The Soviet side stressed most categorically that relations between countries, especially major powers, must be built not on the stereotypes guiding the advocates of the arms race but on the principles of peace, the reduction and elimination of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the inadmissibility of an arms race to space, and the creation of a system of general security.

No country, irrespective of whether it is big or small, should be the target of aggression or outside pressure by another country or a group of countries.

All the proposals, which have been put forward by the Soviet Union in the course of the meetings and talks with the United States, breathe peace. A special place among them is held by those that were demonstrated during the Soviet-U.S. summit meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. They equally accord with the security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as of all other states. The Soviet initiatives are based on the most cherished ideas of people all over the world.

The agreement between the USSR and the United States on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, which was signed in Moscow today, is in a certain measure an indicator of the fact that the two powers can, if they wish, bring to a logical end the talks on issues of mutual interest.

The Soviet Union's proposals, set out the other day in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Prague, about the Soviet Union's readiness not only to conclude an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe but also to start discussing the question of the reduction and subsequent elimination of operational and tactical missiles deployed in the European continent, attracted the attention of the whole world. These initiatives, alongside the proposals to reduce strategic offensive arms and to prevent the militarization of space pursue profoundly peaceful aims suiting the interests of all humanity.

The Soviet-U.S. talks held these days in Moscow and Mikhail Gorbachev's conversation with George Shultz have shown that the Soviet side has the most serious intentions. As for the U.S. side, what was voiced by George Shultz shows that apparently it has not yet decided on its attitude toward the Soviet proposals. In any case, the views expressed here by the United States secretary of state do not present a basis for an accord.

#### Ligachev Meets Delegation

LD171217 Moscow TASS in English 1159 GMT 17 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 17 Apr (TASS)--Yegor Ligachev, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, today received a delegation of the United States Congress headed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives James Wright.

Yegor Ligachev also dwelt on the international aspect of the profound changes in the Soviet Union. The restructuring is unbreakably linked with the USSR's vigorous peaceloving policy. On the one hand, its scope depends on the reliability of peace, on the stability of the international situation. On the other hand, the renewal imparts still greater dynamism and intensity to the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state, strengthens the foundation of their struggle for peace.

The Soviet Union invariably displays political will and takes practical steps to solve key international problems. The proposals made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech in Prague and in the conversation with the United States Secretary of State George Shultz are added evidence of this. They open up new possibilities for finding solutions to key problems of arms limitation and reduction, for a cardinal change in international relations. Will these possibilities be translated into reality, and if they will, then how soon? This depends entirely on the United States now, Yegor Ligachev said.

It was noted from both sides that a vast field of possibilities exists for improving and deepening Soviet-American relations. The importance of stepping up concrete efforts in the search of ways of ensuring a peaceful nature of relations between the USSR and the United States for the good of the peoples of both countries and in the name of mankind's survival was stressed.

Present at the conversation were chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Lev Tolkunov, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Georgiy Arbatov and the ambassador of the United States in the USSR Jack Matlock.

#### Arbatov, Congressmen Hold Talks

LD161846 Moscow TASS in English 1838 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Excerpts] Moscow, 16 Apr (TASS)--Relations between the USA and the USSR over many years were marked by mistrust, mutual suspiciousness and apprehension. This state of affairs must be altered. Member of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congressman Sherwood Boehlert said this today during a debate in the working group on bilateral Soviet-American relations. The delegation is staying here on an official visit at the invitation of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Congressman Boehlert said that when he had been going to the USSR He hoped to learn if openness really existed there or if it was merely propaganda.

Pointing to the danger of the arms race, Boehlert declared that a part of the funds now spent on military programmes should be transferred for the needs of scientific research, for measures of environmental protection. Instead of spending funds on cruise and Pershing missiles I would like the U.S. Government to appropriate more funds for scientific research, for construction, for instance, of a centre to study atmospheric phenomena, he said. People are dying of hunger and diseases at a time when billions of dollars are spent on bombs and cannons that are of no use for humanity, he said. He declared for broad development of cooperation in the sphere of medicine.

## Tolkunov Welcomes Congressmen

LD151456 Moscow TASS in English 1343 GMT 15 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 15 TASS -- A delegation of the House of Representatives of U.S. Congress on an official visit to the Soviet Union and the leadership of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet today had a meeting at the Kremlin.

Welcoming the American guests, Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "What has brought us together at this table? It is awareness of the catastrophic consequences of a possible nuclear conflict and concern for the survival of humanity. Despite our differences of outlook, some of them fundamental, we all are aware of the value and importance of dialogue and the vital need for an improvement in Soviet-American relations, an improvement without which life of peace is unthinkable." We stand for normal and stable relations between our social systems and ideologies should not lead to tension in our relations.

It is our conviction that both powers should gear their policies to mutual understanding rather than hostility.

Lev Tolkunov noted that the present situation offered no other alternative. The survival of humanity has become the imperative of our age. There is a need for a new philosophy of international relations and a new mode of thinking. The chairman of the Soviet of the Union drew attention to the Soviet program for building a nuclear weapon-free world, the program for the elimination of all weapons of mass annihilation by the end of the century. "We are ready to eliminate medium-range, shorter range and battlefield missiles in Europe, ban chemical weapons and destroy their arsenals, substantially reduce conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe, and reintroduce a moratorium on nuclear explosions."

Speaking on behalf of the American delegation, its leader, Jim Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives of U.S. Congress, said that the American congressmen were seeking to discuss the most complex problem, that of preserving peace, which should be tackled with a determination like that displayed by our countries in fighting Nazism. "Peace is not simply an absence of war. Rather the fact is that peace is a positive factor and a condition required for the fulfillment of the purposes of men and women all over the world," he stressed. "This morning our group has visited the Tomb of the Unknown Soviet Soldier and the Lenin Mausoleum and paid our tribute to the heroes of the Soviet Union. Some of this delegation were engaged in the Second World War along with members of your Armed Forces.... I turned back and looked at the faces of the young men standing guard at the Mausoleum."

"And as I saw them I thought of those who died in defense of the freedom of this great nation against the barbarous hordes of Nazism."

The leader of the American delegation said furthermore: "We have, I believe, an unrivaled opportunity to create conditions for a more peaceful world so that the children of the generation of those young men who stood guard at the Mausoleum could have peace."

Turning to contacts between the USSR and the U.S. at different levels, including the summit level, Jim Wright said:

"We hope that the results of those talks and subsequent talks which we hope will be held between your general secretary Mr Gorbachev and our President Mr Reagan will produce a mutual and verifiable reduction in all armaments on your part and on our part and ultimately we may begin both of us to devote a greater proportion of our resources to the attainment of noble human aims."

"I have read with great interest the speech that was made in Czechoslovakia only a few days ago by Mr Gorbachev and we have heard the new spirit of openness and your new efforts to restructure and strengthen your economy and your social system."

The House speaker said that he had visited the Soviet Union 15 years previously and had now seen immense progress. He thanked the Soviet hosts for the opportunity for several delegation members to go out to Chernobyl, where they had got answers to all their questions. He characterised this as an example of openness and candour on the Soviet side. "We have tired of spending 300 billion dollars a year on military strength."

"It seems foolish we should be building debts, borrowing from our children and grandchildren in order to build weapons which will be used in war now and of which they will have no use."

"How many young Soviet citizens and how many young Americans could be given a higher education with just a fraction of what we are spending? And there are many people who will die of disease and plague and of the new disease AIDS who could have been saved. What a great thing it would be if next year we in the United States and you in the Soviet Union jointly were able to spend less on military strength."

"It is my belief that we will build bridges and tear down the walls that divide us, the walls of alienation, hostility, misunderstanding and mistrust, and use those bricks that have been in those walls to build bridges and highways of better communication."

#### Luncheon in Kremlin

LD161251 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS -- The chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet today gave in the Kremlin a luncheon in honour of the delegation of the House of Representatives of U.S. congress on an official visit to the Soviet Union.

Welcoming the visitors, Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "Our ideal is a nuclear-free world. It is a world living without fear of nuclear catastrophe that is the goal of an historical statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15, 1986, the resolutions of the 27th congress of our party and many other foreign-policy initiatives of the Soviet state."

The USSR, he continued, suggests that medium-range missiles in Europe should be eliminated. We also are ready to eliminate shorter-range missiles. The USSR agrees that research into air defences can be conducted on the condition that it is confined to laboratories, and proposes that work should begin to formulate the key principles of further talks on the strategic triad, the regime of the ABM Treaty and nuclear testing.

Progress in each of these major areas is possible and an important role in achieving it can be played by the highest legislative bodies of our countries, by all parliamentarians. Our duty is to do everything we can to ensure a life of calm and peace for the present and future generations.

Speaking on behalf of the delegation of U.S. Congress, the delegation leader, House Speaker Jim Wright (Democrat, Texas), stressed the importance of the comprehensive development of Soviet-American relations. He said that the delegation had read with interest the speech made by Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague the other day. He added that there was no single way to peace and social development, that there were different ways and that individual countries were free to choose any.

Jim Wright said that the stereotypes of the USSR as an aggressive state, common in the West, including the U.S., were wrong. Some people in the U.S., he said, still see the communists as people brandishing arms and dreaming of conquests. Wright ridiculed the tales current in the U.S. about the suppression of religion in the Soviet Union.

The delegation leader stressed in conclusion that all people today wanted to live in a world free from wars, violence and nuclear weapons.

AFP: Accord 'Close'

BK160232 Hong Kong AFP in English 0155 GMT 16 Apr 87

[Article by Sylvie Kauffmann]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Apr (AFP)--The United States and the Soviet Union are close to an accord on both intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said Thursday.

The official TASS News Agency quoted Mr Gorbachev as telling a group of 21 visiting U.S. congressmen that Moscow was willing to unilaterally eliminate the shorter-range weapons "in several months, basically in a year."

The Kremlin chief briefed the congressmen on his talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who left from Brussels on Wednesday after reporting that agreement on medium-range Euromissiles was "close at hand."

Mr Gorbachev told the U.S. legislators that Moscow and Washington were "close to an accord on the problem of intermediate-range missiles, and as a corollary, on shorter-range missiles."

He had offered to include the question of shorter-range arms in any accord on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) during 4½ hours of talks with Mr Shultz on Tuesday. Washington said it would have to discuss the proposal with its allies.

(Mr Shultz arrived in the Belgian capital on Wednesday evening and was due to brief North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies on Thursday and Friday about his talks with Soviet officials.

(A member of his delegation, who refused to be named, cited "understandable concern" among the United States' European allies that the Soviet arms proposals could leave them exposed to superior Soviet conventional forces.)

Mr Gorbachev first met here with Jim Wright, speaker of the Democratic-controlled U.S. House of Representatives, House Majority Leader Thomas Foley and Richard Cheney, a Republican congressman. He then saw the entire delegation, which was invited here by the Supreme Soviet, or Parliament.

The congressmen also met with Soviet President Andre Gromyko, who told them that Mr Shultz' discussions here showed that the United States had not yet decided on its response to the Soviet proposals, TASS said.

"In any case, the views expressed by the American secretary of state do not constitute the basis of an accord," Mr Gromyko said. Moscow has complained that the United States did not really want to eliminate shorter-range arms in Europe, but rather to increase them.

But by the end of Mr Shultz's three-day visit, both superpowers expressed optimism that an accord on Euromissiles was within reach.

Mr Shultz, who had two unscheduled sessions of late-night talks here, said on Soviet television that his visit had "considerably" boosted chances for an accord on intermediate- and shorter-range weapons.

However, in a half-hour interview broadcast after his departure, Mr Shultz reiterated that many problems remained to be resolved. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to "global" security and strict verification procedures.

The chief U.S. diplomat said that little headway had been made on the question of nuclear tests. He had told a news conference before leaving here that "not much progress" had been made on the major issues of strategic weapons and research on a space-based defense system.

(In Santa Barbara, California, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said progress had been made at the Moscow talks, but added "more clearly remains to be done.")

Mr Shultz's visit was the first here by a senior U.S. official since the October summit in the Icelandic capital of Reykjavik. Those talks broke down on Mr Gorbachev's insistence on including space research in any accord on weapons.

The secretary of state said he had come to Moscow with new proposals on the U.S. "Star Wars" plans, formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

On eliminating intermediate-range forces, Mr Shultz said Moscow wanted each side to maintain 100 warheads, with the Soviet missiles deployed in Soviet Asia, and the U.S. missiles in the United States.

For verification purposes, the United States wanted the complete elimination of intermediate weapons, but would go along with the Soviet view in the interest of an accord, he said.

Mr Shultz said Washington was still waiting to hear Moscow's reaction to a draft treaty including stiff verification proposals, which was presented at Geneva. Moscow would have the opportunity to give its views when the Geneva talks resumed on 23 April, he said.

Moscow proposed removing shorter-range missiles from East Germany and Czechoslovakia on the signing of an INF treaty, and eliminating the rest in a year as part of "negotiations over remaining missiles."

TASS said that the talks had been carried out in a "frank and workmanlike" manner, and that the two sides had agreed to continue contacts at all levels including between their foreign ministers.

#### Wright TV Interview

LD182230 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Special program: "Interview with James Wright, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to Soviet television"; with political observer Vitaliy Ilyashenko; Wright speaks in English fading into superimposed Russian translation; slantlines indicate portions audible in English that differ from Russian translation]

[Excerpts] [Ilyashenko] Good evening, comrades, I would like to introduce you to James Wright, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. He is leading the delegation of U.S. congressmen that is currently visiting our country.

Mr Wright, as I understand it, our visit is coming to an end. During the visit you have had the opportunity to meet and talk to many statesmen and politicians in our country, including Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. What are your impressions, and what would you like to say to Soviet television viewers?

[Wright] First of all, my fellow citizens -- you probably find it strange that I address you as fellow citizens, since I am a U.S. citizen and you are citizens of the USSR, but still, in a certain sense, we are fellow citizens. We are citizens of the world, and the world is becoming smaller and smaller. Science and technology have caused the planet earth to become smaller: It took Christopher Columbus 56 days to cross the Atlantic Ocean, while I covered the same distance last week in only 6 hours. In order to express that fact in a much more dangerous concept, I will mention that the distance between Vladivostok and Fort Worth, Texas, /where I live/ can be covered by a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile in 40 minutes. [passage omitted]

I lead the work of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. We allocate money for everything that our government does -- we levy taxes. And last week we completed the process of preparing the annual U.S. budget, and I am convinced that very tragic events are taking place in both our countries. This year the United States is spending on the order of \$300 billion, which is about R280 million on tools for killing and destruction, on tools of destruction that no one needs. Your country will spend approximately the same sum of money on these same things. This is an enormous waste of resources for both countries, at a time when the legitimate needs of the peoples are not being satisfied. There are young people in our country who will not get a good higher education purely because we are spending so much on arms -- we are not going to be able to give them the necessary grants and allowances. In both of our countries there are opportunities for building hospitals, but they will not be built. There are many lives that could be saved, but they will not be saved because we spend so much on reinforcing our military might. And a considerable part of the money that we are spending -- at least in my country -- we are going to compel our children and our grandchildren to pay for it, in the form of our national debt.

Today the countries of the world have something on the order of 60,000 nuclear warheads. Their destructive capacity exceeds by 1 and 1/2 million times the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Between us, between our two countries, we hold in our hands enough destructive power to put an end to the existence of civilization itself. Under these circumstances, it seems to me that we really do not have a common enemy, and this common enemy is war itself.

We have a common purpose: And the common purpose is peace. As a token of our friendship, I would like to send you a small personal gift, if you will allow me, if you will agree to accept it. It has no great material value, but I would like to send you an expression of our will to cooperate with you. That is what I would like to say. It is now going to be shown. Jim Wright, from Washington, in the United States. Write me a letter even if you like. If you write me a small letter and say that you have seen this program, then I would like to send you this small badge which I have pinned on me here. Here you see the flag of your country and the flag of my country. Here they are side by side and if you write me a short note and send it to this address, then I will be glad to send you this emblem with my best personal wishes. [video shows Wright fingering badge on his lapel which consists of crossed flags of USSR and the United States; Wright's address appears moving across the bottom of the screen in Cyrillic characters, reading: J. Wright, Washington DC, United States]

I know that people of my generation -- you love your children as I love my children. People of the older and of the younger generations -- you love your country, without doubt, just as I love my country. And so I offer you this wish, to your children and our children, and to the children of our children: May they live in peace. And that is what I wanted to say to the Soviet people.

[Ilyashenko] Mr Wright, talks between Mr Shultz and Comrade Shevardnadze, our foreign ministers, have just ended in Moscow. As is known, attention was focused on questions of arms limitation, on disarmament talks. What hopes do you see in connection with the disarmament talks, and what is your assessment of the results of the talks between Mr Shultz and Shevardnadze?

[Wright] Well, I think that some good was done; the first step was taken along the road to peace by our two countries this week. They signed a new agreement which defines 16 joint experiments or projects that we are going to carry out jointly in space.



In addition to that, I think that they will reach agreement on numerical limits on intermediate armaments, that is to say, no more than 100 warheads on each side. In this connection, they have carried out some preliminary discussion which I think will lead to the reaching of an additional agreement on shorter-range armaments. These agreements must be discussed with our Western allies, still -- of course, but I have complete grounds for expecting -- as a result of those talks that we have held with Mr Gorbachev and Mr Shevardnadze and also with Mr Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State -- that we will find mutually acceptable agreements in order that we may at least begin to get this process moving as far as intermediate-range and shorter-range systems are concerned, so that they can be eliminated.

[Ilyashenko] Just now you mentioned large, unproductive expenditures, if it can be described like that, on armaments in the United States of America and in our country. You mentioned the figure \$300 billion. In a recent interview with the ABC television company, you said that you are in favor of gradually reviewing, if it can be put like that, priorities for financing in the United States. What do you mean by that?

[Wright] We are spending around \$300 billion on weapons, and we think that the Soviet Union is spending approximately the same sum. That is, a huge proportion of our wealth, of our resources. We do it largely because we fear what the Soviet Union might do against us if we did not do it; you probably do it because you fear what we might do if you didn't do so. It is a pity that we engage in this. It seems strange to us that the Soviet Union fears what we might do because we have no aggressive intentions. Perhaps you think that we do have these intentions. Each country is the product of its own history, and I recall that my country has been fortunate in that no other country has ever invaded it since the days of the revolution when Great Britain encroached on our territory: If during my lifetime misfortune overtook us -- if for example the Nazis had invaded us as they invaded the Ukraine, and that almost got as far as Moscow; and if the siege of Leningrad had been a siege of Chicago or New York, then we would probably be afraid just as the people of the Soviet Union is afraid of this.

#### PRAVDA Cites Wright

PM211056 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "An Agreement Must Be Concluded: J. Wright on Arms Control"]

[Text] New York, 20 Apr -- The recent Soviet peace initiatives were greeted with great interest in Washington and are now being actively discussed in U.S. political circles. As James Wright, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, stated after his official visit to the Soviet Union as head of a delegation of American legislators, there is now the best opportunity since World War II of achieving genuine peace in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Peace, he noted in an NBC television interview, is not simply the lack of armed conflict, but a situation in which understanding exists and where both sides attempt to get on with each other. Of course, there are people who do not want an arms control agreement and who want the "cold war" and the arms race to continue. But we have reached a point where, it seems to me, it would be to our advantage to conclude an arms control agreement which is reciprocal and verifiable. That would enable us to begin to reduce the huge U.S. federal budget deficit. We spend \$300 billion a year on arms. There are sufficient explosives and nuclear arms in the world to blow us all up several times over.

M.S. Gorbachev is trying to move the peace process forward, the speaker of the House of Representatives stressed. I do not think there are many serious obstacles, Wright went on, to the conclusion of an agreement on medium-range and even shorter-range missiles. In my opinion everything depends on the consent of our Western allies. Many of them are very enthusiastic about this idea.

At the same time another member of the delegation of American legislators, Les Aspin, speaking on an ABC television program, came out against the very idea of the progressive elimination, piece by piece, of nuclear arms in Europe, claiming that it would even be dangerous, since, according to him, there is no balance of nonnuclear forces in Europe. At the same time Aspin confirmed that together with other Democratic congressmen he will ask the Reagan administration to adopt the "package" of proposals submitted in the House of Representatives last fall, concerning control in the sphere of strategic arms. In particular, this means demands for the limitation of nuclear tests and compliance with the 1972 Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and the ceilings imposed on strategic arms by the SALT II treaty.

There is no single approach to arms control questions even within the administration. As the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR points out, there is still no consensus in Washington concerning the planned accord on nuclear missiles in Europe. "The Pentagon hard-liners," it notes, "want to continue the military, economic, and technological pressure on the Soviet Union." They seek to delay the attainment of an accord, and they "detest the idea that Congress could find grounds for cutting military spending," the article stresses.

#### TASS Cites Wright

LD181342 Moscow TASS in English 1318 GMT 18 Apr 87

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS -- James Wright, leader of a delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives on a visit to the Soviet Union, said today that if President Reagan asked his opinion about the results of the trip, he would tell him it was his firm belief that the time now was most favorable for a mutual arms reductions agreement with the Soviet Union.

Wright, who is the speaker of the House of Representatives, made his remarks at a news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents before the delegation's departure for home. The American Congressmen visited here at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the USSR.

Wright said that the funds released as a result of arms reductions could be spent on education, medical research, environmental protection and to grapple with other important problems.

The congressman said the opinion about the felicitous conditions now for an arms reduction agreement, which was shared by other delegation members, was based on their meetings with Soviet leaders, including Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and useful and frank exchanges of opinions with Soviet parliamentarians.

Asked to comment on the Reagan administration's attempts to review the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and give it a "broad interpretation", he said the original interpretation was the only one correct and it would be wrong now to give other interpretations of the letter and spirit of that bilateral document.

The house speaker voiced the hope for a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles in a linkage with shorter-range missiles in the near future. He said it would be a practical step towards a more comprehensive arms reduction treaty.

#### Wright News Conference

LD182135 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report on 18 April Moscow news conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs by U.S. congressional delegation headed by James Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives; James Wright and unidentified delegation member speak in English fading into Russian translation; correspondents unidentified]

[Text] There was a news conference today in Moscow by a delegation of the U.S. Congress. James Wright, the speaker of the House of Representatives, delivered a brief introductory address.

[Begin recording] [Wright] Frank and fruitful [otkrovennyye i plodotvornyye] talks have been held in Moscow. We learned of the changes taking place in your great country. It is our view -- and I think that I am speaking on behalf of all of us -- that the present moment presents us with a wonderful opportunity, the best in 15 years, to achieve accord in the field of arms reduction.

[Correspondent, in English fading into Russian translation] Why doesn't your speech contain criticism of the Soviet Government?

[Wright] We have come on a mission of peace -- not of criticism. All too often we have pointed the finger at each other. All too often we have spoken at more than great length. It would be more productive to use the time to seek solutions.

[Unidentified delegation member] Of course journalists understand that the delegation represents various viewpoints. Our talks here have been very frank, especially on those issues where we differ.

[Unidentified correspondent, in English fading into Russian translation] According to a report today in THE NEW YORK TIMES, Gorbachev stated that the United States could solve its race problem by creating a separate state for national minorities. What specifically did he say, and what was your reply?

[Wright] He did not say that; he did not give us any such advice on resolving our internal problems. Gorbachev is a man with considerably more sense than that.

[Correspondent] Let me call upon the U.S. side to be democratic. Of 15 questions, only one has been asked by a Soviet correspondent. It has been reported that during his meetings, the speaker of the House discussed such issues as the prospects for preserving the SALT II treaty.

[Wright] Most members of Congress would like to preserve the limitations under this treaty. In my conversations with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, I spoke in favor of observing the provisions of SALT II. Despite the President's decision to exceed the limits of the treaty by one cruise missile, we hope that it will be possible to preserve the treaty. [end recording]

The U.S. Congressional delegation left Moscow today.

#### Meeting With Ligachev

LD172045 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Apr 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Comrade Ligachev today received a delegation from the U.S. Congress led by Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives.

The meaning of the efforts that we are undertaking, Comrade Ligachev said, is to reveal as fully as possible the potential of socialism. The restructuring is indissolubly linked with the USSR's vigorous peace-loving policy. On the one hand, its scope depends on the reliability of peace, on the stability of the international situation. On the other hand, the restructuring imparts still greater dynamism and intensity to the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state, strengthens the foundation of their struggle for peace.

The Soviet Union invariably displays political will and takes practical steps to solve key international problems. The initiatives put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his speech in Prague, and the conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz are additional evidence of this. They open up new possibilities for finding solutions to key problems of arms limitation and reduction, for a cardinal change in international relations.

Will these possibilities be translated into reality, and if they will, then how soon? This depends entirely on the United States.

It was noted from both sides that a vast field of possibilities exists for improving and deepening Soviet-U.S. relations. The importance was stressed of stepping up concrete efforts in the search for ways to ensure the peaceful nature of relations between the USSR and the United States for the good of the peoples of both countries and in the name of mankind's survival.

### Meeting With Shcherbitskiy

AU210911 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 15 Apr 87 p 1

[RATAU report: "A Meeting in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Excerpts] On 13 April V.V. Shcherbitskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, met a delegation of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress which visited Kiev with J. Wright, speaker of the House, at the head. The delegation was visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Participating in the meeting was V.S. Shevchenko, Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member and Supreme Soviet chairman.

V.V. Shcherbitskiy pointed out the close unity between the USSR domestic and foreign policy. The changes taking place in the country convincingly confirm our adherence to the cause of peace and international cooperation. The visitors' attention was called to the Soviet initiatives aimed at ensuring mankind's survival, and reliable security for each people. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the new Soviet proposals presented by M.S. Gorbachev in his speech at the 10 April Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship meeting in Prague, proposals that open the way to reaching an agreement if the corresponding political will is shown on the other side.

Speaker J. Wright and other American congressmen displayed interest in the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. The visitors spoke in favor of improving relations between the United States and the USSR, and agreed with the view that effective talks on reducing weapons were necessary. They expressed satisfaction with the conversation which was held, having evaluated it as a frank one, and expressed thanks for the hospitable reception.

Both sides pointed out the great importance of parliamentary contacts for strengthening confidence and mutual understanding in order to eliminate the threat of nuclear conflict. The visitors expressed the hope that the visit paid by the delegation of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress would facilitate the search for mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of both states and of strengthening peace.

Participating in the meeting were also G.A. Arbatov, V.A. Masol, and B.Ye. Paton, USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, as well as V.K. Vrublevskiy, A.V. Merkulov, and V.A. Pereloma, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputies.

### News Conference on Departure

PM211117 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 87 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Visit Completed"]

[Text] The delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives headed by J. Wright, speaker of the House, left the Soviet Union 18 April. The delegation had been in our country on an official visit at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At the airport in Moscow it was seen off by A.E. Voss, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities, USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies G.A. Arbatov, V.V. Dementsev, and N.I. Maslennikov, and other officials.

J.F. Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, was among the send-off party.

Before the departure a news conference for the delegation took place at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center. J. Wright spoke of their great satisfaction with their meeting with Soviet leaders and the exchange of opinions at the USSR Supreme Soviet. He described the talks which had been held as "honest and frank [otkrovennyye]." The speaker pointed also the importance the talks held this week in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. We believe, the head of the delegation said, the most suitable time has now come that for the first time in the past 15 years will give us a better chance of achieving a constructive accord on the problem of arms reduction.

Answering questions, J. Wright noted in particular that for all the difference of the political systems of the United States and the USSR it is not expedient to waste time of mutual accusations when it could be spent fruitfully on seeing mutually acceptable solutions.

J. Wright said Congress is seeking to observe the ABM Treaty and expressed the conviction that its initial interpretation is correct and that no other interpretations are needed. He also expressed himself in favor of observing the SALT II treaty.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### SOVIET COLONEL SAYS NATO 'UNDERMINES' STOCKHOLM ACCORDS

PM271051 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

[Colonel I. Bogdanov article: "Strengthening Confidence and Lessening the Danger. How the Stockholm Accords Are Operating"]

[Text] At the meeting in Vienna of the representatives of 33 European states, the United States, and Canada, where the problems of European security and cooperation are being discussed, the participants are devoting their constant attention to questions of implementing the accords reached at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. And this is no coincidence. The Stockholm accords are now essentially the touchstone against which the true intentions of each of the all-European conference participant states are tested.

The Stockholm accords represented a great step toward easing tension and improving the European political climate. As CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev has remarked, at the Stockholm conference the socialist countries, in constructive cooperation with its other participants, has done much to find solutions to such key questions as the nonuse of force, the notification of military exercises and troop movements, the exchange of annual plans for military activity, the invitation of observers, and monitoring.

The Stockholm accords represent measures formulated in detail which, given their strict fulfillment (and this is an indispensable condition), are designed to improve understanding of the nature of military activity conducted by the participant states, strengthen confidence, and lessen the danger of armed conflict in Europe. For example, notifications of forthcoming ground forces exercises in which no fewer than 13,000 men or 800 tanks will be engaged, the exchange of annual plans of military activity subject to notification, and other accords are intended to serve this purpose. How are they being implemented?

The representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, and the Soviet Union were first to give their assessments and conclusions on this question at the Vienna meeting, informing the participants of the measures taken in their respective countries to implement the Stockholm accords. The public and the meeting participants positively assess the actions of the Warsaw Pact countries with regard to the implementation of the accord. In the opinion of the majority of them this demonstrates the conscientious attitude of the socialist countries to the fulfillment of their obligations. The NATO countries have not as yet submitted such information on their military activities either during the course of the Vienna meeting or in their mass media.

Maybe this is due to the fact that the North Atlantic bloc is not engaging in military activity subject to notification? Nothing of the kind. Such activity is taking place

and, in the opinion of Western military specialists, no substantial changes in the thrust and intensiveness of the NATO Armed Forces' operational and combat training are expected in 1987. The NATO states have submitted to all the other all-European conference participants plans for notifiable military activity in 1987 that include 17 military exercises, including 2 major transfers of troops from the United States to Europe. True, 14 of the bloc countries' 17 military measures are scheduled for August-November; however, intensive troop training has been under way within NATO's Armed Forces since the start of this year.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written that at the beginning of January the United States held a major command staff exercise on FRG territory under the code name "Caravan Guard" employing troops of the 5th Army Corps. As has become known, 23,000 men took part in it. In terms of its parameters this exercise was subject to notification, and observers should have been invited to it, but on a formal pretext the U.S. command not only did not invite observers to this exercise but did not even inform anyone about it in advance.

Even today attention is drawn to the fact that a number of NATO countries are, to put it mildly, negligent in fulfilling their Stockholm commitments. In particular, the United States and Norway, citing technical reasons, were late in submitting annual plans for notifiable military activity, while Canada, Portugal, and Italy have not submitted to the other states either plans or announcements to the effect that they will not be carrying out notifiable military activity in 1987.

To be blunt, curious information was received in the preliminary notification about the joint British-Norwegian troop exercise "Cold Winter-87." Areas earmarked for individual stages of the exercises did not coincide with the general exercise area, and the coordinates of one of the troop-loading points were given incorrectly; and it turned out that troops taking part in the exercise were operating on the territory of neutral Sweden.

Such an attitude to the observance of the Stockholm document's commitments -- which as is well known are of a politically binding nature -- undermines the accords reached and intensifies mistrust on the part of other countries participating in the all-European process.

The Soviet Union's and the other Warsaw Pact states' understanding of the Stockholm accords is precisely this. Within a precisely established deadline and strictly in accordance with an agreed formula they have submitted such plans of notifiable military activity for 1987. All in all these include 25 different military exercises involving both ground and airborne forces, which are taking place in various areas of the Warsaw Pact countries, including within the limits of the European part of the USSR. It is planned to invite foreign observers to nine of these exercises.

The USSR has notified all Stockholm conference participants that in 1988 major ground force maneuvers will take place on Soviet territory in the region of Lvov, Donetsk, Orel, and Polotsk, involving more than 75,000 men and up to 2,000 tanks.

Since the beginning of this year socialist countries have given notification of 11 exercises, including 6 exercises on the territory of the RSFSR, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus republics. Foreign observers were invited to a number of these that took place on the territory of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR. Thus, for example, observers from 20 countries including 11 NATO countries were present at the combined force exercise of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the GDR National People's Army at the end of March. According to the observers' assessments,



all the necessary working conditions were created for them as stipulated by the Stockholm document. Over 4 days they had the opportunity to directly observe the course of the exercises, talk with the participants and convince themselves of the nonthreatening nature of this activity for countries contiguous with the GDR, and see troop-training actions in field conditions. "This exercise," said Brigadier General Mallory, the U.S. observer, in an interview for GDR radio, "has served to strengthen mutual trust not only in Europe by also throughout the world."

The USSR regards the execution of the Stockholm accords not as a short-term campaign but as a solid basis for the further development of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, one that creates the prerequisites for moving on in the very near future to the elaboration of entirely new confidence-building measures and measures to ensure military strategic stability in Europe, and to the reduction of armed forces and conventional and nuclear armaments in Europe.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### USSR: WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY DENIED

PM301037 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General F. Gontar, reserve, under the rubric "Facts Versus Lies": "Once Again About 'Imbalance...'" ]

[Text] It has become a bad tradition that whenever the Soviet Union puts forward new initiatives to strengthen international security, all kind of steps are taken in the West to thwart the achievement of accords. This also seems to be the case with the Soviet proposal to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe and, what is more, to conclude it without delay. Those opposed to ridding Europe of nuclear weapons are spreading anti-Soviet fabrications and putting forward "arguments" that are clearly false.

In this context the ballyhoo raised once again in the West around the alleged "imbalance" in the sphere of conventional arms is attracting attention. British Foreign Secretary G. Howe, for instance, is claiming that "the Soviet Union has two to three times more tanks, tactical aviation, and artillery than NATO." And if the "zero" option in respect to Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is implemented, he argues, "the problem of the disruption of the equilibrium in the sphere of conventional arms" will become "even more acute."

Incidentally, I must mention that G. Howe and other NATO country representatives are behaving as if they knew nothing about the proposal, put forward at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest in June 1986, to open talks without delay on mutual deep reductions of armed forces and conventional arms in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a result of the implementation of this proposal the Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces and tactical strike aviation would be cut by more than half a million men on each side in the early nineties. In order to prove what cannot be proved, NATO strategists are citing certain disproportions in the structure of the armed forces and individual types of conventional arms that exist on both sides. At the same time, military sector manpower resources and production capacities are deliberately not taken into account, and the French and Spanish Armed Forces are excluded, as are forces under national commands, reserve forces, and arms and military hardware reserves stored at depots.

In reality the actual situation is as follows: NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have approximately the same number of men under arms (NATO has 5.6 million men and the Warsaw Pact has 4.9 million men). This has been confirmed by P. Nitze, special adviser to the U.S. President and secretary of state on matters of arms control. Speaking in Congress he declared: "The number of servicemen in NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact is approximately the same." NATO countries (including France and Spain) have 94

combat-ready divisions and the Warsaw Pact has 78 combat-ready divisions. At the same time the numerical strength of combat-ready divisions in NATO countries varies between 16,000 and 23,000, while Warsaw Pact divisions comprise a maximum of between, NATO has a certain advantage. The North Atlantic bloc also has unquestionable superiority in terms of reserve components, since its total population considerably exceeds that of the Warsaw Pact states (620 million against 375 million). Neither is the NATO bloc lagging in specific types of arms.

Let us take tanks, for instance. The Warsaw Pact states have a few more, but NATO also has a considerable number. In counting their tanks, the NATO leaders only take into account tanks under the NATO Allied Command, Europe, (allegedly only 12,000-13,000) and conveniently "forget" the existence of around 6,000 tanks belonging to forces under national commands. [paragraph continues]

In addition some 4,500 U.S. tanks and almost 6,000 West German tanks stationed at depots in West European countries are not included in the count. Thus the total of tanks at NATO's disposal in Europe comprises some 30,000 units. As for antitank weapons including "third generation" antitank weapons with automated homing systems, NATO has a several-fold advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries.

Approximate parity exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the number of field artillery pieces. However, NATO has considerably more nuclear artillery pieces, for which the United States has stockpiled around 3,000 203.2 mm and 155 mm nuclear artillery shells in Europe, including rocket-assisted shells with a range of up to 30 km.

In the number of tactical aviation combat aircraft NATO has an advantage in fighter-bombers and ground-attack aircraft but has fewer interceptor-fighters.

NATO also has an advantage in the overall number of warships (2,175 against the Warsaw Pact's 1,872). And as for the number of naval combat aircraft and helicopters, NATO has an almost threefold advantage (3,173 against the Warsaw Pact's 1,126).

Thus the claims that, If Europe gave up its nuclear weapons, the West might fall victim to the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional arms are totally groundless. Essentially even U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz was forced to admit this. Shortly after the Reykjavik meeting he declared: "...When people claim that in a nuclear-free world we would be outnumbered in general-purpose forces, I simply do not believe it."

Why, you may ask, are fabrications about a "Soviet superiority" in conventional arms being spread within NATO and yet, 10 months after the Budapest initiative, a sensible answer has still not been received? The answer is obvious. NATO leaders do not like the military equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In order to disrupt this equilibrium they are escalating not just the nuclear but also the conventional arms race. They are aiming at the qualitative renewal of conventional arms, at the large-scale equipment of the armed forces with new, high-precision, and long-range weapon types and system, including weapons that resemble tactical nuclear weapons in terms of their destructive capacity. The United States and other NATO countries act as the instigators of the race in "conventional" arms based on new physical principles, and specifically laser weapons for close-range ground-based and air-based combat, accelerator (particle beam) weapons for troop and ship air defense, VHF radio weapons, and others. This unprecedented buildup of military potential is pursued by no means for defensive purposes.

So behind the NATO circles' talk about "imbalance" in conventional arms and armed forces there is a very dangerous plan -- namely preventing the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe and thwarting a relaxation of tension in this region and beyond.

## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### SOVIET DELEGATE VIEWS CSCE CONFERENCE PROGRESS

AU221246 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 17 Apr 87 p 6

["The Vienna Meeting -- Assessment After Two Stages"]

[Excerpts] The second stage of the Vienna meeting of the states participating in the European Conference for Security and Cooperation has ended. Tsocho Kumanov, the SOFIA PRESS correspondent in Vienna, carried out a poll specially for RABOTNICHESKO DELO of the leaders of the following delegations: Bulgaria, Ambassador Lyuben Petrov; the Soviet Union, Ambassador Yuriy Kashlev; France, Ambassador Pierre-Henri Renard; and Finland, Ambassador Marku Reyma [spelling of name as published]. They gave answers to these two questions:

1. How do you assess the forum's work so far?
2. What new elements are contained in the proposals relating to the military aspects of security?

Yuriy Kashlev (USSR):

1. We assess the fact that over 130 proposals have been submitted as a demonstration of the great interest in strengthening detente and cooperation in Europe, and in developing the Helsinki process. Naturally, this number of proposals makes the delegations' work more difficult, but it is better so than if there was a lack of proposals.

2. As you know, the socialist countries supported the idea of unofficial consultations with the NATO states in order to more speedily and effectively prepare fresh negotiations on reducing the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. As a whole, these consultations are proceeding in a businesslike atmosphere. However, one serious obstacle still exists: The NATO states assert that the Warsaw Pact possesses a superiority, and therefore they are insisting not on disarmament, but on removing this superiority. Negotiations can hardly be held on this basis. We reject such a position. Of course, we are prepared to examine the question of imbalance, when it exists, but only in the process of a substantial mutual reduction in armed forces and conventional arms.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### USSR: REPORTS ON END OF CD SPRING SESSION

#### Nazarkin Interviewed

LD301458 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 87

[Text] The spring session of the disarmament conference finished work in Geneva today. Our correspondent, Vladimir Dmitriyev, reports from the Swiss capital:

[Dmitriyev] The Soviet Union and other socialist countries came forward during the session with important initiatives, amongst them the proposal put forward at the bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks. These initiatives also have a direct relation to the conference, namely, to single out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of matters relating to disarmament and conclude a separate treaty on them. What are the main results of the current session? Here is Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation:

[Begin Nazarkin recording] The attention of participants at the session was naturally drawn first and foremost to such issues as banning nuclear tests, nuclear disarmament, and averting an arms race in outer space. On all these issues, our delegation, together with the delegations from fraternal socialist states and with the support of the nonaligned countries, moved toward beginning talks aimed at concluding international accords on these problems. Unfortunately, we have not managed to do this, primarily because of U.S. resistance.

Talks were conducted on another problem, that of banning chemical weapons. The recent statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in Prague, where he announced that the Soviet Union had ceased production of chemical weapons, had begun construction on a building for destroying chemical weapons, and did not have reserves beyond its national borders, had a great stimulating effect on the course of the talks. We intend to continue striving for a rapid conclusion of this convention, proceeding from the fact that it can and should be concluded this year. [end recording]

#### Progress 'Blocked' by West

LD291709 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1606 GMT 29 Apr 87

["First Part of the Session of the Disarmament Conference is Ending" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Geneva, 29 Apr (TASS) -- The first, spring part of the session of this year's disarmament conference ends tomorrow. Despite some optimistic hopes, the conference

has not managed to make progress to an extent that would accord with the aspirations of the world community. Owing to the position of the United States and several of its NATO partners, constructive discussion of questions of nuclear disarmament, the halting of nuclear weapons tests, and prevention of an arms race in space is being blocked, and a brake has been applied to the course of the talks on the banning of chemical weapons, where there are realistic prospects for success this year. The session will resume its work on 9 June.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

### BRIEFS

PACT WORKING GROUP MEETS 22 APRIL--The Warsaw Treaty working group of experts on issues of reducing the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe held a session in Budapest on 22-23 April. The experts considered progress in implementing the Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in the light of the discussion of these issues at the Vienna CSCE meeting, consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries in Vienna and bilateral contacts with NATO states, neutral and non-aligned European countries. Views were exchanged on how to speed up the beginning of talks on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 24 Apr 87 LD] /9274

SOVIET-NORWEGIAN CSCE CONSULTATIONS--Oslo, 22 Apr (TASS)--Two-day Soviet-Norwegian consultations on questions of the Vienna meeting of representatives of participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ended here today. The Soviet special representative, head of the department for questions of security and cooperation in Europe of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yuriy Deryabin met with representatives of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and also was received by the acting prime minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg. It was noted during these conversations that the proposals made by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague and at the meeting with the United States Secretary of State George Shultz in Moscow open the road to ending the nuclear arms race and lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 22 Apr 87 LD] /9274

FRENCH CSCE GROUP IN USSR--Moscow, 21 Apr (TASS)--Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, has received today the delegation of the French Left Radicals Movement led by Francois Doubin, chairman of the party. The French delegation is currently on a visit in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Views were exchanged on problems of nuclear disarmament and military detente in Europe. The attention of the French guests was drawn to the USSR's peace initiatives, which were put forward during Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet leadership's talks with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 21 Apr 87 LD] /9274

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